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ABSTRACT
THE BOUNDARIES OF THE PUBLIC: MEDIATING SEX IN POSTWAR LEBANON
Sara Mourad
Marwan M. Kraidy
This dissertation examines the mediation of non-normative genders and sexualities in
contemporary Lebanese public culture since the end of the civil war in 1990. Through a
critical analysis of television performances, literary texts, digital media productions, and
narrative films and interviews with cultural producers, I demonstrate how media
discourses on sexuality engender the public sphere through the construction and
contestation of ideal masculinity and femininity. The confessional television talk shows,
feminist films, and autobiographical digital and print queer publications collected here
are genres that unsettle distinctions between the private and the public, the personal and
the political. Through their circulation, these representations produce social discourses
that reveal the centrality of sex and gender in the articulation of individual, collective,
and national identities. They are public interfaces where the recognition and contestation
of social difference unfolds, but they are also cultural artifacts that record and document
the otherwise unspoken and invisible violence of normativity on dominated subjects. I
conclude that processes of mediation shape the visibility of non-normative subjectivities
and give cultural representations their social meaning, revealing what a repressed
discourse on sexuality – one I characterize as infrapolitical – can tell us about the
mechanics of power in society.
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INTRODUCTION
“The thing I remember as the hardest about my childhood, and I am sure about the
whole culture, the hardest to live with, was the fact that we had no life of our own, no
privacy, neither physical nor moral. People in the Arab world, and certainly
elsewhere in the Third World, are never really left alone, they live under the scrutiny
of everybody around.”
Etel Adnan, 1986, p.13
In an essay titled “Growing Up to be a Woman Writer in Lebanon,” LebaneseAmerican poet, novelist, and painter Etel Adnan remembers her childhood and
adolescence in Beirut of the 1930s and 1940s - when the country was under French
mandate - formative years in which she came to writing, which in turn opened the
door for her to travel to France to attend college there. An only child to a Syrian
Muslim father and a Greek Christian mother, Adnan’s solitude fuelled her creativity.
Watching French and American movies and writing, she recalls, provided an escape
from the constant and unflinching gaze of her overly protective mother, and a hiding
place from familial surveillance which embodied a “whole culture’s” scrutiny.
“Developing private thoughts was my first rebellion, my first emancipation,” she
writes (p. 13). In a context of pervasive social scrutiny, the ability to evade the social
gaze is critical for those who – like Adnan – break the mold of normative masculinity
and femininity. Adnan’s queerness manifested itself early on in her cross-gender
identification as a child: “Being dressed as a boy made me feel very happy” (p.9).
Recalling a pair of short black pantaloons and a white satin blouse sewn by her
mother, she notes that the outfit “must have reinforced my identity of being neither
just a girl, nor a boy, but a special being with the magical attributes of both” (p.9).
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Her sense of marginality, of being neither here nor there, was compounded by her
mixed religious background: “I got used to standing between situations, to being a bit
marginal and still a native, to getting acquainted with notions of truth which were
relative and changed like the hours of the days and the passing of seasons changed”
(p.11). As a young girl growing up in late thirties Lebanon, Adnan had few life
options ahead of her. “A little girl,” she writes, “was a daughter, a school girl, and a
future wife. She was never considered as an autonomous being whose life could turn
out to be something other than what was considered to be the social norm” (p.12). In
her autobiographical account, Adnan paints a picture of the norms that prescribed the
spaces she had access to, the roles she could play, and the aspirations she could have
for herself as a woman. These norms, as she explains, dictated conjugal
heterosexuality as the ultimate destiny of young women like herself, and manifested
themselves primarily through her mother’s paranoid policing of an undutiful daughter
whose path had deviated from all that was familiar. The daughter’s desire to become
an engineer and her later quest to get a university degree in literature were deemed to
be “immoral” demands on her part (p.16). And when she professed her disinterest in
getting married, she was accused of “preferring to be adventurous and irresponsible,”
and she was often made to understand that she was in danger of losing her mind
(p.18).
Adnan’s autobiographical account of her formation as a woman writer paints a
picture of the power and weight of normativity in outlining the horizon of possibility
for Arab men and women. But it also demonstrates the personal material, psychic,
and creative labor performed by those whose bodies, desires, and lifeworlds do not fit
2

prescribed social narratives of appropriate gender behavior. As such, her essay
provides a fitting point of entry into this dissertation, which takes, as its objects of
study, representations of non-normative gendered subjectivities and the social orders
they conjure as they enter into collective, public consciousness. “The Boundaries of
the Public: Mediating Sex in Postwar Lebanon” sketches the connections between
sex, media, and the public realm through an examination of cultural artifacts that, in
their circulation, trouble the distinction between “private” and “public” as separate
spheres of human action. By doing so, these artifacts – and the representations of sex
and gender they mediate – push the limits of the sayable in public and constitute
analytic sites to probe the fraught and shifting relationship between the “personal”
and the “political” in contemporary Lebanese society. By considering the gender and
sexual discourses that media representations put in motion, this dissertation probes
how the distinction between “private” and “public” is constructed and contested in
contemporary Lebanese public culture in order to understand the pivotal role of these
categories in the maintenance and interruption of a patriarchal and heterosexual
normative social order.
The dissertation positions visibility as a central category of analysis, looking
in particular at the appearance of non-normative genders and sexualities in a variety
of cultural productions and how such appearances push the boundaries of publicity.
By examining the relationship between visibility and publicity in televisual,
cinematic, digital, and print representations, I am particularly interested in identifying
what queer theorist José Esteban Munõz (1999) has referred to as “moments of
counterpublicity,” where non-heteronormative and anti-patriarchal discourses find
3

expression in the public sphere. In the following chapters, I examine the visibility of
the abnormal in the media to probe the shifting boundaries of the public realm.
Theoretically, I am interested in exploring visibility’s relationship to publicness, and
how this relationship is shaped and reshaped by media genres, platforms, and
technologies. In my dissertation, I consider media genres that trouble the distinction
between “private” and “public,” that make the personal available for public
recognition and contestation. These include voyeuristic television talk shows,
feminist films, and autobiographical digital and print publications (see tables below).
So I look at the media to understand normativity as a social force, considering how
media representations are instrumental for the collective imagination and contestation
of what is normal gender behavior. I tackle the following questions: How do we make
sense of the appearance of new discourses of gender and sexuality in Arab societies
today? What do socio-cultural battles over the status of women and sexual minorities
tell us about the boundaries of the public – about who and what can appear in public?
What role do media technologies play in reconfiguring those boundaries? And what
effects does such a reconfiguration have on people whose life narratives, experiences,
and bodies have been historically marginalized – if not wholly excluded – from
public imagination?
The new visibilities of women and sexual minorities in the Middle East and
the language of gender and sexual rights through which they circulate transnationally
have pushed postcolonial scholars to consider the political stakes of a discourse of
gender and sexual oppression in the region. Middle East scholars, working within the
epistemological framework set up by Edward Said’s Orientalism (1979), have
4

demonstrated how discourses of gender and sexual rights have been integral to the
elaboration of Euro-American imperial discourses which construct women and sexual
minorities as victims of their backward cultures. The construction of “women” and
“gays” as victims in need of emancipation and rescue in Western human rights
discourses, they argue, perpetuates Orientalist stereotypes and, in a post 9/11 global
geopolitical landscape, serves to justify military interventions. While this discourse of
salvation assumed a particular meaning in the context of the War on Terror, whereby
Muslim women needed to be saved from the grip of radical Islam, the Western
imperative to save women from their cultures can be traced back to the European
colonization of the Middle East and North Africa. In “Algeria Unveiled,” Franz
Fanon (1967) exposed how the French constructed the female veil donned by
Algerian women as a signifier of civilizational inferiority and an index of the
oppression of Muslim women. By staging public spectacles of unveiling, French
women sought to uplift their sisters from the shackles of tradition. For Fanon, the
French obsession with the veil had nothing to do with women’s emancipation and
was symptomatic of a deep-seated racism towards the colonized indigenous
populations who refused to be subjugated. The veil, as he shows, signified Algeria’s
resistance to colonialism and the Muslim woman – who can see without being seen –
embodies the subversion colonial relations of domination by refusing to be the willing
object of the colonizer’s gaze. In her influential essay, “Do Muslim Women Need
Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and its Others,” penned
in the wake of the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod
(2002) probes the persistent, now American, fascination with the figure of the
5

oppressed Muslim woman. This fascination, evident in the extensive media coverage
of the plight of “our sisters of cover” – to borrow George W. Bush’s formulation – is
symptomatic of the centrality of liberal “rights” discourses in the perpetuation of
American hegemony on a global scale. This is the logic that justifies the invasion of
Afghanistan under the pretext of liberating its women. Whether it is the War on
Terror in Afghanistan or the War of Independence in Algeria, the narrative of
salvation has largely depended on the invisibility of women’s bodies in its
construction of Muslim women as hapless victims in need of emancipation through
bodily exposure. The popularity of a discourse of gender and sexual liberation that
subtends imperial and neo-imperial politics therefore hinges on the continued
equation of the veil with opacity and invisibility, and of unveiling with an
emancipatory politics of gender equality. The ocular logics that structure the
discourse around Muslim women’s liberation acquires a new meaning in
contemporary Euro-American societies, now dealing with the Muslim woman not as a
stranger in foreign lands but as a citizen and subject of the postcolonial, liberal state.
As Joan Scott (2009) has shown in The Politics of the Veil, controversies around the
passing of legislation banning the wearing of headscarves in public institutions was
symptomatic of France’s racist colonial history and its inability to deal with the
changing fabric of society. The prohibition of the veil, as she demonstrates, is a
protection against “the disturbing difference of Islam, an Islam whose difference is
cast in terms of a difference of sexual practice” (p.121). In “Re-Orienting Desire: The
Gay International and the Arab World,” Joseph Massad (2002) transposes the
argument around the centrality of sexual difference as a marker of civilizational
6

difference from women and onto gay subjects. He coins the now widely-used term,
the “Gay International,” to refer to Western LGBT organizations that universalize a
discourse of gay rights, creating new gay subjects that they then purport to save. In
the era of the War on Terror, such discourses of women and gay human rights provide
the moral pretext for military intervention abroad, but also a political opportunity to
enlist gays in patriotic discourses, facilitating their assimilation into mainstream
society, what Jasbir Puar (2007) has called homonationalism. These discourses, as
many of these scholars have pointed out, are constitutive of imagined civilizational
differences between “East” and “West,” “Islam and modernity.” However, the
exposure of the hypocrisy of Western discourses of human rights should not be the
end of critique. In the multiplicity of discourses circulating in contemporary Arab
societies, women and sexual minorities appear in a far greater number of guises than
just that of the victims of culture. The dichotomies of tradition and modernity, East
and West—even if they are deployed in critique—are therefore insufficient to
understand these new visibilities.
While this body of literature has shown how the status of women and sexual
minorities operates as a cross-cultural marker of civilizational difference which serves
to buttress the fictions of “East” and “West” as separate and contained geographies, I
am interested in examining how discourses of gender and sexuality both cement and
trouble the imagined separation between private and public, and to what effect. My
work accounts for discursive shifts through an examination of the relationship
between public and private, or more precisely, by taking into account how
transnational cultural flows reconfigure the boundaries between private and public. It
7

is my contention that to understand the postcolonial condition, one must have an in
situ understanding of the immanent political operations of the locations in question.
In the following chapters, I consider the social undercurrents and transnational
cultural flows that are reconfiguring the relationship between the “personal” and the
“political” – the “private” and the “public,” to understand, in more concrete terms, the
emergence of new discourses and social formations that imagine subjectivity beyond
heteronormativity. These include new media technologies, the transnational
circulation of information, and the multiplication of mediated forms in which such
information is communicated that have implications for our understanding of subjectformation and cultural production in a postcolonial world. In this regard, a media
studies approach can fill some of the analytical oversights that have allowed for the
theorization of the social visibility of non-normative subjects as necessarily
symptomatic of an overdrawn process of Westernization. Such an approach allows us
to account for transformations in communication and media technologies that carried
implications for the performance of identity, practices of resistance, and the
authorship and flows of cultural production; in other words, transformations in
regimes of social visibility. I am less interested in analyzing stereotypical visibilities
of Middle Eastern women and sexual minorities and their circulation transnationally,
and more invested in understanding how conditions of visibility are transformed,
locally, particularly when it comes to the sensitive subject of sexuality. Thus, my
methodological aim – elaborated in the “Method” section – is to shift from a
diagnostic approach that employs a paranoid mode of reading to expose the imperial
ideological underpinnings of discourses of gender and sexual rights, to a thick
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description of the mode of communication through which these discourses circulate
in public. Local cultural productions where such discourses take shape display the
forbidden through fugitive gestures of disguise, masquerade, and anonymity,
metaphorical language, and humor, demanding that we adjust our understanding of
visibility as a spectrum rather than a binary. I characterize these communicative
tactics as “infrapolitical,” borrowing political scientist James Scott’s (1990) term, to
show the “dialectic of disguise and surveillance” (p.4) – which pervades relations of
racial, class, and gender domination – can help us identify ephemeral and fleeting
forms of resistance and account for the crises of hegemony over the definition and
regulation of the boundaries of public life.
The dissertation considers gender and sexuality in social rather than individual
terms – as sites of collective identification, countercultural production, and antinormative politics. In this regard, it takes Gayle Rubin’s provocation, in her 1984
essay “Thinking Sex: Towards a Radical Theory of Sexuality,” penned in the ferment
of the U.S feminist sex wars, to explore “the political dimensions of erotic life.” In
her pathbreaking essay, largely credited with establishing the field of sexuality
studies, Rubin called for the elaboration of new theoretical tools and optics that would
allow us to consider what she called “the fallacy of misplaced scale” that burdened
non-normative sexual practices with the weight of other social anxieties. Rubin
proclaimed, in the essay’s memorable opening line, “the time has come to think about
sex.” Beyond the productive tension it provoked around thinking sex separately from
gender, Rubin’s exhortation was also about moving the discussion of sexual politics
“beyond single issues and single constituencies, from women and lesbians and gay
9

men to analyses that could incorporate and address with more intricacy the crossidentifications and multiple subject positions that most of us occupy” (2010, p.40).
This led her to identify, in a 2010 essay reflecting on the original reception of
“Thinking Sex,” a certain “protoqueerness” to the text: the way it conceptualized the
“outer limits” of acceptable sexuality not in terms of fixed identities, but as marginal
positions vis-à-vis a conjugal, heterosexual norm. By enumerating and grouping
different erotic practices under the signs of “good sex” and “bad sex,” Rubin offered
a new taxonomical model to think sex beyond the homo/hetero binary. Rather than
assume the referents of the non-normative and investigate subject positions like “gay”
or “lesbian,” the dissertation is similarly interested in probing the contours of that
category in its specific Lebanese context. Therefore, while “non-normative”
encompasses gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender, it is not limited to them. It is the
norm, rather than any pre-determined identity, that orients the analytic gaze of the
dissertation. This has allowed the inclusion of practices like extramarital female
sexuality, for instance, under the rubric of the “non-normative.”
The Public in the Media
In an episode of “Mouthi’ al-Arab” (Arab Anchorman, June 5, 2015), a
television competition show for young Arab talents seeking careers in television, one
of the contestants interviewed a Lebanese woman about her experience as a victim of
domestic abuse.1 In her televised testimony, on pan-Arab satellite channel Abu Dhabi
1

Abu Dhabi TV is based in the United Arab Emirates. Khalife’s intervention can be
accessed here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dXczICYnl_8&list=PLQAKNM4bsxIIdpNlt5uE
871LsOqDZn-cE
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TV, the woman described her husband’s violence and the trauma it caused her son
who had witnessed it. Lebanese television anchor Tony Khalife, one of the three
judges evaluating the contestants’ performances on the show, seized the opportunity
to stage a response to women’s rights organizations that had accused him of
promoting sexism and misogyny on his television show:
I categorically refuse our constant portrayal as a masculinist society, as if we
are Arab people that have nothing but beating the woman, humiliating the
woman, and offending the woman. Woman is our mother, our sister, and our
daughter. What I object to in this issue is the exploitation of woman’s plight and this is addressed to civil society organizations – for the purpose of
building commercial organizations that take advantage of a woman’s suffering
by raising foreign funds, making tons of money off of each film they produce
that shows a woman’s suffering [Audience Cheers and Applause]. Madam,
your son’s humiliation and trauma is for him to hear you talk today before
millions of viewers, and not from your abuse by your husband in front of him
[He stands up]. When your son today hears you speak out in front of millions
about how his father used to beat you in front of him, this is humiliation for
him, not when his father hit you in his presence [Audience Cheers and
Applause]
This segment lays bare the symbolic power of shame in inscribing the limits of public
discourse. As Khalife’s intervention makes clear, talk about domestic abuse is a
source of shame for the family. Along with the advocacy work of women’s rights
organizations lobbying for the criminalization of domestic violence in Lebanon, the
victim is accused by the prominent television anchor of tarnishing the image of Arab
societies by turning women’s private suffering into public spectacle.
By shaming mediated self-disclosure rather than domestic abuse, Khalife
normalizes gendered violence by scandalizing its representation in public, conjuring a
private realm where knowledge about such violence must be guarded in the name of
family honor. Normalization, or the labor of “the eternalization of the arbitrary” (p.2)
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as Bourdieu (2001) put it, is achievable in part through an imposition of silence on
those who deviate from socially-prescribed norms of behavior. When it comes to
gender, the virtues of privacy are often invoked by social conservatives to proscribe
the erasure of critiques of patriarchy and masculine domination from the public
realm. Alternative life narratives, desires, and intimacies are thus condemned to
invisibility. Ironically, Khalife, has made a career out of publicizing intimate matters.
He rose to fame hosting television shows that promised to put the private life of Arab
singers and movie stars on display. He also introduced a new genre of investigative
television through his show “Lil Nasher” (For Publication), which secured high
viewer ratings through a sensationalist display of marginal and abnormal social
behaviors and situations.2 Khalife, in fact, has been a forerunner in creating media
genres that put private life on display. While his shows thrived on blurring the
boundaries of private and public life, Khalife became vocally critical of the growing
media visibility of domestic violence against women. In 2007, Kafa (Enough), a
“feminist, secular, Lebanese" civil society organization “seeking to create a society
that is free of social, economic and legal patriarchal structures that discriminate
against women” (About, 2015), proposed a project for a law to protect women against
family violence. The project brought together 64 non-governmental organizations that
submitted a draft law to Parliament in 2009.3

“Lil Nasher” inspired similar shows on other stations such as Joe Maalouf’s “Inta Horr” (You Are
Free) on Murr Television (MTV).
3 For more on the new Domestic Violence Law, see Human Rights Watch (April 3, 2014).
“Domestic violence law good, but incomplete.”
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/03/lebanon-domestic-violence-law-good-incomplete;
Massena, F. (December 31, 2014). “Lebanese women not safe despite domestic violence law.” AlMonitor. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/12/lebanon-law-domesticviolence-women.html
2
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For Khalife, organizations like Kafa exploited abused women for commercial
profit by forcing them to file complaints against abusive husbands. This infringement
on family privacy by a women’s rights discourse, he notes, was about money, not
politics. Privacy, in this regard, consecrates a familial domain that must be shielded
from invasive public scrutiny. But privacy is also, as the quote in the epigraph by
Lebanese-American novelist, poet, painter, and writer Etel Adnan (1986) shows,
freedom from public scrutiny and the social and psychic constraints it engenders. It is
a necessary space for self-actualization beyond the moral and physical restrictions of
the dominant order enforced by social institutions like the family. Articulated as
such, privacy is “the right for each individual to decide the extent to which ‘his
thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others’” (Thompson,
2011, p.60). 4 Together, the woman’s testimony on domestic abuse and Khalife’s
condemnation of women’s rights organizations reveal the leakage of the “private”
into the public realm and the moral crises it engenders. While the increased social
visibility of domestic violence as a result of civil society campaigns and legal
advocacy work constitutes a prominent example of the politicization of gender in
postwar Lebanon, it must be understood within the context of a changing media
landscape where all sorts of boundaries – between the national and the transnational,
the local and the global, the private and the public – have been reconfigured.
This dissertation examines the mediation of non-normative genders and

For the marginalized and oppressed, “the point is not to preserve their privacy but rather to
strengthen the public as a site open to interconnections and contestations” (Brighenti, 2010,
p.119).
4
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sexualities in contemporary Lebanese public culture since the end of the civil war in
1990. It reveals the intimate dimensions of postwar citizenship through a focus on the
expression and representation of stigmatized queer and female sexualities in public.
Through a critical/cultural analysis of television performances, literary texts, digital
media productions, and narrative films, I demonstrate how bodies, desires, and
intimacies that have been historically excluded from the public realm have been rearticulated through new discourses on gender. The confessional television talk shows,
feminist films, and autobiographical digital and print queer publications under study
are genres that unsettle distinctions between the private and the public, the personal
and the political. They are public interfaces where the recognition and contestation of
social difference unfolds. But they are also cultural artifacts that record and document
the otherwise unspoken and invisible violence of normativity on dominated subjects.
By tracing the processes of cultural production, representation, and circulation by
which gender and sexual difference is made to signify as a matter of shared and
public concern in a variety of cultural genres, the dissertation shows the psychic and
social effects of familial and social scrutiny on those who deviate from norms of
gender and sexual behavior.
The confessional talk show, feminist film, and queer autobiographical writing
examined in each chapter are genres that formally and thematically challenge the
public/private binary by making the violence it conceals visible. They reveal the
structuring force of normativity in everyday life, depicting its operation in intimate,
familial, and public spaces. As public interfaces, the televisual, filmic, and digital
media under consideration reflect how dominant gender ideologies and the
14

hierarchies subtending them shape practices of representation, but they also make the
experiences of the marginalized and dominated visible in the public domain. As a
“regime of visibility,” the public domain exists “at the point of convergence and in
the zone of indistinction between material and immaterial processes, whereby an
immaterial meaning is created through acts of material inscription and projection”
(Brighenti, 2010, p.110).

Collectively, these media texts illustrate how material

processes of media production are central for the politicization of gender. By
inscribing and projecting gender as an alienating social identity, one that is
structurally determined by the hierarchies of patriarchy, they demystify masculine
domination as an “extraordinarily ordinary social relation” (Bourdieu, 2001, p.2). If
politicization is the introduction of power where it was assumed not to exist before,
these media artifacts – through the representations they put forth but also the
collective practices of reading and interpretation they give rise to – introduce power
to a putatively private sphere of human action: to familial ties, conjugal relationships,
and sexuality. In so doing, they participate in the creation of shared social meaning
around the personal as a site of regulation, pleasure, and suffering. Media are
symbolic objects for collective imagination and contention of gender, as a
relationship of power and a site of collective identification.
The following is not a study of media production or media reception, nor does
it strictly adopt an interpretive approach to media as texts. Rather, it is an attempt to
describe television, film, and writing as surfaces of mediation where our being with
others increasingly takes shape and where, as Nick Couldry (2002) has argued,
private experience is shared and “looped through” zones of public disclosure (p.116).
15

The best way to describe my objects is as zones of disclosure, which in their
contraction and expansion, tell us something about the limits of public discourse, and
the effects of those limits on the reproduction of gender as a relation of domination.
Media, in this regard, enable and animate the collective symbolic production of
gender in discourse, and the creation of its cultural and political meanings. An
analysis of media as zones incorporates the social in its analytic pull. It is only by
thinking of media as zones for the mediation of gender that we can understand the
confessional and ethnographic drive of television talk shows, the feminine/feminist
authorship of Nadine Labaki, and the “civic narcissism” (Papacharissi, 2002) of
feminist queer publications. As “public feelings genres,” to borrow Ann Cvetkovich’s
term (2002), television talk shows, Labaki’s films, and the autobiographical writings
of feminist queer collective Meem, revolve around the avowal, before an audience, of
personal experiences of shame and social alienation borne from the failure and/or
refusal to re-enact norms of masculinity and femininity. As such, they are part of “a
whole public environment of therapeutic genres dedicated to witnessing the constant
failure of heterosexual ideologies and institutions (Berlant & Warner, 1998, p.556). In
many countries, queer theorists Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner (1998) explain,
people testify to their failure to sustain or be sustained by institutions of privacy, such
as the heterosexual marriage or the nuclear family, in different media forms such as
the talk show. In the genres under examination, speaking out about gender-based
violence and injustice as well as the difficulties of inhabiting alternative ways of
living and being acquires a therapeutic value, providing space for emotional catharsis,
feedback, and reflection. But in the zones of disclosure they constitute, these genres
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also interrupt and complicate dominant social narratives about manhood and
womanhood, masculinity and femininity, publicness and privacy. As cultural
productions, television shows, films, books, and electronic magazines make the
stigma and shame of non-normative sexual attachments and gender roles available for
public recognition and contestation. They inscribe and project non-normative bodies,
desires, and agencies and thus determine their visibility in contemporary Lebanese
public culture.
What makes culture public? The dissertation is also an inquiry into the
relationship between the two parts of the term “public culture,” keeping as open as
possible the definition of what constitutes publicness “in order to remain alert to
forms of affective life that have not solidified into institutions, organizations, or
identities” (Cvetkovich, 2003, p.9). For John P. Thompson (2011), the public “has
been reconstituted as a sphere of information and symbolic content that are detached
from physical locales” (p.55). Thus, media are integral for the understanding of the
modern public sphere, but also of the constitution of publics and counterpublics. As
Paolo Carpignano (1999) has argued, because the public sphere is inherently
mediated, it is necessary to scrutinize how this media space is materially,
technologically, and socially shaped. I examine mediation as the process through
which culture accrues social meaning. Mediation makes culture public, I argue,
inasmuch as it involves something more than the transmission of information,
encompassing as it is communicative processes that reproduce, contest, and transform
social meaning. It is the total sum of practices of production and consumption of
symbolic inscriptions, and their circulation in time and space. With its practices of
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collective reading, criticism, and pleasure, media, Arjun Appadurai (1996) has noted,
provides the condition for the emergence of what he calls a “community of
sentiment,” a group that “begins to imagine and feel things together” (p.8). Thus, I am
interested in media less as institutions and more as shared symbolic spaces where and
around which we think and feel collectively. Media provides the common cultural
material through which we establish our sense of self and sociality.
As a social interface, media is at the epicenter of public life. By altering the
nature and modes of social interaction, media technologies transform the meaning of
being in public, giving rise to what Thompson identifies as forms of “mediated
publicness” (2011). What we think of as the public sphere today, he argues, has
become “a complex space of information flows where ‘being public’ means ‘being
visible’ in this space, being capable of being seen and heard by others” (p.63). New
forms of mediated visibility, Thompson contends, are shaped by distinctive properties
of communication media such as camera angles, editing processes, and organizational
interests, but also by the new types of interaction that these media enable (p.57). The
transformations brought forth set the stage for the flourishing of a “new kind of
intimacy in the public sphere” through “intimate forms of self-presentation”
(Thompson, 2011, p.57-58). These are instances of what Nick Couldry (2003)
identifies as “media rituals,” where non-media people perform for the media, for
example by revealing intimate truths before unknown millions on TV shows. In such
performances, Couldry explains, the media themselves "'stand in’ for something
wider, something to do with the fundamental organisational level on which we are, or
imagine ourselves to be, connected as members of a society" (p.3). The media, in
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other words, stand in for the public.
In his analysis of everyday media practices, Couldry (2003) draws on
Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic power to argue that such practices preserve the
dominant symbolic order by reproducing “the myth of the mediated center,” that is
the need and desire to go to and be in the media. Couldry is not interested in the
details of what individuals disclose through mediated interactions but rather in the
formal elements that give them shape. As he explains, “too close a focus on the
content of individual disclosures risks missing the most puzzling aspect of this whole
landscape: its links to the ritually reinforced notion that the media provide a ‘central’
space where it makes sense to disclose publicly aspects of one’s life that one might
not otherwise disclose to anyone” (p.116). This “mediated intimacy,” as Thompson
(2011) describes it, can be perceived in cultural genres like the talk show or the
personal blog, where information about the self is voluntarily shared with unknown
others. While they recognize such mediated intimacies as a common feature of the
media landscape, both Thompson and Couldry stop short from elaborating the
political consequences that such disclosures may carry in their interpellation of new
publics and counterpublics into being.
While the media reconstituted the public realm by transforming the conditions
and relations of visibility, it has also, crucially, reconfigured the communicative and
associative processes through which publics and counterpublics come into being, and
without which politics would be unimaginable. A public, according to John Dewey
(1927), “consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of
transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences
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systematically cared for” (p.16). Publics, in this conceptualization, emerge around
shared problems and grievances and constitute a necessary feature of democratic
political life. If we follow Dewey’s definition, all publics are counterpublics to the
extent that they emerge against conditions deemed injurious to a group of individuals.
Andrea Brighenti (2010) describes counterpublics as “arenas of communication” that
correspond more specifically “to communitarian, subcultural or oppositional
minorities who importantly intervene in the mainstream, fostering change within, and
sometimes even dissolving into it” (p.116). Defined as such, counterpublics can only
be thought in terms of their relationship to the mainstream, marked as it is by the
“counter-” prefix. In the mediatized world we inhabit, any account of counterpublics
that does not engage with the media practices that give it shape and form and
constitute the possibility of its existence is lacking. The significance of mediated
representations, performances, and practices lies in making gender domination and
the social norms upholding it visible, and therefore public. They are political insofar
as they create what queer performance scholar Jose Esteban Muñoz (1999) has
identified as “counterpublic moments.”
In Disidentifications: Queers of Color and the Performance of Politics,
Muñoz recalls an episode of the reality television show “The Real World” where
Pedro Zamora, a gay and HIV-positive Cuban-American participant, “talked openly”
and in a distinctly Cuban Spanish about homosexuality and AIDS with his father.
Muñoz (1999) recognizes his own interpellation as a queer subject by the televisual
performance of Zamora: “I was struck because this was something new; it was a new
formation, a being for others. I imagined other living rooms within the range of this
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broadcast and I thought about the queer children who might be watching this program
at home with their parents” (p.160, emphasis added). For Muñoz, such spectacles –
occurring as they are on the wide-scale of television – provide “instances” or
“moments” of counterpublicity which are momentary, fleeting, and subtle. This is
when the mass public “glimpses” different lifeworlds than the one endorsed by
dominant ideology. What started out as a “tokenized representation” in a reality show
on a major network became “something larger, more spacious – a mirror that served
as a prop for subjects to imagine and rehearse identity” (p.154). Media represents a
counterpublic to itself, as when queer activists recognize themselves in the writings of
their friends and lovers. These “counterpublic moments” offer a compelling
counterpoint to what communication scholars Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz (1991)
call “media events.” In their theorization of these "high holidays of mass
communication" (p.5), they argue that television enlists a renewed loyalty to society
through a simultaneous, pre-planned, and collective watching of rituals of conquest,
contest, and coronation. If, as Dayan (2001) argues, these televised rituals enable an
experience of "watching with" (p.743), the mundane televisual spectacles, such as the
one described by Muñoz, enable a different kind of “watching against” where loyalty
and belonging are not renewed but rather challenged and interrupted.
In the following chapters, I explore cultural productions as repositories of
personal experiences, “of feelings and emotions, which are encoded not only in the
content of the texts themselves but in the practices that surround their production and
reception” (Cvetkovich, 2002, p.7). The unspeakability of lesbian desire in Nadine
Labaki’s Caramel for instance, examined in chapter 2, can be captured both at the
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level of its filmic representation, but also through the filmmaker’s account of her
practice of pre-emptive self-censorship – a habit she acquired as a woman – which
informs our understanding of the social visibility of female sexuality and
homosexuality and the difficulties of their representation. As cultural artifacts, these
productions record and document the otherwise unspoken and invisible violence of
normativity on dominated subjects. My aim is not to catalogue local representations
of non-conforming genders and sexualities. Rather, I offer a multi-layered analysis of
mediation through a close reading of selected texts, which incorporates the meanings
attributed to them by their authors and creators as well as the ones that emerge in their
circulation. By combining textual and visual analysis of films, talk shows, and print
and electronic publications with in-depth interviews with their producers, I trace the
practices of encoding, production, and reception that Cvetkovich (2003) gestures,
examining normativity through a study of its mediation.
In his best-selling book Society’s Witness, Zaven Kouyoumdjian (2012), host
of the longest-running talk show on Arab television “Sireh Winfatahet” (Open
Conversation), claims that his talk show contributed in setting in motion a "culture of
revelation and confession” among a young generation of viewers that had become
more comfortable with and willing to talk about their bodies and their psychological
problems because “they had seen on TV people who are like them, talking about what
they hadn’t dared talk about” (p.11). Open Conversation, along with the two other
talk shows I examine in chapter 1 – El-Shater Yehki” (Let the Brave Speak out) and
“Ahmar bil Khatt el-Arid” (Bold Red Line) – invite ordinary people to participate on
the show by sharing intimate stories with millions of viewers. Episodes on sexual
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deviance and gender non-conformity – such as prostitution, homosexuality, and
cohabitation – drive higher viewer ratings and are therefore attractive and lucrative
for producers. During these episodes, participants provide first-person accounts of
their non-normative desires, attachments, and identifications which are then discussed
among experts – Muslim sheikhs, Christian priests, psychiatrists, and lawyers are
usual guests. Public opinion on the topic under discussion is often presented in prerecorded segments where ordinary citizens are polled on the street. In a televized
spectacle that claims to capture “social reality” (al-Waqe’ al-Ijtima’i), television talk
shows interpellate viewers as citizens who must be sensitized about society’s issues
and problems such as sexual and gender diversity and deviance. In scenes of
democratic deliberation among experts and ordinary people, the latter often speak
through their identities “as Muslims” and “Christians,” reinscribing religious sect as
the point of access to and expression of citizenship in public.
In her two award-winning feature-length films, Lebanese filmmaker Nadine
Labaki works with an all-female ensemble cast to portray the social status of women
in contemporary Lebanon. In her distinct but converging treatments of the condition
and role of femininity and its relationship to womanhood, Labaki positions herself at
the center of her productions, writing, directing, and starring in her own films.
Chapter 2 considers her work, and its transnational circulation, through the lens of her
authorship as a critically-acclaimed and globally-recognized Lebanese and Arab
female filmmaker. By mobilizing the notion of the feminine author – as developed in
feminist film scholarship – I examine how Labaki’s persona and her public careers,
first as a director of popular Arab music videos then as a filmmaker, mediate the
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reception of her work. Labaki’s identity as a Lebanese, Arab, and Middle Eastern
woman on the international film festival circuit, her self-professed ability to speak a
“universal language” through masterful depictions of intimate locality is not
incidental to the commercial success of her films.

While her persona inspires

questions on the relationship between gender, representation, and cultural production
in the Arab world today, the themes and aesthetics of her films capture the tensions
between East and West and modernity and tradition around which the “woman
question” in the Arab Middle East has come to be defined.
In the cultural production of the Beirut-based feminist queer collective Meem,
discussed in chapter 3, personal trauma is transformed into shared experience, repurposed for collective identification and struggle against the intersecting forces of
masculine domination and compulsory heterosexuality. Through autobiographical
writing in Bekhsoos (Concerning, 2008-2012), an electronic magazine, and Bareed
Mista3jil (Express Mail, 2009) a print anthology of short stories, members of Meem
documented and registered queer existence, making it accessible for others seeking
information and support. Thus, these publications perform what Laurent Berlant and
Michael Warner (1998) have described as the “entextualization” of queer as culture.
While they constitute a public archive of/for this feminist queer community, the
collective labor that went into their production – from writing, to interviews, to
editing, to design, to publication – was elemental for the formation and development
of the community they sought to describe and document. The discursive production
of queer and LGBT publics in the Global South is not, as regarded by some
postcolonial scholars, evidence of an incitement to discourse by Western gay rights
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organizations, famously dubbed by Joseph Massad (2002) as the “Gay International.”
As my analysis of Meem’s publications demonstrates, the constitution of a queer
counterpublic is deeply embedded in local politics of identity and difference and
intimately connected to other movements for social justice. Queer counterpublics
emerge through the production and circulation of alternative discourses that counter
the dominant cultural narrative of “sexual deviance” (shoudhoudh jinsi), which
pathologizes and demonizes non-normative bodies and desires.
In the remainder of this introduction, I situate these cultural productions in
their local and transnational contexts, namely in the postwar and the postcolonial.
While the civil war, which lasted from 1975 until 1990, may not be immediately
present, its history structures the contemporary cultural and political fields and the
discourses of identitarian difference animating them. The war may not be directly
represented, but it nevertheless appears and reappears in the entanglement of sex and
sect across the texts under consideration. Thus, I situate the following cultural
representations in their postwar context, where the “post” functions as a spaceclearing gesture to make room for new identities, new politics, and new forms of
cultural expression that emerge in the aftermath of a civil conflict and are thus
conditioned by its legacy. The “post” is not intended to mark a historical rupture;
rather, it is to establish the continuity of war through the structures it put in place,
ones that endure long after the fighting has stopped. I then locate my intervention visà-vis a body of postcolonial literature on gender in the Arab Middle East, proposing a
move beyond religion to examine sexuality as a gendered practice. Finally, I mobilize
James Scott’s notion of the “infrapolitical” to understand how sex has been rendered
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in public. There, I consider non-normativity as a thwarting and twisting of norms,
rather than their manifest rejection, in the everyday negotiations of the boundaries of
public and private life.
Identity and Difference in Postwar Society
An analysis of media discourses about bodies that err from their assigned roles
and appearances opens up the question of social difference writ large and the political
registers through which it circulates. Importantly, the cultural texts examined here
deal with the question of identity and difference in the aftermath of a fifteen-year civil
conflict. Taking the legacy of the civil war as background and context, I explore
what new discourses on gender and sexual non-conformity tell us about the postwar
public - as a site of contention and a space of coexistence and a collective meaningmaking. Originally pitting Leftist and Palestinian factions against the ruling Lebanese
Christian right, the war devolved into a fifteen-year long protracted sectarian conflict
that officially ended with the signature of the Taif Agreement (also known as the
National Reconciliation Accord) by members of the Lebanese Parliament in Saudi
Arabia in 1989. The Accord institutionalized Syrian hegemony over Lebanon,
formalizing the continued presence of Syrian troops – which had entered the country
in 1976 and participated in the war – on Lebanese territory. The country was
propelled soon thereafter into the Reconstruction era where the horrors of the war
were never explicitly addressed. In 1991, Parliament passed a general amnesty law
that pardoned all crimes committed before its enactment. The ongoing absence of the
civil war from school history curricula and the still unknown fate of the 17,000
kidnapped and disappeared are visible signs of the country’s failure to collectively
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confront and publicly memorialize its immediate history of civil violence.
This official policy of silence around the war, its causes, effects, victims, and
culprits was justified through a rhetoric of common living (al-‘aych al-muchtarak)
that came to dominate postwar politics. Christians and Muslims, Sunnis, Shias, and
Druze, were to live in common, in harmony, in the name of national unity. While the
monolithic categories “Muslim” and “Christian” flatten and obfuscate the diversity
and complexity of religious identification or its lack thereof, they are widely used to
describe Lebanon’s incendiary religious diversity. The Taif Accord, and the ideology
of “common living” it institutionalized, defined social cleavage along exclusively
sectarian lines. Sect was reified by the state as the primary social and political identity
through which subjects are interpellated as citizens. Parliamentary representation is
based on a confessional distribution of seats whereby each religious community has
an allotted number of deputies proportional to its size, with equal representation for
Muslims and Christians, each granted 64 parliamentary seats out of a total of 128.
Political leaders demand and secure their constituencies’ allegiance in the name of
adequate sectarian representation. The right to be properly represented, as a sect, thus
came to define postwar political life, resulting in the public erasure of other lines of
social stratification and axes of difference.
According to a 2015 report by the World Bank, the confessional system has
incurred significant economic losses for the country as the ruling elites
instrumentalize sectarianism as a cover for their accumulation of wealth. The report
concluded that the roots of state failure in promoting comprehensive development and
creating job opportunities lie in confessional governance: “Lebanon’s political
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development since independence has been influenced primarily by its evolving
confessional system. However, this system, originally established to balance the
competing interests of local religious communities, is increasingly seen as an
impediment to more effective governance as it has resulted in a paralysis in decisionmaking and a general hollowing out of the state” (World Bank, June 15, 2015, xi).
This has also lead to a hollowing out of public life, whereby citizens are interpellated
as sectarian subjects, mobilized around their political representation as religious
communities, not around shared socio-economic grievances that cut across sect. In a
socio-political context defined by sectarian difference and haunted by its recent
bloody legacy, how may we recalibrate our vision of shared social and political space,
of common living, to questions of gender? How, in other words, are gender-based
grievances unmuted in a national public sphere overdetermined by sectarian politics?
Violence against women and sexual minorities, for instance, is accorded secondary
status along with class and race-based inequities.5

5

Migrant domestic workers in Lebanon, which number around 250,000 and the
majority of whom are women from Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, the Philippines, and Nepal,
are excluded from the protection of the Lebanese labor code. In December 2014 a
request was submitted to the Ministry of Labor to form a union for domestic workers.
In January 2015, without receiving a response from the Ministry, around 300 workers
participated in the inaugural congress of the union which was denounced by the
Minister of Labor as illegal. Among the union’s primary aims is the abolishment of
the Kafala sponsorship system which offers no protection or safety net for the
migrant worker while giving all the power, and tying her right to stay in the country,
to the employer. Domestic workers thus suffer from lack of labor protection, racist
and sexist abuse by their employers, and are denied freedom of association and
collective bargaining. The most common complaints documented by the embassies of
labor-sending countries and non-governmental groups include mistreatment by
recruiters, non-payment or delayed payment of wages, forced confinement to the
workplace, a refusal to provide any time off, forced labor, and verbal and physical
abuse. A 2010 report by Human Rights Watch highlighted Lebanon’s poor record of
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In the past decade, Lebanon witnessed the emergence of civil society
organizations and initiatives that sought to bring gender and sexual-based injustice
and inequality into public attention through a non-sectarian political framework.
Membership in them was not organized around sect, nor were their demands routed
through sectarian channels. In chapter 3 I discuss this through an analysis of the
publications of Meem, 6 a Beirut-based collective of lesbian, bisexual, transgender,
queer, and questioning women that was founded in 2007 to provide a safe space and a
community of support for non-heterosexual women and trans persons. Meem
emerged in public, along with other groups and collectives, in the aftermath of the
assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005, which led to the
withdrawal of Syrian troops from the country. Helem,7 the region’s first above-theground LGBT organization, was created in 2004. According to its mission statement,
Helem “leads a peaceful struggle for the liberation of Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and
Transgendered (LGBT), and other persons with non-conforming sexuality or gender
identity in Lebanon from all sorts of violations of civil, political, economic, social, or
cultural rights” (Helem.com, 2015). Helem opened up a space for individuals to
organize around the stigma of non-normative gendered and sexual expressions and
desires, and produced a counterdiscourse that critiqued and denounced homophobia
as a form of discrimination and violence.

punishing abuse against domestic workers. For more on this see
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/03/10/lebanon-recognize-domestic-workers-union
6
The name “Meem” is derived from the Arabic letter “m” (Meem) which stands for
"majmouaat mou'azara lil-mar’a al-mithliya" (support group for lesbian women).
7
The Arabic acronym of "Lebanese Protection for Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and
Transgenders" also meaning “dream” in Arabic.
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Like Kafa (enough), Helem adopted an explicit rights-based discourse,
demanding the implementation of legal reforms in personal status laws and the
criminal code to outlaw and punish gender-based violence and discrimination.
Helem’s primary goal is the annulment of article 534 of the Lebanese Penal Code,
which punishes sexual intercourse “against nature” and is used to prosecute persons
with non-conforming sexualities or gender identities by the security forces. 8 The
law’s annulment, according to the organization, would reduce state and societal
persecution against non-conforming individuals (Helem.com, 2015). Over the past
decade, activists and civil society organizations have made strides in legal reforms. In
a landmark ruling in 2009, a judge ruled that homosexual sex is not against nature.
Similarly, in March 2014, drawing on that legal precedent, Judge Naji El Dahdah of
the Jdeide Court in Beirut rejected the case that was brought up by the state against a
transgender woman who was accused of having “same-sex relations.” This decision
was also based on a 2011 ruling by Judge Mounir Suleiman, which stated that samesex relations were not against nature, and hence could not be prosecuted under Article
534 (Human Rights Watch, March 6, 2014). In 2016, a ruling at the Court of Appeals
in Beirut confirmed the right of a transgender man to change his official papers,
granting him access to necessary healthcare (Safdar, February 6, 2016).

8

Article 534 of the Lebanese penal code stipulates that sexual acts which contradict “the laws
of nature” are punishable by up to one year in prison. Article 534, put in place by French
authorities when Lebanon was placed under French mandate after the second World War, is
used incases targeting homosexual activities. Although most Arab countries do not have
specific laws that outlaw homosexuality, authorities usually prosecute sexual deviants
through laws of public morality (al-haya’a al-aam). In the highly-publicized Queen Boat
Affair in Egypt in 2002, the Egyptian police arrested 52 men on charges of debauchery.
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Thinking Sex After Orientalism
In her pathbreaking essay “Thinking Sex: Notes Towards a Radical Theory of
Sexuality,” penned in the midst of the feminist “sex wars” of the 1980s, Rubin (1984)
argued that it is as a social construct – not a biological entity – that sexuality lends
itself to political analysis. A radical theory of sex, as she describes it, “must identify,
describe, explain, and denounce erotic injustice and sexual oppression” (p.9). Rubin
notes that following Michel Foucault’s first volume of The History of Sexuality,
academic discourses on sex articulated a denunciation of “erotic injustice” and
“sexual oppression” that was situated less in in the freedom of individuals than in
analyses of the normative and coercive relations between specific populations and the
institutions created to manage them (p.275). In his dismissal of the “repressive
hypothesis,” which postulated that following a period when “bodies made a display of
themselves” (p.3) sexuality had become repressed under modern regulatory regimes,
Foucault attended to the ways in which sexuality had been actually produced as a
discourse of power. The question, as Foucault (1990) put it, is not “why are we
repressed?” (p.8) but rather “why has sexuality been so widely discussed, and what
has been said about it?” (p. 11).
Because of his emphasis on the ways that sexuality is produced in discourse
rather than on the silences, censorships, and interdictions that govern it, Rubin (1984)
explains, Foucault has been vulnerable to interpretations that deny or minimize the
reality of sexual repression in the more political sense (p.10). Such interpretations are
ones we see at work in an important branch of scholarship on gender and sexual
politics in Arab societies. Adopting a Foucauldian approach to power, Lila Abu
31

Lughod (2002) and Joseph Massad (2002) – leading scholars in the field – formulate
a critique of Western projects of saving Middle Eastern and Arab women and LGBT
populations from their oppressive societies through an incitement to discourse on
women’s and gay rights. Gender, and women’s bodies more specifically, serve as
boundary-markers between an imagined “self” and “other” (Abu Lughod, p.3) and are
instrumentalized in the ongoing domination of the East by the West. While Abu
Lughod’s (2002) “Do Muslim Women Need Saving?” set the tone for a post-9/11
postcolonial feminist critique that exposes the complicity of progressive discourses of
women’s rights in the U.S-led War on Terror, Massad (2002) extends this line of
critique to the realm of sexuality, attributing the emergence of a discourse on sexual
identity in Arab societies to the “Gay International,” a constellation of
transnationally-operating Euro-American gay rights organizations. The victimization
of particular subjects, both Abu Lughod and Massad show, is produced by an
orientalist discourse that cast Muslim/Arab/Middle Eastern women and homosexuals
as victims of their own cultures and in need of rescue and emancipation.
Thus, the exposure of the complicity of Western discourses of gender rights in
the legitimation of relations of imperial domination has become a critical touchstone
in an important branch of postcolonial scholarship that builds on Edward Said’s
theory of Orientalism. Indeed, both Abu Lughod and Massad have applied Edward
Said’s contrapuntal reading method to understand the reverberations, in the West, of a
discourse of gender oppression in the Middle East. In her critique of the sustained
victimization of Muslim women in Western media, anthropologist Lila Abu Lughod
(2013) examines a genre she calls “pulp non-fiction,” memoirs of Muslim women
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who have escaped their oppressive conditions under Islam and have become famous
figures in the West for writing about it. Firsthand testimonies by the likes of Ayaan
Hirsi Ali and Azar Nafisi,9 Abu Lughod tells us, offer accounts that are “surprisingly
pornographic” (p.107), vivid in their descriptions of sexual violence, and lending
passion “to the mission of saving women globally” (p.107). In addition to
circumcision, Abu Lughod demonstrates how issues like veiling and honor crimes
have come to structure the global outlook on the woman question in predominantly
Muslim societies, cementing in the process a fixed and monolithic vision of these
societies that serves to buttress the West’s own sense of moral superiority. “Projects
of saving other women,” Abu Lughod cautions, “depend on and reinforce a sense of
superiority, and are a form of arrogance that deserves to be challenged” (p. 47).
In a similar vein, Joseph Massad (2007) has vehemently argued that the
category “homosexual” is a product of the West and that homosexuality as a sexual
identity beyond same-sex contact had been implanted in the Arab world by what he
calls the Gay International. This constellation of Western-based international gay
organizations and their attendant discourse of gay human rights were purportedly
transforming Arab individuals from “practitioners of same-sex contact into subjects
who identify as ‘homosexual’ and ‘gay’” (p.162). He explains, “The categories gay
and lesbian are not universal at all and can only be universalized by the epistemic,

9

Ayaan Hirsi Ali is a Somali-born, Dutch-American author and politician and a staunch critic of
Islam. In 2003, she was elected as a member of the House of Representatives in the Dutch
Parliament. Her 2004 short drama film with Theo Van Gogh, Submission, about four fictional
female characters abused under Islamic laws, sparked controversy and led to the murder of Van
Gogh in 2004 by a Muslim Dutch citizen. Azar Nafisi is an Iranian-born American writer and
professor of English literature, She is best known for her 2003 book Reading Lolita in Tehran: a
Memoir in Books where she narrates her difficult experience as a teacher in the University of
Tehran after the 1979 Iranian revolution.
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ethical, and political violence unleashed on the rest of the world by the very
international human rights advocates whose aim is to defend the very people their
intervention is creating […]” (p.162). While this line of critique has been crucial in
demystifying the power relations embedded in civilizational rescue missions and
challenging Western stereotypes of Muslim and Arab women and queers as the
hapless victims of their barbaric cultures, it falls short from addressing gendered
relations of domination within Arab societies. A focus on the universalization of
Western taxonomies through a neo-imperial “incitement to discourse” on gender and
sexual rights eclipses the repressive dynamics at work in postcolonial societies.
While focus on the political violence of discourses of victimization eclipsed a
critique of masculine domination, the valorization of religion – and Islam in particular
– as an object of a gender analysis has precluded a critical engagement with other
modalities of performing gendered identities. In The Politics of Piety: The Islamic
Revival and the Feminist Subject, anthropologist Saba Mahmood (2005) challenged
Western liberal feminism’s conceptualization of feminist agency through an
ethnographic account of the women’s mosque movement in Egypt, itself part of the
Islamic revival in Arab societies in the wake of the 1979 Iranian revolution. Through
a reworking of Michel Foucault’s “ethics of the self” and Judith Butler’s theory of
gender performativity, Mahmood offered an alternative reading of agency wherein
submission to, not transgression of, social norms is understood as an agential act by
the pious female subject. Piety, as Mahmood explains, is an ethics of the subject
where ritual practice such as praying, reading the Qoran, and veiling is performed by
a “docile agent” in her willed submission to a transcendental force. In a similar vein,
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Lara Deeb’s (2006) An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shi’i
Lebanon contested the putative incompatibility between Islam and modernity by
demonstrating how Shi’i Lebanese women understand their public performances of
piety, such as participation in mourning constitute and active involvement in
community life, as a modern self-making project that breaks from the traditional
quietism expected from Shi’i Muslim women in the past.10
While such ethnographic and theoretical engagements with the complex ways
in which Islam shapes and reconfigures the status and role of women in public life
have challenged dominant views on the incompatibility of Islam and modernity,
religion and politics, postcolonial feminist critique must not stop at the deconstruction
of such binaries and the prejudiced ways of thinking about religion that they give rise
to. Religion in Arab societies does not only signify vis-à-vis the West, and must be
apprehended as the structuring force it is within Arab societies. How may we reconceptualize the question of difference beyond the East/West, religious/secular
dichotomy that a critique of Orientalism often perpetuates? How does religion shape
sexuality, for instance, as a gendered experience? But also, how can we decenter
religion as a rubric of gender analysis? As Deniz Kandiyoti (1998) cautions, women
should not be studied in terms of an undifferentiated “Islam” but necessarily through
the differing and specific political projects of nation-states, including their ideological
and strategic uses of Islamic idioms (p.275). Women’s bodies not only signify vis-à-

Veiling is a discursive formation whose apparent unity screens from view the multiplicity
of its meaning. Crucially, its local meanings do not necessarily overlap with the way it is
understood on a transnational level or in different societies. The veil signifies differently in
France than it does in Egypt.

10
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vis the West, nor can discussions of Middle Eastern or Arab gender and sexual
politics be circumscribed to a discussion of Islam.
Gender or Sexuality?
As vehicles for the circulation of personal life in public, the cultural genres in
question are strategic sites to study the labor of normativity in the social construction
and surveillance of gender roles and the social institutions that restrict and repress
their expression. As Rubin (1984) has pointed out, popular culture is permeated “with
ideas that erotic variety is dangerous, unhealthy, depraved, and a menace to
everything from small children to national security” (p.12). This is as true in a
Lebanese context as it is in the American one that Rubin is describing. As Gramsci
(1971) has noted, “Regulation of sexual instincts, because of the contradictions it
creates and the perversions that are attributed to it, seems particularly ‘unnatural,’”
which explains the frequency of appeal to ‘nature’ in disputes over sexual behavior
(p.294). Such disputes, Rubin (1984) explains, often become “the vehicles for
displacing social anxieties, and discharging their attendant emotional intensity”
(p.4).11 In addition to legal and punitive measures, the perceived menace of sexual
activity and erotic variety beyond the confines of heterosexuality and conjugal
domesticity justifies and mandates the regulatory function of social institutions like
the school and the family.
To return to the opening example, Khalife concludes his intervention by
attributing the rise in reported cases of domestic violence against women to the
emergence of “women’s organizations” and the circulation of their discourse on a
11 This is evident in chapter 1, where the protection of children and citizens from unsafe and
corrupting sexual knowledge justifies the repression of sexual discourse on talk shows.
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local and transnational level. Khalife is referring to civil society organizations,
specifically non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which emerged in Lebanon in
the mid-2000s. Since their establishment, NGOs working on issues ranging from
electoral reform to environmental awareness have applied for funding from American
and European donors - international NGOs, embassies, state agencies - to carry out
and implement projects that had been approved and sometimes fully designed by
foreign, Western donors. One of these organizations, Kafa (Enough), worked on legal
reforms to improve the status of women in Lebanon.12 Since 2007, Kafa has been at
the forefront of a national campaign to pass a bill criminalizing domestic violence
against women. “The Law to Protect Women from Family Violence” was submitted
to Parliament in 2009. On April 1, 2013, the Lebanese parliament passed an amended
version of the law that was decried by the National Coalition for Legislating the
Protection of Women from Family Violence, as a watered down, toothless version of
the original draft. This is most immediately captured in the bill's new title – "The Law
on the Protection of Women and other Family Members from Domestic Violence"–
which not only diluted the original focus on women but also undermined the

12

Although the Lebanese state ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1996, the government expressed reservations
on Articles 9 and 16. The rejected articles were related to personal status laws and the
nationality rights of women citizens. Thus, despite ratifying CEDAW, the Lebanese state
continues to deny women the same rights as men in instances of marriage, divorce, and all
family matters and upholds the ban on Lebanese women from passing their nationality to
their husbands and children. The personal status law was thus maintained under the mandate
of religious rather than civil courts. As Salameh (2014) notes, “people are basically unable to
practice social life, relations, and personal choices outside of the license of sectarianism”
(p.6). CRTD-A is a civil society campaign that was launched calling for the passing of a new
nationality law that allows Lebanese women, married to non-citizens, to pass their nationality
to their children.

37

campaign’s insistence on the legal recognition of marital rape by removing a key
clause criminalizing marital rape.
The thorny issue of marital rape, included in the original draft of the law, had
caused a fanfare since its emergence in public discourse in 2012 (“The Law is your
Image!” February 8, 2012), when women’s rights groups stirred the issue in the
media, eliciting the condemnatory response of incensed political and religious figures
(Aziz, July 24, 2013). An infamous (and much satirized)13 statement by MP Imad elHout, member of the parliamentary subcommittee debating the law, captured some of
the blowback: “There’s nothing called rape between a husband and a wife. It’s called
forcing someone violently to have sex.” More recently Randa Berri, wife of Speaker
of the House Nabih Berri and Vice President of the National Committee on Women’s
Issues, justified the parliamentary reservations about marital rape: “It became evident
that it is impossible to prove the occurrence of this act in a closed bedroom” (LBCI,
March 4, 2014). In her speech during the launching event of the National Campaign
to Protect Underage Girls from Early Marriage, Berri declared to the public that
marital rape is non-legislatable because it cannot be known. It is lack of proof,
verifiable evidence to determine whether a man had indeed raped his wife, that makes
it impossible to know rape in the conjugal bedroom. This is the same state that proves
female virginity and male homosexuality by forcing vaginal and anal examinations on
unsuspecting but “suspicious” individuals. The question remains, as feminist legal
scholar Nivedita Menon (2004) put it, “Is ‘the private’ private because the law cannot
intervene and influence it?” Or is it alternatively the law that constructs the private by

13

http://nothingcalledimadhout.tumblr.com
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refusing to intervene, “by closing off the arena as inappropriate for its own
intervention”? (p.13).
On Saturday April 21, 2013, the head of the municipality of Dekwaneh, a
working and middle class town in the northern suburb of Beirut, ordered the
municipal police to raid a gay-friendly nightclub. Three men and one transgender
person were arrested, beaten, and forced to undress in order to verify their sexual
identity (El-Ali, April 25, 2013; Legal Agenda, December 2, 2013). The bar, Ghost,
was shut down few days later and the a report was posted on its door containing the
full names and dates of birth of the detained persons, along with the crimes of which
they were accused, including prostitution and drug use. The hashtag #DekAbuse14
was trending soon afterwards and critical responses to the arrests abounded on
Lebanese social media (Abdessamad, April 25, 2013). The arrested persons, as it
turned out, were working class, Syrian citizens who had fled the war next door. Once
juxtaposed, the state’s crackdown on gay-friendly establishments in a working class
neighborhood and its refusal to trespass the boundaries of the closed conjugal
bedroom demonstrate how privacy is an unequally distributed right, whereby the
conjugal bedroom of married heterosexual couples is off-limits to the authorities
while gay clubs in working class neighborhoods are fair game. In the case of the
latter, the right to privacy is suspended in the name of public morality, whereby nonnormative bodies are constructed as a threat to the social order therefore requiring
official intervention and discipline. Justifying the raid in a television interview, the
head of municipality Antoine Chakhtoura described those arrested as “pseudo-men”

14

https://twitter.com/search?q=%23dekabuse&src=typd
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and accused the club of endorsing sexual activities inside and outside its premises and
promoting drug trafficking and lewd and inappropriate behavior (El-Ali, April 25,
2013). The municipality, according to him, had the moral obligation to protect
children from exposure to freaks in their neighborhood: “Of course we made them
take off their clothes, we saw a scandalous situation and we had to know what these
people were. Is it a woman or a man? It turned out to be a half-woman and half-man
and I do not accept this in my Dekwaneh" (LBCI, April 23, 2013).15 On Tuesday,
April 23, around fourty LGBT-rights activists and allies gathered in front of the
Ministry of Justice in Beirut to protest the raid. “We are asking the public persecution
office to act upon the 11 violations monitored by NGOs, among them: violating
privacy, arbitrary detention, and stopping Lebanese people from practicing their civil
rights,” stated Ahmad Saleh, a board member of Helem (Dream), a Beirut-based nongovernmental organization lobbying for LGBT and human rights since 2005
(Chehayed, May 1, 2013).16 While no legal measures were taken against Chakhtoura,
the Dekwaneh raid and arrests provided a highly-publicized case on the that refracted
the unequal distribution of the right to privacy while also allowing the articulation of
new attitudes and discourses on non-normative genders and sexualities.17

15

Watch the interview here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AVcTrkZ4W2Y
Helem, in cooperation with the Legal Agenda, a non-governmental organization working on
legal activism and reform, had filed a complaint against the head of the municipality urging
the public prosecutor to take the necessary legal action to bring him to justice (Legal Agenda,
April 30, 2013).
17
The raid on Ghost in April 2013 was preceded by a raid by the Internal Security Forces on
a gay porn movie theater, Cinema Plaza, in the working class neighborhood of Bourj
Hammoud in August 2012, which resulted in 36 arrests (Farrell, August 1, 2012). It was
followed in August 2014 by raids on two Turkish bath houses, Shehrazad Hammam in the
working class neighborhood of Burj Hammoud and the Agha Hammam in the commercial
and residential district of Hamra, allegedly used as meeting points for homosexual men. The
16
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These two social vignettes, on domestic violence against women and public
violence against gender non-conforming subjects, map out a connection between
gender and sexuality that is a central premise of this dissertation. In “Thinking Sex,”
Rubin (1984) considered sexuality as a vector of oppression, calling forth the
productive separation of gender and sexuality as distinct categories of experience and
analysis. This cleavage, as Annmarie Jagose and Don Kulick (2004) have pointed out
in an edited special issue of GLQ titled “Thinking Sex/Thinking Gender,” was
subsequently contested by many “who objected to the normalizing capacity of any
neat quarantining of the cultural work of sexuality and gender” (p.211). “Is it
necessary,” they ask, “to preserve a sense of the specificity of sexuality in relation to
the study of gender, or a sense of the specificity of gender in relation to the study of
sexuality?” (p.212). Responding to the question, transgender studies scholar Susan
Stryker (2004) notes that while the field of queer theory – born out of a union
between feminism and sexuality studies – has opened up a anti-essentialist and postidentitarian critical space to consider the constitution of non-normative subjectivities,
it had largely adopted a lens that “privileges sexual orientation and sexual identity as
the primary means of differing from heternormativity” (p. 214). Stryker’s observation
acquires added meaning once we consider the categories of gender and sexuality
Internal Security Forces arrested 27 men in the Agha Hammam raid (Benoist, August 13,
2014). Five Lebanese advocacy organizations, Helem, Arab Foundation for Freedom and
Equality (AFE), M-Coalition, Marsa Sexual Health Clinic, and the Lebanese Medical
Association for Sexual Health (LebMASH), condemned the arrest in a jointly-published
statement, branding it as "homophobic practice that aims to police the sexual rights and
liberties of the individuals involved" (AFP, August 13, 2014). For more on the 2014 arrests,
see Littauer, D. (August 15, 2014). Lebanon launches police raids targeting gay men. The
Huffington Post. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/dan-littauer/lebanonpolice-raids-gay-men_b_5678120.html
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transnationally and beyond a Euro-American context. Rather than posit a priori a
distinction between the two, I found it more productive – in framing the object of this
study – to use “sex” to refer to the interpenetration and mutual constitution of the
experiences of gender and sexuality as axes of social difference, loci of new social
formations, and salient objects of cultural representation. “Jins,” the Arabic word for
sex, refers both to sex acts as well as gender. I chose to hold on to rather than resolve
the multiple referents of the word “jins” – translated back to English as “sex” – as it
allowed me to capture a certain distance from heteronormativity, across my case
studies, that cannot be exclusively conceived on the basis of either sexuality or
gender. I consider gender and sexuality together, under the sign of sex, to examine
how sexuality constitutes a vector of gender normalization and insubordination, and
how gender serves to regulate and discipline erotic charges and limit the horizon of
sexual possibility.
Even as they constitute analytically distinguishable categories, gender and
sexuality are often hard and impossible to separate if we are to understand the nature
and labor of normativity in the production of disciplined subjects and citizens. As an
instrument of power, shame disciplines deviating subjects by repressing their selfexpression in public. A sexual orientation is shameful, in the case of the arrested men
of the nightclub, as it is outwardly indexed in a failed performance of masculinity:
gay men are perceived as “pseudo-men.” Speaking out about abuse is shameful, for
the victim of abuse, because women are not supposed to air their dirty laundry in
public as the moral imperative to protect the sanctity of the family supersedes their
need to vocalize their suffering. As a “bodily emotion” (Bourdieu, 2001, p.38), shame
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emerges from the failure to perform appropriate masculine and feminine roles. It is
the embodied effect of symbolic power through which the dominated, “often
unwittingly, sometimes unwillingly, contribute to their own domination by tacitly
accepting the limits imposed” (Bourdieu, 2001, p.38). Gender is regulated through the
surveillance of sexual conduct, and sexuality is controlled through norms of
masculine and feminine desire and embodiment. Indeed, gender categories are what
enable desire to take shape and find its aim (Stryker, 2004). As anthropologist David
Valentine (2004) argues, gender and sexuality are heuristic categories that
respectively describe the social meaning through which we figure out who is
masculine and feminine and what those gendered bodies do with one another in the
realm we call sex. In the dissertation, I consider this difference from heterosexual
norms without assuming the primacy of either sex or gender as ontological categories
of experience. As Valentine (2004) has argued, while the analytic separation of bodily
sex, social gender, and sexual desire has helped in the analysis and validation of nonnormative identities and experiences, to claim as empirical fact that gender and
sexuality “are separate and separable experiences results in a substitution of an
analytic distinction for actual lived experience” (p.217). Homosexuality, extra-marital
sexuality, and cross-sectarian heterosexual attachments are all, to different degrees,
“non-normative” and “non-conforming.”
Under conditions of masculine domination, women, trans-identifying persons,
and gay men – as I will show in the following chapters – are targets of sociallysanctioned verbal and physical violence on the grounds of their inappropriate or
excessive femininity. To speak of femininity beyond women and masculinity beyond
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men dislodges gender from a biological determinism that obfuscates its sociallyconstructed meanings, but it also calls into question the separation of gender and
sexuality as categories of analysis. This separation characterizes the literary analyses
of same-sex desire in Arab cultures that have set the terms of academic debate.
Egyptian novelist Naguib Mahfouz’s 1947 novel Midaq Alley is a recurrent object of
study as the first Arab novel to depict homosexuality. The novel is a portrait of the
transformation of public life in an Egyptian neighborhood upon the onset of colonial
modernity. Kirsha, the owner of the alley’s coffee shop, is a married family man who
loves and lusts over younger men. His character stands as the literary evidence of the
historical tolerance of same-sex desire in Egyptian and Arab societies (Lagrange,
2000; Massad, 2007; El-Ariss, 2013; Hadeed, 2013, Allen, 2013). Set in the early
1940s in a traditional alley in an old neighborhood of Cairo, on the eve of the Second
World War, Mahfouz’s masterpiece – which has inspired multiple television and film
adaptations – depicts the changing lives of the residents of the alleyway that gives the
novel its name. In the social realist style that characterized his early writing career,
Mahfouz traces, in detail, the transformation of morality and public order under the
simultaneous forces of British colonialism, war, and modernization. Kirsha is among
the novel’s many characters who are negotiating an incongruence between their erotic
and material desires and the prevailing social norms. Frederic Lagrange (2000)
describes him as “ just another typical character of the popular hara [alley] of Cairo”
(p.178) noting the social acceptance of homoerotic desire in pre-colonial Arab
societies. For Joseph Massad (2007), Kirsha’s character is liminal, standing at the
threshold of the pre-colonial pederast and the postcolonial homosexual. His sexual
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proclivities only become a subject of scandal once avowed in public, that is, when his
latest flame, a local youth, becomes a regular in his café. The scandal takes place
when Kirsha’s wife storms into the coffee shop one night, attacking her husband’s
lover and shaming him in front of neighbors, customers, and passersby. In Massad’s
reading, it is Kirsha’s public display of desire rather than the desire itself that incurs
scorn, violence, and ultimately his oldest son Husayn’s intervention to bring his father
to his senses:
Clearly, for Husayn, his father’s sexual practices are not the cause of shame or
embarrassment at all if they remain within the realm of the private and are not
advertised publicly. People knowing what his father’s practices are is one
thing while his father becoming open about them is another (Massad, 2007,
p.275).
The problem is not, Massad explains, that the neighborhood knows Kirsha’s desires,
but that he thinks he can openly court young men before the eyes of the community
without facing censure. It is the “stark publicity” of private and intimate practices that
provokes social scorn (p.276). Faced with her husband’s refusal to change his ways,
Kirsha’s wife Umm Husayn seeks the help of the alley’s wise mediator and man of
faith, Radwan Hussainy, pleading with him to talk to her husband. During his meeting
with Kirsha, and upon asking him to pray for God’s forgiveness for his misdeeds,
Kirsha – annoyed by the encroachment on his private life – politely tells Hussainy
that “you have your religion, I have mine!” According to Massad, in his act of selfdefense, Kirsha invokes “the traditional tolerant impulse of folk Islam where each
will be judged according to his/her religion or to his/her interpretation of religion,”
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adding, “This metaphorical positing of sexual practice as tantamount to professing a
religion is important in that it signals Kirsha’s refusal of one uniform religious
judgment of his sexual practice, and his refusal of one religious authority’s right to
pass such judgment” (p.275). If, like Massad, we read fictional characters as social
actors whose lives reflect social reality, we must understand their speech and
behavior within the social context in which they unfold, without overinvesting in
questions of interiority. In his counter-deployment of a dominant and moralizing
religious discourse, Kirsha is not necessarily making a claim about religious
hermeneutics. Rather, this scene, like many others in the novel, stages the characters’
strategic navigation of the moral order in their pursuit of illicit desires, where radical
subversion is not always, and not necessarily, a desirable outcome. When we factor in
the secrecy that animates the lives of most of the characters, it becomes evident that
scandal, gossip, and surveillance are structuring power dynamics of the social order.
By locating same-sex desire within the broader narrative of the novel, examining
Kirsha’s predicament alongside the alley’s other characters, we realize that it is
scandal itself that constitutes the thematic and narrative focus of Mahfouz’s novel,
structured as it is around dynamics of secrecy and revelation.
In his reading of Alaa al-Aswany’s Egyptian novel The Yacoubian Building
(2002), Allen developed the notion of “queer couplings” to note that it is only by
reading two characters together, against each other, that their queerness or deviance
may be fully revealed to us. I propose to do so by reading Kirsha’s sexuality
alongside that of another major character. Hamida is engaged to be married to Abbas
the alley’s barber. After her fiancé’s departure to join the British army to make
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enough money to marry her, the ambitious young Hamida is seduced by a strange
man who promises her infinite wealth and pleasure. Enthralled by the prospects of a
life of status and leisure away from the alley, Hamida willingly follows him and
becomes a prostitute, leaving the misery of the hara behind. Introducing Hamida into
our reading of Kirsha yields new observations. Kirsha’s struggle with the publicity of
his desire is not exceptional; in fact, the dissonance between the characters’ interiority
and their public selves characterizes the story’s individual plotlines. While Massad
identifies colonial modernity as the root cause of the transformations of the alley’s
moral order, he stops short from qualifying the change and noting its effects in the
reconfiguration of the private and public spheres. Instead, Kirsha’s scandal is
construed as a symptom of the entry of Western sexual epistemology into the
Egyptian social imaginary. This is exemplified, for Massad, by Mahfouz’s use and
spelling of the word “H-O-M-O-S-E-X-U-A-L” in English, by one of the characters,
to describe Kirsha’s newly publicized sexuality. The appearance of a name, an
identifiable category, evidences for Massad the infiltration of Western taxonomies
into the local socio-cultural fabric and thus the fulfillment of an imperialist will to a
particular sexual knowledge.
The question, though, is this: how far can we refuse the reification of
difference without preventing the mark of difference from appearing in public? Taken
to its logical extreme, the refusal to name same-sex bonds in order to prevent their
reification as identities does, indeed, prevent the mark of difference from appearing in
public, thus foreclosing the possibility of social transformation through the
performance of difference. Indeed, what lacks in Massad’s theory of sexuality is an
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engagement with the social. If same-sex eroticism, in Massad’s account, is contained
within an internal realm of desire, unavailable to language and representation, what
do we make of gender identities that cannot or refuse to be contained within a private
realm? In his fixation on genderless sex, Massad unwittingly reproduces the takenfor-granted analytic distinction between “gender” and “sexuality,” thereby replicating
its analytical blind spots. This is evidenced in his reading of the story of Afsa, a
queer character in the play Rituals of signs and transformations by Syrian playwright
Saadallah Wannus. For Massad, it is when Afsa decided to “come out,” adopting an
effeminate look and style publicly, that society condemned him: “The fact that alAfsa lived in a society that for the most part respected the private […] and did not
condemn what it did not know, was unsatisfactory” (p.367). El-Afsa’s effeminacy is
regarded as a sign of sexual excess and not a manifestation of non-normative gender
expression by Massad. As Smith argues in her analysis of what she calls the
“deafening silence” surrounding being gay in Morocco, “the entrenched taboo is that
gayness cannot exist or, if it does, then it must remain unspoken and concealed
behind a gendered identity that is compatible with accepted social mores” (p.46).
Normative gender identity is thus produced in concealing and silencing deviant sex.
And the concealment of deviance is successfully achieved through authorized
expressions of masculinity and femininity. But, evidently, this model of “private” or
“privatized” sex acts only works for those who can and want to publicly conform to
gender norms: effeminate men, alternative masculinities, butch women, transgender
people are all excluded

48

Thus, even if we accept Massad’s claim of the existence of a pre-colonial tacit
Arab tolerance of same-sex desires, what I call following Liu and Ding a “reticent
tolerance” (elaborated in chapter 2), bodies and desires deemed excessive, flagrant,
that simply refuse to be privately contained lie beyond the scope of this conditional
social tolerance predicated on the public erasure of deviating, queer, and dissenting
bodies. Assuming this erasure as a transhistorical cultural trait forecloses the
possibility of the social transformation of gender relations that often requires the
public display, performance, and recognition of difference. Evidently, this model of
“private” or “privatized” sexualities only works for those who publicly conform to
gender norms: effeminate men, masculine women, and trans individuals are all
excluded from Massad’s genderless discussion of sexuality. Inserting Hamida
sexuality into the analysis of Kirsha’s homoeroticism, therefore, serves to redress this
gender blindness, reintroducing the question of gender, and of women, in a discussion
on the relationship between sex and power. If the previous overview on the visibility
of deviant desires in modern Arabic literature has focused on male homoeroticism
and homosexuality, it is because non-normative female sexuality – indeed female
sexuality in general – remains less visible and rigidly regulated than its male
counterpart in public. As a queer coupling, Kirsha and Hamida – the homosexual and
the prostitute –move us beyond the specific question of same sex-desire and the
identities that may or may not emerge through it, and into a consideration of the
appearance of non-normative gender roles and sexualities in public.
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The Infrapolitics of Sex
Shame is an important mechanism of power in this regard and is differently
deployed by social actors, such as moral entrepreneurs and sexual deviants, in ways
that reproduce or disrupt social norms of sexual behavior and expression. As Dina
Georgis (2013) has shown, “Ayb, the word for shame in Arabic, which is closely
linked to what is deemed morally wrong by society, is commonly used in everyday
conversation in the Arab world. When children are told that their behavior is ayb,
they learn early on that that behavior is censored by the outside world, which is not
forgiving of moral violations” (p.64). As Rubin (1988) has pointed out, “Families
play a crucial role in enforcing sexual conformity. Much social pressure is brought to
bear to deny erotic dissidents the comforts and resources that families provide”
(p.22). In Lebanon and the Arab world, families and the extended networks that
emerge around them constitute the primary site of gender and sexual control and
regulation. In her work on intimacy within Arab families, Suad Joseph (1999)
explains that notions of the self do not conform to the individualist, separative,
bounded, autonomous, constructs subscribed to in much of Western psychological
theory (p.2). 18 Arab societies, she argues, valorize rather than pathologize the
embeddedness of self and other, where embeddedness does not necessarily preclude
individual agency.
But this vital and sustaining relationality, she points out, can also become
conjoined with gendered and aged structures of domination that are moralized by
For more on the Lebanese family, see Samir Khalaf (1968), “primordial ties and politics in
Lebanon,” Middle Eastern Studies, 4(3); Edwin Terry Prothero and Lutfy Najib Diab (1974),
Changing Family Patterns in the Arab East. Beirut: American University of Beirut Press; Akram
Fouad Khater, Inventing Home:
18
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kinship norms and rules (p.2). A “patriarchal connectivity,” formed through the
intertwinement of relational modes of selfhood and patriarchy, leads to the
internalization of demands of compliance with gendered and aged hierarchies (p.14).
In her examination of a discourse of “family crisis” in contemporary Arab societies,
Frances Hasso (2011) notes how this incendiary discourse reinforces hegemonic
values and inhibits productive discussions about the complexity of social changes that
emerging marital and sexual practices such as singlehood, increased individuation,
divorce, delayed marriage, secret marriage, and exogamy point to (p.16). But, as
Georgis (2013) notes, “Any violation of conventional life, especially if it’s public in
nature, including a marriageless life, divorce, adultery, or any type of sexual scandal,
threatens the social fabric” (p.243). As such, in a discourse of crisis, changes in
women’s subjectivities and desires around gender, marriage, and sexuality are often
underestimated, and their demands for more equitable practices are attributed to
mimicry of the West (Hasso, 2011, p.125; 129). In both scholarly research and
popular culture, Joseph (1999) argues, the centrality of family in the Arab world has
been so axiomatic that there has been relatively few attempts to problematize the
psychodynamics of family life, leading to its placement in a “sacrosanct place”
beyond critique and reproach (p.9). The result is that most profound insights on the
interior dynamics of family life come from literary and fictional accounts (Joseph,
1999, p.9).
In his examination of the representation of sexual deviance and madness in
contemporary Arab fiction, literary scholar Tarek el-Ariss (2013) identifies the family
as a crucial site of bodily and sexual regulation, a coercive counterpart to the
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regulatory institutions of modern power examined by Foucault (such as the prison and
the clinic). As Rubin (1988) has argued, “Popular ideology holds that families are not
supposed to produce or harbor erotic non-conformity. Many families respond by
trying to reform, punish, or exile sexually offending members” (p.22). The family, elAriss explains, wields its social and political authority to suppress deviant and
excessive desires and confine sexuality within the bounds of heterosexual marriage
(p.128).

Through acts of emotional and physical violence ranging from gossip,

beatings, murder attempts, incarceration and institutionalization, and forced marriage,
the family - and the neighborhood by extension – regulate sexual practices and gender
presentations deemed socially-inappropriate (p.132). In his reading of Thieves in
Retirement (2002) by Egyptian novelist Hamdi Abu Golayyel, El-Ariss describes the
main character’s family’s continuous attempts to suppress and eliminate his
homosexuality and effeminacy, to make them and him “disappear” (p.134). The
forced institutionalization of Sayf, the homosexual son, as ordered by his older
brother highlights “the complicity of the modern institution – the psychiatric clinic –
with the traditional hara’s [alley] enforcement of social and sexual norms” (p.134). In
order to restore its legitimacy and counter the ill repute incurred by the son’s
effeminate appearance, the patriarchal family enlists the power of the modern
institution of the mental asylum to eliminate the mad, queer son (p.134).19 El-Ariss
(2013) compares the scene of Sayf’s abduction by the “madmobile,” in front of the
entire neighborhood, to the spectacle of ritualized punishment that Foucault describes
El-Ariss (2013)also sheds light on the ways in which traditional discursive
practices, such as neighbors’ gossip, produce homosexuality as an antisocial and
subversive behavior and the source of a family’s shame (p.133).
19
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in Discipline and Punish as “the site of deployment of the premodern power of the
sovereign” (p.134). This public display of the queer son’s disappearance restores the
family’s honor, “aligning the premodern institution of punishment and justice [the
family] with that of the modern state” (p.135).
While the forced disappearance (ikhtifa’a) of the body of the effeminate
homosexual frames the process through which homosexuality is disciplined (El-Ariss,
2013, p.136), takhaffi on the other hand, as El-Ariss explains, refers to tactics and
strategies of disguise and concealment adopted by the deviant subject in her
navigation of a censorious public realm. Upon his release from the asylum, the forms
of takhaffi (disguise) adopted by Sayf – namely the public façade of heterosexual
marriage – allow him to fulfill his deviant desires in secret, far from the
neighborhood, and are thus accepted by his new wife and family. “What is imagined
as a traditional form of homosexuality, which coexists with marriage,” el-Ariss
contends, “is exposed to its moment of coercive production in Abu Golayyel’s novel
[…] Sayf disappears through a power structure that involves the family, the
neighborhood, and the state ” (pp.136-137). In light of the asylum’s failure to “cure”
him, the doctor’s note to Sayf’s family, recommending his immediate marriage,
reverts to “an ‘old fashioned’ cure that seeks to neutralize homosexuality’s visibility
by making it disappear in the arranged marriage” (p.138).
This moves the discussion on sexual identity beyond the binary of invisibility
and visibility as it conceives visibility not as an emergence from an originary maw of
darkness, but as an ongoing articulation and re-articulation of the appearance of nonnormative bodies in public. This reframing of visibility is necessary in order to re53

politicize what has been defines as cultural difference. In his analysis of the 2002
Queen Boat Affair, when Egyptian police raided a gay nightclub, located in a boat
moored on the Nile in Cairo and arrested fifty-two men on charges of debauchery,
Massad argued that it was not “same-sex sexual practices that are being repressed by
the Egyptian police but rather the sociopolitical identification of these practices with
the Western identity of gayness and the publicness that these gay-identified men
seek” (p.382). In a similar vein, Pratt Ewing (2011) argues that “Muslims are less
troubled by sex and desire in all their possible forms than they are by the peculiar
modern practice of naming our sexualities as the basis for secular public identities”
(p.89). Such essentializations, she adds, are typically a part of the very structure of
“coming out” stories that are foreign to Muslims (pp.93-94). In their anti-identitarian
critique, that is the rejection of public identities in favor of erotic practices, both
authors identify the naming of desires, rather than the desires themselves, as a
problem. If these societies do not know these sexual identities to begin with, the
argument goes, then how could they be accused of homophobia? In other words, how
can there be a phobia without there being a homo?
Murray and Roscoe (1997) observed that “The apparent tolerance for
homosexuality in Islamic societies depends upon a widespread and enduring pattern
of collective denial in which the condition for pursuing […] homosexuality is that the
behavior never be publicly acknowledged” (p.8). Further noting: “Usually in Arab
and other Islamic societies, everyone successfully avoids public recognition (let alone
discussion!) of deviations from normative standards – sexual or other” (p.15). As
such, “claims of a [gay] identity and demands of respect for it challenge the
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accommodation of discrete homosexual behavior” (p. 17). The insistence, then, is on
the behavior to remain discreet. It is only in its reticent form that sexual
nonconformity is, in turn, reticently tolerated. Juxtaposed to homophobia, this reticent
tolerance can be understood as society’s way of (not) knowing its sexual others.
However, as Liu and Ding (2005) argue, “It is too simplistic to think of pre-western
traditional tolerance and post-colonial or western epistemic homophobia as mutually
exclusive and diametrically clear-cut attitudes and ways of knowing or ignoring”
(p.32).
But visibility is a political question that determines who has access to the
public sphere and under what condition. The space of appearance is brought forth
through action and speech in public (p.183). The public, as Hannah Arendt (1958) has
described it, is a “space of appearance,” where one is heard and seen by others. It
comes into being “wherever men are together in the manner of speech and action, and
therefore predates and precedes all formal constitution of the public realm” (p.178).
Its peculiarity, Arendt writes, is that it does not survive the actuality of the movement
which brought it into being, but disappears not only with the dispersal of men – as in
the case of great catastrophes when the body politic of a people is destroyed – but
with the disappearance or arrest of the activities themselves” (p.178). Power, Arendt
writes, is “actualized only when word and deed have not parted company […] where
words are not used to veil intentions but to disclose realities, and deeds are not used
to violate and destroy but to establish relations and create new realities. Power is what
keeps the public realm, the potential space of appearance between acting and
speaking men, in existence” (p.179). “What keeps people together after the fleeting
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moment of action has passed (what we today call ‘organization’) and what, at the
same time, they keep alive through remaining together is power” (p.180). Plurality,
acting and speaking together, which is the condition of all forms of political
organization (p.181). The mere fact of appearing, as Thompson explains in his
reading of Arendt, “endows words and actions with a kind of reality they did not have
before, precisely because they are now seen and heard by others” (p.63). If we
recognize the mediated nature of publicness it follows that the appearance of the nonnormative in mediated representations is necessary for alternative life forms to be real
– recognizable and identifiable – particularly for the minoritarian subject in a phobic
public sphere. It is through their visibility and existence in public that discourses on
gender can produce political possibilities for social change. The texts under
discussion represent stigmatized sexualities and gender roles but also, importantly,
the taboo of their representation. The politics of representation they enact could be
described as “infrapolitical,” to borrow James Scott’s (1990) term, inasmuch as they
constitute attempts to display the forbidden through fugitive gestures of disguise,
masquerade, and anonymity. They act as “vehicles by which, among other things,
they insinuate a critique of power while hiding behind anonymity” (xiii), among other
strategies. The expressions of dissident genders and sexualities under consideration
are infra inasmuch they are often undetectable and hard to pin down. The testifying
social deviants on talk shows, for instance, often hide their identity behind masks and
other accessories, becoming visible while maintaining their anonymity. Similarly,
queer activists and bloggers write anonymously or under pseudonyms, in online and
print publications, making themselves identifiable for members of the community
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while hiding their identity from the larger public. The “dialectic of disguise and
surveillance,” as Scott (1990) explains, pervades relations between the weak and the
strong, and help us understand cultural patterns of domination and subordination
(p.4). The concealment of personal identity, occurring as it is on talk shows and in
queer publications, is politically meaningful not because it enables a partial “coming
out” of deviance in public – though this is also significant. Rather, its counterhegemonic charge lies in its exposure of the limits of public discourse, of “what can
be done and said in public, what can be done in private but not spoken of in public,
and what can, patriotically speaking, neither be done nor legitimately spoken of at
all” (Berlant, 1997, p.383).20
Scott (1990) points to the “theatrical imperatives” that prevail in situations of
domination, distinguishing between the public and hidden transcripts of the
discourses of the weak and dominated. For Scott, the dominated acts in public in
close conformity with how the dominant want things to appear and it is in their
interest “to produce a more or less credible performance, speaking the lines and
making the gestures he knows are expected of him” (p.4). In its accomodationist
disposition, the public transcript “provides convincing evidence of the hegemony of
dominant value, for the hegemony of dominant discourse” (p.4). Scott’s distinction
between public and hidden transcripts captures the dynamics of normalization of the
status quo, not as evidence of a false consciousness among the dominated, but as the
result of a compulsory performance of the norms of public behavior. It offers a useful

20

Importantly, as I will later discuss in the introduction, patriotism in the Lebanese context
cannot be considered in isolation from sectarianism as allegiance to the nation is re-routed
through an allegiance to the sect as a social and political community headed by a male leader.
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framework to think about the practices of hiding in public that constitute a running
thread across the different cultural productions under consideration. In chapter 2, for
instance, I consider filmmaker Nadine Labaki’s use of reticence in her depictions of
the touchy subjects of homosexuality and female sexuality. Labaki’s use of metaphor
in her filmic image and script to render unspeakable subjects allows her to evade
censorship by state authorities. Through symbolizing gestures – recurrent hair
washing scenes between a feminine and a masculine woman – she renders lesbian
desire without fixing it in representation. Her reliance on visual analogy and word
play to convey meaning distinguishes her restrained style of storytelling that abstains
from overstating its message. It displays without revealing everything. Labaki
describes her reticence as a representational strategy, a necessary bargain to push the
limits of the knowable in public.
In “The Privilege of Unknowing,” Sedgwick (1988) questions the impulse
against the sexual definition of same-sex bonds. She concludes that under the
consolidate regime of “sexual knowledge,” such a move took the shape of a repressive
appeal to “a modern origin-myth of primeval sexual innocence” (p.121), a move
towards the sexual de-legitimation that will undergird any new fascism. She writes
that “It is only within this understanding that the political concept of a fight against
sexual ignorance can make sense: A fight not against originary ignorance, nor for
originary ignorance, but against the killing pretense that a culture does not know what
it knows” (p.121). Knowledge, she explains, is the “magnetic field” and is not itself
power (p.102). Ignorance and opacity compete with it in mobilizing the flow of
energy, goods, and people. Recalling the work of Foucault and Derrida among others
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in revealing knowledge’s vexing relation to power, Sedgwick nevertheless holds
ignorance under equal critical scrutiny, trying as with knowledge to pluralize and
specify it. If ignorance is not “a single Manichaean, aboriginal maw of darkness from
which the heroics of human cognition can occasionally wrestle facts, insights,
freedoms, progress, perhaps there exists a plethora of ignorances, and we may
begin to ask questions about the labor, erotics, and economics of their human
production and distribution” (Sedgwick, 1988, p.104). Cultural production around
gender hierarchies and the stigma of sexual non-conformity is an important site of
analysis of the labor it takes to maintain and disrupt the privilege of unknowing. It
allows us to examine the creation of “red lines” for discourse, the distribution of
speaking privileges, the elaboration of new modes of address, and the development of
sites for the articulation of counter-cultural discourses.
Method
Name
Diana
Joelle
Leen
Lynn
Manal*
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Ahmad Saleh
George Azzi
Raja Farah
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Nadine Labaki
Janane Mallat
Ziad Noujeim
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Bareed/Bekhsoos
Bekhsoos
Bekhsoos/Bareed
Bekhsoos/Bareed
Bekhsoos/Bareed
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Oh My Happiness
(gay blog)
Be Lebnani (gay blog)
Caramel/Where Do We Go
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Let the Brave Speak Out
Let the Brave Speak Out
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Occupation

Date

Writer
Writer/Editor
Writer/Editor
Writer/Editor
Writer
Writer/Editor
Editor
Writer
Blogger

8/8/2015
1/7/2015
6/7/2015
13/1/2014
10/7/2015
22/4/2013
1/5/2015
16/3/2012
20/12/2013

Blogger
Filmmaker/Actress

27/12/2013
08/15/2013

Television Producer
Talk Show Host
Talk Show
Host/Writer

12/23/2014
12/15/2014
03/16/2013

List of Interviews
*Indicates pseudonym to protect anonymity
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To explore how non-normative and dissident genders and sexualities are
communicated across media platforms, I propose an approach that combines textual
analysis of talk show episodes, films, music videos, and electronic and print
publications with interviews with cultural producers, filmmakers, television
presenters and producers, and queer feminist writers and activists.
In order to grasp a cultural phenomenon, it is necessary to study its production
(how it is created), the thematic narrative, visual, or textual content (what is being
said) and its reception (how audiences interpret or use it) (Gamson, 1998, p.227).
Therefore, in addition to interpreting the gender discourses and ideologies in the texts
under study, my aim is to recover the meanings that cultural producers give to
practices of representation and consider them within the political, social, and
economic fields that define their conditions of articulation. This is a study of media as
a cultural text and a public interface where neither the messenger nor the interpreter
have the last say, and where meaning is never fixed but always in circulation. It
consists of a thick description of the texts collected, capturing the density of the webs
of signification that animate them and lend meaning to the social phenomena they
represent.
Thick description, as anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973) has defined it,
presupposes a semiotic concept of culture as “interworked systems of construable
signs.” Culture, Geertz writes, “is not a power, something to which social events,
behaviors, institutions, or processes can be causally attributed. It is a context,
something within which they can be intelligibly – that is, thickly – described” (p.14).
Thick description, as a method of cultural analysis, is “not an experimental science in
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search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning” (p.5). It is an
interpretation of the flow of social discourse, an attempt “to rescue the ‘said’ of such
discourse from its perishing occasions” (p.20). The dissertation locates the social
meanings of gender and sexuality by mapping connections across these different
discursive occasions, treating culture as a text and tackling a variety of media genres
that evidently have different conditions of production and reception. While this may
spread the analysis too thin, as Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) remind us, “the
more settings studied the less time can be spent in each. The researcher must make a
trade-off here between breadth and depth of investigation” (p. 31). The thickness of
the description does not lie in the depth of engagement with the generic specificities
of television, film, digital publications, or memoir. Rather, the thickness lies in the
density of the webs of signification woven across multiple sites where the norms of
gender and sexual behavior are represented, challenged, and reinforced. The locus of
study, as Geertz reminds us, is not the same as the object of study. A cross-media
analysis can identify discursive and communicative patterns in different
representations, mapping lines of articulation within and among media texts and their
producers.
Talk Show

Let the Brave Speak Out
(El-Shater Yehki)

Open Conversation

Episode
“AIDS”
“The Devils and Hard Rock”
“Sexual Variance”
“Rape”
“Incest”
“Cohabitation”
“Prostitution”
“Marriage of Pleasure”
“Who Said It is Forbidden?”
“The Internet”
“Sexual Repression”
“AIDS”

Air Date
9/11/1995
10/1/1996
10/7/1996
7/11/1997
3/12/1997
6/2/1998
6/3/1998
27/3/1998
29/11/2000
7/2/2001
25/4/2001
26/02/1999
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(Sireh Wenfatahit)

Bold Red Line
(Ahmar bil-Katt el-Arid)

“Sexual Questions”
“The Phallic Woman”
“Transexuality”
“How Two Males Got Married
in Lebanon”
“Prostitution”
“Girls Who Became Men”
“Transexuality”
“Pre-Marital Relationships”
“Homosexuality”
“Sexual Harassment”
“Sexual Pleasure”
“Incest”
“Sexual Problems among Men”
“Those who Physically
Transform”
“When They Touch”

16/04/1999
15/06/2002
16/03/2004
23/05/2005
17/08/2006
7/09/2007
16/4/2008
26/11/2008
28/1/2009
22/4/2009
1/7/2009
3/3/2010
16/6/2010
11/5/2011
6/6/2012

In his pathbreaking essay “Encoding/Decoding,” Stuart Hall (2006 [1980])
challenges the send-receiver transmission model of communication by interrogating
the necessary correspondence between the encoded meanings of the message and the
effects these meanings generate. He calls for the conceptualization of the
communication process in terms of a “structure produced and sustained through the
articulation of linked but distinctive moments – production, circulation,
distribution/consumption, reproduction” (p.128). This move, as cultural studies
scholar Jennifer Daryl Slack (2005) argues, compels a rethinking of the process of
communication not as correspondence but as articulation. In this model, the different
components of the communicative process – sender, receiver, message, meaning – are
themselves articulations, without an essential or fixed meaning. Discourses of gender
and sexuality, circulating as they are in mediated messages, are constituted as analytic
objects through lines of articulation drawn between texts and their producers,
consumers, and other texts. This is a circular approach, as Grossberg (2009) explains,
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inasmuch as it “can only produce what it is to analyze through the practice of its
analysis” (p.35). The answer to the question, why do we talk about non-normative
genders and sexualities in the way we do and how does this shape and reflect
relations of power within society, does not lie in one place for all time. Rather, social
meaning emerges through connections that must be made between different
discursive sites through a process of articulation between moments of production,
consumption, and circulation of cultural artifacts.
In chapter 1, I combine a textual analysis of 27 talk show episodes from three
television talk shows – “Al-Shater Yehki” (Let the Brave Speak Out), “Sireh
Winfatahit” (Open Conversation), and “Ahmar bil Khatt el-Arid” (Bold Red Line) –
with interviews with Janane Mallat, a talk show producer, and two talk show hosts,
Ziad Noujeim and Zaven Kouyoumdjian.
In Chapter 2, I analyze filmmaker Nadine Labaki’s music videos and her two
feature films, Sukkar Banat (Caramel, 2007) and W Halla’ La Wein? (Where Do We
Go Now? 2012). In addition, I examine articles about and reviews of Labaki’s work
and interviews with her in local and international media. I incorporate Labaki’s own
understanding and framing of her work through an interview I conducted with her in
August 2013. In chapter 3, I examine two feminist queer publications, Bareed
Mista3jil (Express Mail, 2009) and Bekhsoos (Concerning, 2008 – 2012), through a
textual analysis of stories and posts and in-depth interviews with six feminist and
queer writers and activists.
Cultural studies, as Daryl Slack (2005 [1996]) argues, works with a
conception of method as “practice,” suggesting both the techniques to be used as well
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as the activity of practicing or trying out. This “shifts perspective from the acquisition
or application of an epistemology to the creative process of articulating, of thinking
relations and connections as how we come to know and as creating what we know”
(p. 115). More than a connection, then, articulation is the process of creating
connections. For Stuart Hall (1986), the unity or connection that matters is the linkage
between an articulated discourse – say on “gay rights” – and the social forces “with
which it can, under certain historical conditions, but need not necessarily be,
connected” (p.53). The problem with Joseph Massad’s (2002) conceptualization of
the Gay International as the eminent social formation through which and to which
discourse on LGBT rights is articulated is that it fails to account for the ways in
which LGBT and queer discourse gets articulated to a variety of other social
formations and discourses, thereby overlooking the unpredictability of articulation
and the new political subject positions it may give rise to. The purpose of this
dissertation, therefore, is to identify and specify LGBT and queer discourses as they
circulate in culture, and to disarticulate them from the hegemonic project of the Gay
International in order to examine them in situ as they get articulated to other
discourses such as anti-sectarianism, anti-imperialism, nationalism, social justice,
gender equality, and in new social formations such as gay, feminist, and queer
collectives (discussed in chapter 3). After all, the articulation of ideology in a new
social formation, as Stuart Hall (1986) reminds us, is the condition of politics. A
critique of queer and LGBT discourses that does not first proceed by tracing and
describing the webs of meaning in which they are imbricated forecloses the political
possibilities of these discourses by always already articulating them to Western neo64

imperial discourses and social formations, such as the Gay International, that
simultaneously produce Arab queers as victims of their cultures and as collaborators
in their victimization. Re-introducing articulation into the study of culture allows us
to account for social transformation – the visibility of queer and gay subjects in public
– not as the inevitable effect of the unhindered penetration of Arab societies by
Western ideologies of sexuality, but as the result of unpredictable connections
between these ideologies, the discourses through which they are socially articulated,
and the social groups “that see themselves reflected as a unified force in the ideology
which constitutes them” (Hall, p. 55). The theory and method of articulation, Hall
contends, enables us to think how an ideology empowers people, enabling them to
begin to make some sense or intelligibility of their historical situation. Through
articulation, we can discern the situated meaning of queer discourses without
reducing and essentializing any public manifestation of sexual politics as
symptomatic of cultural imperialism. It is a theory and a method to explain, for
instance, the interpellation of one of my informants, a Lebanese gay man, by a
rainbow flag carried in the space of an anti-Iraq war street demonstration in Beirut.
Signs, as Hall (1980) argues, acquire their full ideological value and are “open to
articulation with wider ideological discourses and meanings – at the level of their
‘associative’ meaning” (p.56). Articulation accounts for that non-necessary link
between a rainbow flag and anti-war discourse. Framing queer-identified individuals
as native informants for or collaborators of the Gay International misrecognizes the
differences in a discourse of sexuality by fixating on its unities, and fails to account
for the contingencies of a correspondence between an ideology and a social force.
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The communicative mode of representations of non-normativity, their mode
of circulation that I characterize as “infrapolitical” is significant for our understanding
of the discourses themselves and the ideologies underpinning them because, as Hall
(1980) reminds us, “the discursive form of the message has a privileged position in
the communicative exchange (from the viewpoint of circulation)” (p.129). Thus, the
analysis of the form of appearance of signs of non-normative genders and sexualities,
as well as their associative meanings, that is, of their articulation with discourses and
social groups, is crucial because “it is at the connotative level of the sign that
situational ideologies alter and transform signification” (Hall, p. 133). To illustrate his
point, he uses the example of religion, arguing that it has no necessary political
connotation: “Its meaning – political and ideological – comes precisely from its
position within a formation [by which he means society]. It comes with what else it is
articulated to. Since those articulations are not inevitable, not necessary, they can
potentially be transformed, so that religion can be articulated in more than one way”
(Hall, 1986, p.54). This, however, does not entail that all articulations are of equal
force. Some, as he suggests, are potent and persistent. He describes them as “lines of
tendential force” that serve as barriers to re-articulation or re-signification (p.53).
This explains, for instance, the tenacious articulation of non-normative genders and
sexualities to discourses of medical pathology, moral inferiority, social deviance, and
mental illness.
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CHAPTER ONE

Television Talk: Sexual Deviance and the Performance of Politics
“With a few mediagenic elements to get attention – disguises, masks, whatever –
television can produce an effect close to what you’d have from fifty thousand
protestors in the street.”
Pierre Bourdieu, On Television, 1998
“It was the wigs that made me want to be one.”
Marga Gomez, Marga Gomez is Pretty, Witty, and Gay, 1992

Introduction
“They are normal, living a life without noise around them. No one talks about
them.” Lucio, a twenty-two year old Lebanese man, had come to the studio to
participate in an episode of “Al-Shater Yehki” (Let the Brave Speak Out), a weekly
nighttime social talk show broadcast on the terrestrial channel of the Lebanese
Broadcasting Corporation (LBC). Speaking behind a white screen, concealing his
identity, Lucio complains about the unwanted “noise” in his life as a femininelooking man. He compares himself to “normal” men and women who are spared the
daily verbal and physical harassment he endures as a gender queer person. The point
of appearing on the show, he explains, is to make his voice heard by thousands of
spectators. In April 1996, when that episode was first broadcast, “Let the Brave Speak
Out” was one of the most popular programs on Lebanese television. In fact, it was the
first local adaptation of the live-audience talk show by LBC. The collective
discussion format produced a space for public life to take form in a society emerging
from a fifteen-year long civil war. Studio participants talked about their personal
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experiences, audiences at home phoned in to state their opinions, share their stories,
and address questions to the experts – psychiatrists, doctors, lawyers, university
professors – featured on the show. Talk show topics are presented by the producers as
issues of social and collective concern, interpellating their audiences as members of a
national public, enlisting their participation in the creation of the discourse that
produces it. In this chapter, I treat television talk as a space of publicity constituted in
discourse. This popular media genre stages the performance of “public opinion”
around such issues as prostitution, homosexuality, civil marriage, and incest, thus
functioning as an archive of contentious politics around sex. But it is also
occasionally a space for the expression of marginal subjectivities and their
appearance in a majoritarian public sphere from which they have been excluded.
The show’s claim to realism, its pretense of representing “social reality” (alwaqe ‘ al-ijtima’i), constituted its main attraction. In pre-recorded segments,
producers claimed to capture “public opinion” on any given issue by asking ordinary
citizens, on the streets, to share their opinions on camera. Writers on the show would,
as executive producer Janane Mallat put it, go to the “end of the world” to report a
compelling story – the end of the world in this case being a mere two-hour drive from
Beirut. Long before the emergence of Reality TV, shows such as Let the Brave
claimed to represent reality and “capture the voice of ordinary people.” In the preface
to his best-selling book, Society's Witness, talk show host Zaven Kouyoumdjian
(2012) writes that his television program contributed to the emergence of new Arab
and Lebanese generations that have no taboos in their conversations and daily lives.
These are viewers that had now become "more comfortable with and willing to talk
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about their bodies and their psychological problems" because “they had seen on TV
people who are like them, talking about what they hadn’t dared talk about” (p.11). In
his words, the show had set in motion a "culture of revelation and confession on the
television screen” (p.11). Through the representation of reality, these shows also
wanted, crucially, to educate citizens about a host of pertinent social questions. In the
studio, hosts would seek out the opinion of experts – clerics, priests, psychiatrists,
medical doctors, and lawyers – on issues as diverse as rape, corruption, heavy metal
music, and homosexuality.
That this particular form of televised therapeutic/didactic talk, where real
people discussed real issues, emerged as it did in the direct aftermath of the civil war
matters to the analysis. In a purely materialist sense, real people with real stories were
television’s newest commodity, delivered on a weekly basis to audiences watching
from home. Sexual deviants like Lucio drove higher audience ratings and
consequently higher advertisement shares. Their appearance on the show made
commercial sense. But they were also among a roster of citizens who came to
publicly testify and complain about a host of socio-economic and political grievances
in the immediate aftermath of a fifteen-year civil war, in a context where the civil war
itself could not be explicitly discussed. As media scholars Sonia Livingstone and
Peter Lunt (1994) explain, whatever the intentions of broadcasters in making these
shows – often accused of being irrelevant, cheap, and trashy – they do not define the
nature of the product or its audience reception. In fact, such shows may end up
constituting a “contested space” where “new discursive practices are developed in
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contrast to the traditional modes of political and ideological representation”
(Carpignano et al, 1990, p.35).
In the context of a society that had come out of a long war that remained
largely unnarrated and underrepresented in the postwar mediascape, the confessional
drive of talk shows – and the obsession with representing reality that undergirds it –
takes on different overtones. Scepticism about the confessional drive fuelling these
shows is often articulated in relation to their sensationalist revelation and exposure of
what are seen as private or and politically trivial affairs, particularly concerning sex.
These shows do in fact turn personal stories into a spectacle for public consumption.
They incite and entice people to share intimate information about their lives with an
immediate studio audience, and through it, to millions of unknown viewers. In a
typical format, a studio is filled with invited “ordinary people” and “experts” who
discuss topical questions and social problems under the direction of a program host.
The studio audience, standing in for the general public, explores the personal troubles
of individuals who have come to tell their stories. As Bourdieu explains, while the
latter are there to explain themselves, the former are there to explain things, “to make
a metadiscourse, a talk about talk” (p.34-35). In this chapter, I consider both – talking
about the self and talking about talk – as new communicative practices that acquire a
particular significance in the aftermath of the Lebanese civil war. The utterances
made by ordinary guests, experts, studio audiences, in pre-recorded segments, callins, and street interviews, constitute an archive of "the waste materials of everyday
communication in the national public sphere" (Berlant, 1997, p.13). Like Berlant, I
read this mundane talk about the nation, and the prominent place of sexual and gender
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difference within it, "not as white noise but as powerful language, not as ‘mere’
fiction or fantasy but as violence and desire that have material effects” (p.13).
Taking the talk show as a site of social investigation, this chapter examines
how this form of mediated talk, with its focus on televised self-disclosure, refracts
otherwise muted differences of class, sect, and gender in the national public sphere.
Through a reading of three talk shows, Al-Shater Yehki (Let the Brave Speak Out),
Ahmar bil Khatt al-Arid (Bold Red Line), and Sireh Winfatahet (Open Conversation),
my analytic goal is threefold. First, it is to understand how sexual difference is
performed and narrated on television shows that claim to represent social reality.
Second, it is to offer a theoretical account of how representations of marginal
sexualities – of queers, children, or the rural working class – interpellate differentlypositioned publics. Finally, it is to explore how television talk, as a media practice,
may constitute a new ethnography. I treat episodes of these shows as texts, verbal
and visual, where information about sexual deviance circulates. Between the opinion
of experts, like lawyers and psychiatrists, and moral authorities like Muslim sheikhs
and Christian priests, talk shows are part of the everyday vernacular in which
sectarian citizenship is produced and reproduced in postwar Lebanon. The topics may
have varied, but the lines of contention were set, and sect constituted the primary axis
of social difference. In drawing the contours of the socially-acceptable, Lebanese talk
shows are a repository of everyday sectarian discourse, which should be understood
as a product of the civil war. The signing of the Taif Accord in 1990 may have put an
end to the protracted armed conflict, but it had also set in motion a postwar discourse
of “collective living” – al-‘aych al-muchtarak – where sect became the primary and
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only political signifier of identity, of difference, of a difference that could be
legitimately politicized. In postwar Lebanon, religious sect is the primary identity that
was allowed space in public, space to be politicized, and bestowed with the symbolic
power to define the political terrain. While talk shows may have been popular
channels for the circulation of a sectarian discourse, they have also allowed the public
articulation of minor discourses, and have therefore, in the process, contributed to the
emergence of counterpublics.

.

Anatomy of a neglected genre
The Lebanese civil war lasted from 1975 to 1990. Armed fighting was
officially suspended following the signature, by Lebanese parliamentarians and
political leaders, of the Saudi-sponsored Taif Accord in 1989.21 Originally pitting
leftist Lebanese and Palestinian factions against conservative Christian nationalists,
the war eventually spiraled into a protracted sectarian conflict, bankrolled by foreign
powers, that left 120,000 dead, 76,000 displaced, and 10,000 disappeared. As the
warring factions splintered and multiplied over the course of fifteen years, so did their
channels of communication. The breakdown of the socio-political order was in fact
mirrored in the country’s completely unregulated wartime broadcasting system. By
the end of the war, there were fifty-two television stations and over 120 radio stations
for a population of 3 million (Human Rights Watch, 1997). In a bid to control the

Constitutional amendments resulting from the agreement were passed in August 1990, expanding
Parliament to 128 seats that were, for the first time, equally distributed between Muslims and
Christians. Then, in March of 1991, Parliament passed a general amnesty law for crimes perpetrated
before its enactment, ensuring legal immunity for the warlords and criminals who constitute the
postwar ruling class.
21
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airwaves after the establishment of civil peace, and within a broader context of reinstitituionalization and re-regulation, the government passed a broadcasting law in
1994 to end the state’s legal monopoly of the airwaves and establish a licensing
system for privately-owned radio and television stations.
The Audiovisual Media Law was controversial because the licensing process
it put in place largely followed the political interests of the legislators (with licenses
granted to television stations that were directly or indirectly linked to leading political
figures). In addition, it encouraged censorship by prohibiting the discussion of
matters “seeking to inflame or incite sectarian or religious chauvinism or seeking to
push society, and especially children, to physical and moral violence, moral deviance,
terrorism, or racial and religious segregation.” In practice, this regulation of proper
media content meant that public expression and debate around the war - its causes,
culprits, and consequences - was stifled and largely missing from public discourse. In
addition, the de facto postwar hegemony of the Syrian Assad regime over Lebanon,
which lasted until the withdrawal of Syrian troops from the country in 2005, imposed
further restrictions on freedom of expression, effectively circumscribing public
criticism of the status quo (El Khazen, 2003; Salloukh, 2005).
As a mass medium, television was also undergoing structural transformations
in the mid-1990s. First, the emergence and diffusion of satellite television in the Arab
world - epitomized by the launching of the Qatari-owned all-news channel Al-Jazeera
– delivered, for the first time, one of the largest regional media markets to advertisers.
The prospects of this new transnational Arab television audience preoccupied public
commentators and academics who reveled in the notion of an “Arab public sphere”
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(Lynch). In this context, where the role of the media in Arab public life was
becoming a topic of strategic and political interest, Al-Jazeera’s political talk shows
captured the attention of media scholars who saw in the genre the dawn of a new
political age, characterized by public participation, rational deliberation, and open
dialogue (Bahry, 2001; El-Nawawy & Iskandar, 2003; Miladi, 2003; Lynch, 2005;
Rinnawi, 2006; Seib, 2008). Through fiery programs such as Al-Ittijah al-Mu'akes
(The Opposite Direction) and Bila Hudud (without Borders), Al-Jazeera's promotion
of criticism, mockery, and public call-ins was arguably democratizing Arab political
culture (Lynch, 2003).
The fixation on the socio-political effects of these political talk shows,
however, overshadowed other equally popular genres of TV talk that emerged at that
transitional moment. As Marwan Kraidy (2007) points out, “When scholars and
policy makers contemplate the Arab ‘media revolution,’ they mostly think of AlJazeera and its news competitors. They are guided by the assumption that all-news
satellite television networks are the predominant, even the single, shaper of the Arab
public sphere” (p.139). Social talk shows such as Let the Brave were largely excluded
from an analysis that was concerned with the rational, argumentative, and deliberative
model of public discourse even though they, too, largely adopted that model. But
scepticism about the political significance of trivialized cultural forms is hardly new,
nor is it restricted to the Arab context. As Sonia Livingstone and Peter Lunt (1994)
point out, scholars who look at social talk shows in Europe and the U.S. often wonder
whether “real conversation” takes place in these discussions, and whether they
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produce “a community of citizens talking among themselves about issues of public
concern" (p.3).
After going on air in 1985 as a platform for the Christian-nationalist Lebanese
Forces militia, the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation, LBC, rapidly became the
most watched station in the country and the longest running privately owned Arab
television channel (Kraidy, 2007, p.142). The station quickly became popular among
Arab viewers for featuring attractive and scantily clad TV anchors who mixed
Lebanese Arabic with French and English words, often speaking with an American
accent. LBC established a regional reputation as liberal, westernized, and morallycompromised media outlet. The station provoked a region-wide controversy in the
mid-2000s with its first reality TV show, “Star Academy” (Kraidy, 2010). The moral
panic around the representation of mixing between male and female contestants in a
competitive environment of singing and dancing was one chapter in the station’s
history of pushing the envelope around gender representations. But well before the
emergence of reality television, the station launched its first weekly social talk show,
Let the Brave Speak Out, in 1995. It quickly became one of LBC’s flagship programs
by featuring real and ordinary people talking about controversial issues such as civil
marriage, cohabitation, and incest. The show was cancelled in July 2001 following
ongoing clashes with the Syrian authorities (and their proxies in the Lebanese security
establishment) who were effectively governing the country.22

22

The show's host, Ziad Noujeim, recently confirmed that the program was cancelled under pressure
by General Jamil el-Sayyed, Director of General Security at the time. Ziad Noujeim (November 8,
2012). “I never left a television station in my life but they were the ones to let me go.” El Nashra.
Retrieved from http://www.elnashrafan.com/news/show/1029942/%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8
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Bold Red Line premiered in 2008, with the host Malek Maktabi announcing in
the first episode: “Regardless whether red lines or taboos are set by society or by your
own self… I, Malek Maktabi, will boldly juggle these opposing sides.”23 As opposed
to the more local orientation of Let the Brave, Bold Red Line was pitched from the
outset to a pan-Arab audience. It adopted a transnational angle, regularly featuring
participants from Yemen to Morocco. The show's most controversial aspect is
perhaps its self-established mission to penetrate Arab Gulf countries, 24 not simply as
markets but more importantly as societies with their own share of social grievances
and deviances. For the first time, the off-limit conservative Gulf societies, the most
profitable among Arab audiences, became the spectacle. In the extreme case of an
episode on sexual pleasure, a segment which featured a Saudi man disclosing his
sexual practices and conquests led to the closure of LBC’s offices in Saudi Arabia
and the sentencing of the “sex braggart” to 1,000 lashes and 5 years in prison (Kraidy
& Mourad, 2014).
Open Conversation, the longest-running Arab television talk show, aired on
Future Television between 1999 and 2012. Founded in 1993, Future TV is owned by
the family of business tycoon-turned-prime minister Rafik Hariri, who also owns almustaqbal (future) newspaper. 25 The station mainly targets a cosmopolitan, Sunni
bourgeoisie – Hariri’s political backbone – and adopts a modern and socially
moderate outlook in its programs. While initially focused on entertainment, Future
23

Maktabi started his television career by working on a famous and long-running Lebanese political
talk show Kalam el-Nas (The talk of the people).
24
These include Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman.
25 Hariri also owns Solidere, a privately-owned, joint-stock real-estate company founded in 1994 and
charged with rebuilding the capital’s dilapidated city center after the war. The slogan of Solidere’s
campaign for the reconstruction was “Beirut, a great city for the future.”
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TV’s programming grid underwent a major transformation after the assassination of
Hariri, its founder and owner, in a massive car bomb in February 2005.26 After the
successive political events of 2005, which culminated in the Independence Intifada
that officially ended the Syrian mandate over Lebanon, the station prioritized political
and news programming devoted to anti-Syrian propaganda. Hosted by ArmenianLebanese Zaven Kouyoumdjian, Open Conversation was one of Future’s flagship
programs, consistently securing high ratings among Arab audiences. The show was
popular for regularly featuring a psychologist evaluating individual cases.

The Promises and Pitfalls of TV Talk
In the U.S and Europe, critiques of the genre have centered around three
related characteristics: its investment in unusual stories and people (Gamson, 1998);
its reconfiguration of the boundaries of public life (Carpignano et. al, 1990;
Grindtstaff, 2002); and its adoption of an individualizing therapeutic discourse to
address structural and social problems (Abt & Seesholtz, 1994; Peck, 1995).27
In his analysis of U.S tabloid talk shows of the 1990s, anthropologist Joshua Gamson
notes that the genre relies on bizarre and unconventional stories to drive up the
ratings, often bringing the “rousing, unusual edges of a population for attention”
(Gamson, 1998, p.214). As television scholar and talk show critic Vicky Abt (1994)
argues, “In their competition for audience share, ratings and profits, television talk
shows co-opt deviant subcultures" (p.173). As Tolson (2008) shows, scholars and
26

The Syrian regime was accused of standing behind Hariri’s assassination as well as a number
of other high profile political assassinations that shook the country since 2005, including those of
prominent and vocal anti-Syrian journalists Samir Kassir and Gebran Tueini.
27 The discussion of the therapeutic dimension of talk shows is not included in this paper.
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critics have repeatedly questioned the moral and rational value of television talk, with
some claiming that the genre was "deconstructing" society, and not in a good way. In
their diatribe against American talk shows of the early 1990s, Abt and Seesholtz
(1994) solemnly announce:
To experience the virtual realities of television talk shows is to confront a
crisis in the social construction of reality. Television talk shows create
audiences by breaking cultural rules, by managed shocks, by shifting our
conceptions of what is acceptable, by transforming our ideas about what
is possible, by undermining the bases of cultural judgment, by redefining
deviance and appropriate reactions to it, by eroding social barriers,
inhibitions, and cultural distinctions (p. 171).
The normative ambiguity attributed to the shows is believed to compromise our
ability to "define and constrain deviance" (p.187) in this dystopian vision of society
as an "ersatz community of eavesdroppers" (p.174). The infringement on individual
privacy, which arguably results from an overexposure to others’ intimate lives, is
understood by communication and legal scholar Clay Calvert (2000) as a form of
"mediated voyeurism." The term refers to the consumption, through the media, of
revealing images and information about others’ lives, often for the purposes of
entertainment (pp.2-3). In his characterization of voyeuristic media genres, Calvert
proposes the “tell-all” talk shows where “we get to eavesdrop on guests often selected
from the bottom of the social barrel” (p.8). He describes participants in these shows
as exhibitionists who allow us to “revel in the joys of others’ lives made public” (p.8).
In a similar vein, in his focus on talk shows in his critique of television, Bourdieu
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argues that the television screen “becomes a sort of mirror for Narcissus, a space for
narcissistic exhibitionism” (p.11).
Others, however, are less pessimistic about this exhibitionism. By calling into
question the very structure of separation between the production and consumption of
cultural products, these shows turn passive spectators into active participants who
shape the content of public discourse through personal disclosures and insights
(Carpignano et. al, 1990, p.35). These scholars further tie the emergence of
programming that focuses on the private discourse of personal relationships to the
feminist struggle and its redefinition of the private/public divide. For them, the result
of the politicization of the private is a transformation in the nature of the political
whereby “the means of expression of these new areas of political struggle are quite
different from those of formal politics. They rely more on the circulation of discursive
practices than on formal political agendas (Carpignano et. al, 1990, p.51). Indeed,
these discursive practices have been examined by media scholars Joshua Gameson
(1998) and Laura Grindstaff (2002) who argue that new forms of and registers for
participation enabled previously invisible and socially-marginalized subjects – queer
and working class individuals – to claim the public spotlight. It did matter, as they
show, that these talk shows somehow redistributed the privileges of public speech,
momentarily opening up a central space for marginal subjects.

Not in Front of the Children
Michael Warner (2002) proposes three definitions of the noun “public.” First,
there’s the public as a kind of social totality, meaning the people in general. Second, a
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public is understood as a concrete audience or a crowd witnessing itself in a visible
space. Third, and most pertinently for this discussion, there is the public that “comes
into being only in relation to texts and their circulation” (p.413). In this third sense a
public is “self-organized:” it exists by virtue of being addressed, whether by a speech,
a book, or a television broadcast (p.413). For Warner (1999), the public circulation of
knowledge about sexual variance, more specifically, may call into being new sexual
publics but also enables the learning and unlearning of sexual desires, practices, and
identities. Drawing a link between textuality and sexuality, representation and
practice, he explains that some erotic possibilities that were always there, such as anal
pleasure and female ejaculation, “are learned by many only when the knowledge
begins to circulate openly and publicly” (p.11). The “accessible culture of sex” (p.11),
as he calls it, acts as a symbolic repertoire of erotic possibilities that are constantly
transformed by new technologies. Moral authorities police public space to circumvent
the diffusion of harmful and unsafe knowledge, typically performing their censorship
practices in the name of the nation’s children.
When the Lebanese National Council for Audiovisual Media (NCAVM) - the
regulatory body overseeing media content in Lebanon - attempted to prevent the
airing of Bold Red Line's episode on childhood sexuality in September 2011, it
claimed that the promos of the episode were aired at a time when children were still
awake and watching television (“Sex education,” September 29, 2011). As Lauren
Berlant (1997) has shown, the child is often a stand-in for a set of anxieties and
desires about national identity: “what gets consolidated now as the future modal
citizen provides an alibi or an inspiration for the moralized political rhetoric of the
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present and for reactionary legislative and juridical practice” (Berlant, 1997, p.6).
Shortly after the advertisements for an upcoming episode on childhood sexuality were
aired, Al-Diyar, a Lebanese daily newspaper, ran a front-page article lambasting
LBC’s decision to air the episode in question: “Today’s episode on childhood
sexuality is a scandal. Will General Security dare to intervene?” (“LBC’s bold red
line,” September 28, 2011).28
Concerned about television’s ability to penetrate homes and bedrooms without
permission, the writer laments the erosion of parental supervision whereby adults are
no longer the sole mediators of information. This concern was echoed by one of the
fathers participating in the episode in question, who vehemently rejected the exposure
of his children to sexual information at school or in the media. Citing the outrage of
religious and family organizations, and expressing concern about “our religious and
spiritual upbringing,” the newspaper explicitly asked the state to intervene and ban
the episode. “The Director General of the General Security needs to stop this
program. This is not an attack on freedom. This is about protecting our children from
the poison that such programs bring to their brains. This is not about freedom of
opinion but is a matter of national duty to protect our children” (“LBC’s bold red line,
September 28, 2011). As Berlant (1995) points out, the constant fear of children
coming into harmful contact with unsafe sexual knowledge (and subsequently

In Lebanon, censorship controls over literature, art, and media fall under the jurisdiction of the
Directorate General of General Security. Following certain laws (some of which date back to the
French mandate), General Security has been entrusted with the task of licensing, monitoring, and
censoring creative works. It controls when and how much freedom will be permitted,
heightening or reducing restrictions according to the prevailing political circumstances and
dictates of various political and religious powers.
28
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performing harmful sex acts) legitimates the control of public communication
(p.383). Despite official warning, the episode aired but under the new title of “sexual
education.” Repeatedly emphasizing that this was an issue of “public health,” the host
deployed the same tropes of “moral danger” and “national duty” but to justify and
legitimate the show’s decision diffuse sexual knowledge. A month later the NCAVM
issued official warnings to several television stations (LBC included) for their
controversial programming, stressing that any failure to abide by the Council’s
recommendations would make their licenses ineligible for renewal. In a newspaper
statement, the Council’s president accused two talk shows, Bold Red Line and Open
Conversation, of broadcasting “unethical content,” emphasizing episodes with sexual
themes (Meguerditchian, October 22, 2011).
By 2011, however, Bold Red Line producers had grown accustomed to such
controversies. Two years prior to the sex education polemic, the show had placed the
station in murky waters over an episode on sexual pleasure. In July 2009, LBC aired
via satellite the show’s season finale. In a pre-recorded segment, Mazen Abduljawad,
a Saudi divorced father of four, bragged about his sexual exploits and flaunted his sex
toys and aphrodisiacs on television. A wave of protest ensued in Saudi Arabia, with
Saudis calling for the punishment of the "LBC sex braggart." Saudi officials
proceeded to shut down the station’s offices in Jeddah and Riyadh. Local journalists
launched a media campaign, "do not compromise your nation," to protest pan-Arab
television programming that sensationalized Saudi issues to boost ratings. In addition,
Saudi citizens called for the commercial boycott of the Lebanese station that had
trespassed the moral boundaries of their nation. Abduljawad was eventually
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sentenced to 1000 lashes and five years in prison. As the French daily Libération put
it, Abduljawad was "a Saudi citizen like others, except that he narrated on television
what everybody knows but that nobody says in Saudi Arabia" (Ayad, November 8,
2009). The "sex braggart" controversy demonstrates that talk shows are notorious
because they destabilize the boundaries between “what can be done and said in
public, what can be done in private but not spoken of in public, and what can,
patriotically speaking, neither be done nor legitimately spoken of at all” (Berlant,
1997, p.383).
What is even more interesting in the case of the “sex braggart” is how the
controversy crystallized a certain infantilizing citizenship at work. Along with
Abduljawad’s friends who appeared with him in the segment, a summary court
decided to prosecute a female Saudi journalist who had assisted in the production of
the infamous episode. Rozana al-Yami, 22, was sentenced to 60 lashes for allegedly
working for LBC without a license. However, the Saudi King Abdullah intervened
and personally waived her sentence at the last minute. If Abduljawad’s transgression
was framed as “the fall of the father as a role model” in public commentary, the
King’s intervention confirmed him as “the benevolent father of the nation.” Due to
their compromising media practices, Abduljawad and Al-Yami were represented as
the lost “children” of the nation in need of discipline. 29 These two public
controversies around talk show episodes – controversies that resulted in legal action –
demonstrate how moral panics are often manufactured around children or infantilized
29

For a more detailed analysis of the “sex braggart” controversy, see Kraidy, M. M. & Mourad, S.
(2014). Crossing the red line: Public intimacy and national reputation in Saudi Arabia. Critical Studies
in Media Communication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15295036.2014.960947
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adults coming into contact with harmful sexual information. The public circulation of
this information often mobilizes elements of the dominant culture, including the state
and religious institutions, to take action in the name of a concerned or disconcerted
public. A nuanced understanding of the publics of talk show performances, however,
demands that we equally watch from a non-normative position. What happens when
queer individuals, including queer children, come into contact with information about
sexual variance? In other words, what about what Heather Love (2007) calls “the
queer trauma of spectatorship” (p.15)?

Watching from the Margins
In Disidentification: Queers of Color and the Performance of Politics, José
Esteban Muñoz identifies the potential “counterpublic moments” of television
through a recollection of his own marvel at the “televisual spectacle” of Ray Zamora
and his father “talking openly” about homosexuality and AIDS in a distinctly Cuban
Spanish. Recalling his own interpellation as a queer subject by the televised
performance of Zamora, a gay and HIV-positive Cuban-American participant on the
reality TV show The Real World, Muñoz writes: “I was struck because this was
something new; it was a new formation, a being for others. I imagined other living
rooms within the range of this broadcast and I thought about the queer children who
might be watching this program at home with their parents” (p.160, emphasis added).
In a sense, these “counterpublic moments” offer a compelling counterpoint to what
communication scholars Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz (1991) call “media events.” In
these "high holidays of mass communication" (p.5), television supposedly enlists a
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renewed loyalty to society through a collective watching of rituals of conquest,
contest, and coronation which are planned in advance and simultaneously watched by
millions. If, as Dayan (2001) argues, these televised rituals enable an experience of
"watching with" (p.743), what do we make of more mundane televisual spectacles
that enable a different kind of “watching against,” where loyalty and belonging are
not renewed but rather questioned and displaced? For Muñoz, these provide
“instances” or “moments” of counterpublicity which are momentary, fleeting, and
subtle. Within such an understanding, the transmission of an image of brown queer
intimacy within and beyond the nation constitutes a valuable instance of
counterpublicity, Muñoz argues, because it is where the mass public “glimpses”
different lifeworlds than the one endorsed by dominant ideology. What started out as
a “tokenized representation” in a reality show on a major network became “something
larger, more spacious – a mirror that served as a prop for subjects to imagine and
rehearse identity” (p.154).
Zamora’s performance on The Real World, as rendered by Muñoz,
exemplifies what media scholar Nick Couldry (2003) identifies as “media rituals,”
instances where non-media people perform for the media, for example by revealing
intimate truths before unknown millions on TV shows. In such performances,
Couldry explains, the media themselves "'stand in’ for something wider, something to
do with the fundamental organisational level on which we are, or imagine ourselves
to be, connected as members of a society" (p.3). In his ritual analysis of everyday
media practices, Couldry (2003) draws on Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic power to
argue that such practices preserve the dominant symbolic order by reproducing “the
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myth of the mediated center,” that is the need and desire to go to and be in the media.
Couldry is not interested in the details of what individuals disclose through mediated
interactions but rather in the formal elements that give them shape. As he explains,
“too close a focus on the content of individual disclosures risks missing the most
puzzling aspect of this whole landscape: its links to the ritually reinforced notion that
the media provide a ‘central’ space where it makes sense to disclose publicly aspects
of one’s life that one might not otherwise disclose to anyone” (p.116).
In On Television, Bourdieu (1998) himself describes television as a
“formidable instrument for maintaining the symbolic order” (p.16). The journalistic
field – television included – is socially important as it monopolizes large-scale
informational instruments of production and diffusion of information. As such, it
controls the access of ordinary citizens and other cultural producers such as scholars,
artists, and writers, “to what is sometimes called ‘public space,’ that is, the space of
mass circulation” (p.46). By controlling the means of public expression, he continues,
journalists in effect control public existence, “one’s ability to be recognized as a
public figure” (p.46, emphasis in original). The control of the means of representation
is important for Bourdieu because, with the rise of media technologies such as
television, public space had increasingly become the space of mass circulation. The
distinction between public expression and existence collapses precisely because our
notion of a public space where the self is actualized had been deeply transformed by
mediation. Being in the media becomes a being in public. Media scholar John B.
Thompson (1995) calls this “mediated publicness,”
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an open-ended space in the sense that it is a creative and uncontrollable
space […] where new words and images can suddenly appear, where
information previously hidden from view can be made available, and
where the consequences of becoming visible cannot be fully anticipated
and controlled (pp.246-247).
While Bourdieu recognizes this transformation in the mode of public visibility, he
adopts a rather narrow view as to what constitutes meaningful public discourse. Talk
shows, for him, in their profit-driven search for the sensational and the spectacular,
epitomize television’s degradation of public life. Anyone appearing on television, he
argues, must ask the following questions: “Do I have something to say? Can I say it
in these conditions? Is what I have to say worth saying here and now? In a word, what
am I doing here?” (p.14). Nowhere is this rational and deliberative approach to public
discourse better illustrated than in Bourdieu’s own description of his production of a
television cast of his lecture “on television:”
To maintain the focus on the crucial element – the lecture itself – and contrary
to what usually happens on television I chose, in agreement with the producer,
to eliminate effects such as changes in the format or camera angles. I also left
out illustrations (selections from broadcasts, reproductions of documents,
statistics, and so on). Besides taking up precious time, all of these things
undoubtedly would have made it harder to follow my argument (1998, p.11).
“These things” – camera angles, visual effects, illustrations – are eliminated not
because they are meaningless but because they matter a lot; maybe even more than
the argument that Bourdieu wants to isolate from all the visual noise. As the epitaph
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shows, Bourdieu (1998) believes in the power of visuality to move publics, “With a
few mediagenic elements to get attention – disguises, masks, whatever – television
can produce an effect close to what you’d have from fifty thousand protestors in the
street” (p.22).
What happens if we accept Michael Warner’s (2005) invitation to suspend the
metaphorical rendering of discourse as conversation and deliberation? For one, we
would not treat mediagenic elements as marginal to discourse. Talk shows, as is
evident in their very name, are as much about showing talk as they are about the
rational exchange of verbally conveyed meaning. By describing the melodramatic
talk show scene of revelation as “the money shot,” Laura Grindstaff (2002) not only
highlights the lucrative business of televised confession. Her use of a porn metaphor
to characterize television talk underlines the aesthetic, affective, and visceral
dimensions of public discourse. This performative dimension of discourse, as Warner
(2005) calls it, is routinely misrecognized because in traditional approaches to the
public sphere the public is thought to require persuasion rather than poesis (p.422423). For Warner, however, all discourse or performance addressed to a public “must
characterize the world in which it attempts to circulate, and it must attempt to realize
that world through address” (p.422). This is why public discourse, in his
characterization, is poetic: it conjures the lifeworld in which it circulates not merely
through its discursive claims, oriented to understanding, but through its speech
genres, idioms, stylistic markers, lexicon, and mise en scène (p.422). Thus, the
common perception of public discourse as conversational – as a rational-deliberative
interaction – obscures “the poetic functions of language and corporeal expressivity in
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giving a particular shape to publics” (p.423) and the poetic or textual qualities of an
utterance are disregarded in favor of sense.

Televisual Seduction
Sitting on a bed on a stage meant to look like her bedroom, Cuban and Puerto
Rican-American performance artist Marga Gomez recounts her first interaction with
lesbians in the public sphere. In a stage monologue re-narrated by José Esteban
Muñoz, she recalls how, at the age of eleven, a voice had summoned her down to the
living room where famous TV host David Susskind was announcing that he will
interview “lady homosexuals” on his talk show Open End:
I sat next to my mother on the sofa. I made sure to put that homophobic
expression on my face. So my mother wouldn’t think I was mesmerized by the
lady homosexuals and riveted to every word that fell from their lips. They
were very depressed, very gloomy […] there were three of them, all disguised
in raincoats, dark glasses, wigs. It was the wigs that made me want to be one
(p.).
In his reading of what he describes as Gomez’ “televisual seduction,” Muñoz
demonstrates that beyond persuasion, seduction is a mode of public address. The
formal characteristics of the television performance, its poetics, aesthetics, and mise
en scène, shape its reception, and therefore its public-making potentialities. In other
words, the wig and mask are not paratextual elements but are rather central to
practices of mediated self-presentation and disclosure, particularly for subordinate or
marginalized groups whose struggle for recognition, as Thompson (1995) explains,
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“have increasingly become constituted as struggles for visibility within the nonlocalized space of mediated publicness” (p.247). In this transformed mediascape, talk
shows provide access to the public space of circulation for groups who have been
consistently excluded from it. There is a desire among members of such groups,
Gamson (1998) explains, to be seen and recognized for who they are, as their
“cultural visibility is often so minimal, or distant enough from the way people live
their lives, to render them unrecognizable even to themselves” (p.213).
In his discussion of individual negotiation of stigma, sociologist Erving
Goffman (1962) focuses on the management of discrediting information about the
self by stigmatized persons. This is information about their “failings,” such as their
invisible physical disability or their deviant sexuality. For the stigmatized, writes
Goffman (1962), the question is whether “To display or not to display; to tell or not to
tell; to let on or not to let on; to lie or not to lie; and in each case, to whom, how,
when, and where” (p. 41-42). Goffman’s work on the presentation of the self has been
recently taken up by new media scholars in their examination of online media
practices and interactions. In their investigation of the online information practices of
an extreme body modification community, Jessa Lingel and danah boyd (2013)
unpack the ways in which shared stigma shapes community information practices and
the complexities—in terms of social interactions as well as technological use—of
becoming familiar with information resources and deciding whether or how to share
information with others (p.981). In a more recent piece on what they call “privacy
practices,” Alice Marwick and danah boyd (2014) argue that the dynamics of social
media sites have forced individuals to alter their conception of privacy to account for
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the networked nature of the web. In their words, “individuals are trying to be in
public without always being public” (p.1052) and their frequent sharing of content
does not suggest that they share indiscriminately.
In her examination of online confession sites, Sherry Turkle (2011) quotes one
user: “We put our secrets up, and we just want to show it to a stranger, not a friend
but a stranger. You want to express your emotion. You write it down and write it on
the website and you just want a stranger who doesn’t know you to look at it” (p.232).
Turkle, however, is not optimistic about this new tendency to share secrets and
compromising intimate information with others one barely knows as it opens one up
to the cruelty of strangers, leaving them vulnerable in new ways (p.235). For Warner
(2005), on the other hand, the modern social imaginary does not make sense without
strangers. Strangehood, as a mode of relationality, is a “necessary premise of some of
our most prized ways of being. Where otherwise strangers need to be on a path to
commonality, in modern forms strangehood is the necessary medium of
commonality” (p.417). Long before the diffusion of digital technologies, talk shows
provided a space to publicly address strangers by allowing individuals to speak
without risking their identity or reputation. Adopting different “privacy practices” and
modes of disguise, from white screens to masks to pixels, talk shows used a variety of
technologies to ensure participants’ anonymity when the topic was deemed
stigmatizing. The individual struggle with publicness was transposed, as it were, to
the conflict between modes of publicness.
This was the case with Lucio who, in 1996, appeared in an episode of Let the
Brave titled “The Many Types of Sex.” According to Ziad Noujeim, the show’s host,
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this was the first Arab television show to tackle the subject in such an “open” manner
(personal interview, December 15, 2013). He was referring to the fact that the episode
featured real homosexual and bisexual men speaking about themselves on national
television. Sitting among the studio audience, three participants wearing white masks
talked about the stigma and shame of their sexual desires, repeatedly framing their
experience as “leading double-lives” and “wearing masks.” 30 When Noujeim asked
one of the anonymous guests, who had expressed that he was comfortable with his
sexuality, why he doesn’t remove his mask, “Noun” answered: “For legal reasons
[…] fear is scandal at work, scandal at home, among neighbors, before the state. I am
in a continuous relation of illegitimacy with everyone, with society.” Another
participant, “Meem,” explained: “As long as you are alive you will have…not two
faces, probably more [laughs]. Perhaps three…you sleep as someone and wake up the
next day as someone else, the person you are supposed and asked to be.”
Not surprisingly, following the broadcast of the episode, a detective from the
General Security visited LBC’s offices to inquire about the masked guests. He was
supposedly responding to a public complaint that was lodged against the show. “Last
night you hosted loutiyeen [faggots] on the show,” he told Janane Mallat, the show’s
producer; “I need to know their names.” After correcting him, stating that these were
not loutiyeen but mithliyeen jinsiyyan [homosexuals], Mallat told him that she didn’t
know their names because they had arrived to the studio wearing masks. Mallat was
keen on protecting her guests; “They could’ve been sent to jail had they not covered
30

Compare the use of masks to disguise identity and protect reputation, as seen in this talk show
episode, to the recent adaptation of the mask as a tool of disguise against pervasive technologies
of surveillance in Zach Blass’s “fag face.” The goal in both is to hide one’s identity. While the
latter tries to evade surveillance, the former is a staged attempt to become visible.
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their faces […] I wasn’t going to risk these people’s reputation and life and…in front
of the camera.” As a prosthetic, the mask enabled the public appearance of otherwise
stigmatized bodies. However, masks may also reproduce stigma by reifying the queer
obligation to hide.31
When I first started conducting research on queer visibility online in 2011
(discussed in detail in chapter 3), I interviewed George Azzi, a gay activist and cofounder of Helem - the first LGBT rights advocacy organization in Lebanon - to
discuss his decision to publish a blog under his real and full name. During our
conversation over Skype, Azzi referred to his handle “Nomaskleb.” He recalled the
masks and distorted voices on that episode of Let the Brave, remembering the
powerful effect they had on him and how they made him feel: “The gay people on the
show looked scary. I believe that the only way to change society is to see the real
faces of LGBT people,” adding “masks will just make them look different and
weird.” That homosexuality on these shows was often discussed in connection to
other social deviances, such as addiction and prostitution, Azzi explains, made it into
a source of shame inviting potential violence against the exposed individual and
therefore mandating the masking of their identity.
Anonymity, in that sense, is not a desirable strategy to transform the dominant
symbolic order as it is seen as a further pathologizing of non-normative sexualities.
31

The notion of a public sexual identity, in an Arab context, has been dismissed by some scholars
as inauthentic. The argument against publicness was most staunchly made by Arab scholar
Joseph Massad. In his critique of the 2002 Queen Boat Affair, when the Egyptian police raided the
Queen Boat, a discotheque moored on the Nile in Cairo, and arrested 52 men on the charges of
debauchery, Massad (2002) argued that “it was not same-sex sexual practices that were being
repressed by the Egyptian police but rather the sociopolitical identification of these practices
with the Western identity of gayness and the publicness that these gay-identified men seek”
(p.382). It seems to elide Massad that, in their highly publicized trials, the men wore masks to
cover their faces in a desperate attempt to safeguard theirs and their family’s reputation.
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This is all to highlight that the effects of particular forms of anonymous visibility are
not uniform and cannot be pre-determined. They are often contradictory,
simultaneously inspiring recognition and disidentification. In a way, the televisual
spectacle of masked homosexuals also made Azzi want to be one. But beyond a
critical engagement with the representation of sexual difference and how it shapes
individuals’ self-understanding, the question of queer media visibility allows us to
unpack the perceived role of the media in representing social reality more broadly.

Conclusion
One of the main claims of their producers is that talk shows draw otherwise
separate communities and publics together, bridging the social, sectarian, and actual
physical distances that separate them. By tackling controversial topics, producers
made use of audiences’ opinions and attitudes around sexual difference to publicly
stage regional, socio-economic, and sectarian distinctions. As Mallat explains, Let the
Brave gave people “a chance to get acquainted with other Lebanese citizens who are
very different from them” (personal interview, December 23, 2013).
For Mallat, the show "opened doors that were closed since the war." She was
referring to actual, physical boundaries that had been erected, consolidated, and
internalized between and among communities over the course of fifteen years. She
proudly emphasized that her team of reporters used to go "everywhere:"
Wherever we had a topic we would go bring it from there. Tyr, Saida, Akkar,
Hamra, Achrafieh, Naccache, Bekaa. We went everywhere, because it was the
subject that would take us there, the story. Some people had never stepped
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outside Jounieh. So this is why the show was so appealing to everyone. It was
an eye opener for people who hadn’t been outside their little town or village,
and it brought to the audience another part of Lebanon.
The physical distance between the regions and neighborhoods that Mallat mentions is
actually much smaller than her statement suggests. The northern region of Akkar,
bordering Syria, is only a three-hour drive from Beirut (on a traffic-free highway).
The significance of her statement, however, lies in the way it evokes the vast
symbolic distances imagined by communities in a national population of 4 million
people. Such distances are often captured in non-verbal cues such as regional accents.
An Open Conversation episode about transexuality, aired in 2006, opens with
the story of Amale/Hussein Mawla. As the camera pans over a rural landscape, the
reporter states: "In Hussein’s village, secrets are scarce. Before the results of medical
exams had been issued, the news was already out." The report was about fifteen-year
old Amale who, according to medical exams, "turned out to be a boy." It featured
testimonies from Hussein, his parents, and his siblings who all spoke in a thick
Baalbaki accent. A predominantly Shia region in South East Lebanon, Baalback is
geographically closer to Syria than it is to Beirut. For the urban Sunni bourgeoisie
that constitutes Future TV’s primary target audience, the spectacle was as much about
showing rural poverty and “backwardness” as it was about seeing a trans adolescent.
Similarly, in a 1996 episode on pre-marital sex, Ziad Noujeim introduced the
story of Hala who was murdered by her brother after he suspected she was not a
virgin on her wedding night: "A few kilometers away from the city of Beirut,
Lebanon’s capital, something happened a little while ago – in 1995 – the team of Let
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the Brave went and saw. Watch and listen." The report opens with a shot of a Muslim
cemetery where a veiled crying woman is crouched on the ground next to her
daughter's tombstone. The camera then pans over Abu Samra, a working-class
neighborhood in the predominantly Sunni Northern city of Tripoli and, in the words
of the reporter, "the mirror of Hala's society and her family." We hear testimonies
from family members and neighbors, all speaking in a thick Tripoli accent. When
asked about Hala's story, a middle-aged man proudly states, "for us honor and dignity
are more important than eating and drinking.” A woman comments, "We heard about
the story but this has become normal for us." Beyond the content itself, these
televised spectacles on sex gone bad provide discursive sites where the representation
of a distant other serves to create and portray the cosmopolitan, urban center to itself.
This function of media and television in particular, to visualize and narrate the nation,
is pronounced in talk shows that claim to represent social reality.
This chapter has demonstrated how sexual and gender non-conformity are
discursively mobilized in the performance of socio-political identities – most notably
sectarian identities – in a postwar society where such identities had been muted in
public life. The attitudes and opinions on sexual deviance expressed on these talk
shows, serve as vehicles for the articulation of a range of social differences. Thus, the
televisual discourses on sexuality could be said to function as an infrapolitical force,
both channeling and masking the circulation of discourses where class, sect, and
region find expression in public. Furthermore, these talk shows have served as
platforms for the performance and articulation of newly-emerging sexual and gender
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identities, providing an interface for the actualization of queer identification and the
contestation of the hegemonic norms structuring sex and gender.
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CHAPTER TWO

The Private Lives of Nadine Labaki: Projecting Femininity in the National
Imaginary
“In Lebanon, you know, we live…it’s not an individualistic society. We live within
communities, within families, within neighborhoods. We’re very intimate with the
others, so this intimacy creates a lot of pressure. It comes from love. You’re
surrounded by so much love you’re always scared to deceive. So you end up being
the image that everybody wants from you but maybe it’s not exactly what you want.”
Nadine Labaki, personal interview, August 15, 2013
Introduction
Sukkar Banat (Caramel) is a 2007 Lebanese film set in a women’s beauty
salon in contemporary Beirut. In her first feature-length film, Lebanese director and
actor Nadine Labaki depicts the interconnected daily lives of five women around
salon “Si Belle.” In its close depiction of feminine artifice, Caramel’s feminist
credentials have been subject to debate. Indeed, the deployment of the beauty parlor
as a space of female solidarity and empowerment may be construed as a re-enactment
of a “postfeminist” trope popularized by the American women’s genre of the “chick
flick.” Owned by Layale, a young woman in her early 30s and played by Labaki
herself, the beauty parlor is the setting of love plots, illicit encounters, female rivalry,
friendship, and endless self-styling. Labaki, who dedicated her first film to “Beirut,
Sitt el-Donia” (Beirut, Lady of the World), represents her home city and its social
fabric through the lives of women, in a film about women. In its beautiful
cinematography of interior spaces – bathrooms, waxing rooms, and bedrooms –
Caramel takes intimacy, and intimacy among women in particular, as a site of social

98

observation. By representing the private lives of women – their negotiation of family
ties, social obligations, gender roles, and moral norms – Caramel struck a chord that
resonated with its local and international audiences, for different reasons.
This chapter takes femininity as an object of inquiry through a reading of
Labaki’s oeuvre. In addition to Caramel, it considers the filmmaker’s second and
equally successful feature film w halla’a la wayn? (Where Do We Go Now?) as well
as her work on Arab music videos to unpack the cultural politics that structure the
representation of femininity in the postwar national imagination. Particularly, I
explore the semiotic and material labor of femininity in the construction and
contestation of the fraught categories of “tradition” and “modernity,” “East” and
“West.” Through her representation of femininity in music videos and in Caramel
and of motherhood in Where Do We Go Now?, Labaki paints a portrait of women in
contemporary Lebanon, examining their role and place in society and shedding light
on gender relations and the power dynamics that govern them.
The meaning of Labaki’s work, I argue, is necessarily re-routed through –
without being overdetermined – by the global cultural circuits of international film
festivals and their Orientalizing gaze. As for the much-debated feminist credentials of
her work, I suggest that Labaki’s commitment to the representation of womanhood –
and femininity in particular – through her own subject-position as a woman could be
characterized as feminist inasmuch as it strives to depict gender as an axis of social
stratification and domination, and to do so through a valorization of the feminine as a
site of storytelling. Through her consciously-crafted feminine authorship, where the
creative process is always already personal, Labaki mediates the meanings of her
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work and is therefore herself part of the analysis. As feminist film scholar Catherine
Grant (2001) has argued, approaching the filmmaker as auteur allows a broadening of
the notion of what constitutes a primary text in film studies. Thus, in addition to a
textual analysis of her two films and five of her music videos, I incorporate
paratextual elements – articles about, reviews of, and interviews with Labaki in local
and international media – and information gathered from an in-depth interview I
conducted with her in August 2013. By treating Labaki as an auteur, I want to
mobilize the figure of the woman filmmaker “to index questions central to
contemporary feminism such as visibility, agency, labor, desire, and power” (White,
2015, p.31), questions that cannot be fully apprehended through a strict focus on the
film as text. As I explain in the introduction, I am interested in trailing the meanings
that cultural productions accrue in processes of mediation, which necessarily include
their reception and interpretation by differently positioned local and global audiences.
My analysis therefore adopts a sociological approach to film that was dismissed in
feminist film theory of the 1970s and 1980s in favor of hermeneutic and
psychoanalytic readings (Grant, 2000).
By reading Labaki’s work vis-à-vis the author herself as well as the sociopolitical context and the media environment within which it circulates, this chapter
asks, how does cultural production politicize gender? While my intention is not to
prove nor disprove Labaki’s feminism through a close reading of her work, I do want
to explore what a feminist reading of these selected media productions – one that
actively looks for the connections between the personal and the political – can tell us
about the role of cultural production in making gender a category of social and
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political analysis. The feminist sensibilities in Labaki’s music videos and films, as I
will show, lie less in any definitive answers or prescriptions they may have about the
role and place of women in contemporary society and more in the public
introspections and collective interrogations they generate on femininity as an
embodied identity, a gender performance, and a symbolic realm that has been
historically associated with and instrumental for the construction of a private sphere
of human action. Through the subject-matter of productions and her public persona as
one of the most successful Arab filmmakers today, Labaki, I contend, succeeds in
asking the woman question anew.
Labaki’s claim to Arab fame came with a series of music videos that she
directed for Lebanese pop star Nancy Ajram in the mid-2000s, which catapulted a
then unknown Ajram into pan-Arab stardom. Ajram, who had been singing since she
was a teenager, re-launched her music career in 2003 with a music video, directed by
Labaki, for her song “Akhasmak Ah” (I will Fight You). The video was an instant
popular hit among the transnational Arab audience of the newly-emergent satellite
music channels. Rotana 32 and Melody TV created a local television-based music
culture, where a new form of fandom emerged around music videos and their stars.33

32

In 2003, Saudi Prince and business mogul Al-Walid Bin Talal launched four specialized
music channels under the name of Rotana, a company worth U.S$1 billion (Kraidy, 2009,
p.84). In an interview with Naomi Sakr (2007), Al-Walid boasted that Rotana controls 80%
of all the music in the Arab world (p.122). In the mid-2000s, Rotana, which owned a roster of
about 100 of the Arab world's top stars, produced “a new video every two to three days. The
most expensive can cost up
to $300,000, a fortune in the Arab entertainment industry, where a 30-episode series is
budgeted at half the price” (Usher, May 21, 2007).
33 Established Lebanese performers like Ragheb Alama, Najwa Karam, and Nawal al-Zoghbi
were already popular in the Arab world and had themselves introduced the music video as a
genre in the early nineties.
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In an environment of media convergence, new technologies allowed for high
production values, making the new generation of music videos, heralded by Labaki,
much more seductive to the Arab public. The music industry was undergoing a
technological transformation occasioned by the rise and social penetration of mobile
phone technology, satellite television, and the Internet. Digital technologies changed
everyday media consumption, introducing new habits and enabling increased
connections. Through mobile phones, viewers sent public text messages to be
displayed at the bottom of the screen during each music video’s broadcast. Many
were love letters, many were long-distance conversations, many expressed pan-Arab
sentiments, and many made absolutely no sense. Music videos thus became a site of
media convergence, around which multiple technologies coalesced to create a new
form of Arab entertainment and celebrity culture. Nancy Ajram was its poster child: a
young and seductive Lebanese woman, from a modest background, rising to Arab
fame through provocative performances in slick and ubiquitous music videos.
In the mid-2000s, “at any given time as many as a fifth of the free-to-air
channels on Nilesat (one of the Arab satellite networks) may be broadcasting video
clips” (Armbrust, 2005, p.18). For Labaki, this was a way for her to experiment with
representations of femininity but also with audience reception: “every music video I
did was a huge success. It was maybe aired over 50 times every day. There is not one
household in Lebanon that didn’t watch them” (personal interview, August 15, 2013).
The credits were shown at the end of each video, with the director’s name often
appearing in the opening sequences as well, which made authorship highly visible.
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This allowed Labaki to experiment with how people react to her work: “because in
Lebanon you sign the music video, ‘directed by…’ people started knowing me and
telling me what they like or don’t like. They tell you what they think about your work
because they know you” (personal interview, August 15, 2013). The genre’s ubiquity,
therefore, popularized the videos’ directors who developed distinctive styles and
aesthetics, becoming famous in their own right. Stars relied on directors to lure
audiences through constant innovation in characters, plots, and settings. This
investment in the visual representation of music, by stars and the industry, paved the
way for the rise of a new generation of music video directors, providing a lucrative
opportunity for young talents to experiment with cinematography and filmmaking. 34
With a background in television advertising, Labaki’s style and aesthetics had mass
appeal among Arab viewers, provoking public praise and condemnation, a wave of
imitation, and inciting a new discourse on gender.
Upon the release of “Akhasmak Ah” and its wide circulation on local and
satellite television, the Egyptian Parliament made an official request for television
stations to suspend its broadcast. The video featured a bare-footed Ajram in a little
black dress, dancing and singing before an all-male audience, flirting with and
provoking the patrons of a traditional Arabic coffee shop. 35 As the sole feminine
figure in a male homosocial space, Ajram teases, seduces, and taunts the men whose
lustful gaze she commands, ultimately provoking a fistfight among them and fleeing
the scene in amusement at the end. “Akhasmak Ah” sparked what came to be known

34
35

These include the late Yehya Saade, Joe Bou-Eid, and Leila Kanaan to name a few.
“Akhsmak Ah”: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N-8Vz6jnGAE
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as the music video controversy that preoccupied the Arab public sphere in the mid2000s. The genre became a popular phenomenon, an industry, and a subject of public
ridicule and legislation, where public outrage over the eroticized representation of
women’s bodies was symptomatic of the structural transformation of national media
landscapes. These music videos, dubbed “porno-clips” by Egyptian journalists
(Hasso, 2011, p.112), stirred sustained debates on the role of the mass media in
shaping and subverting moral attitudes and gender norms.
This new discourse, circulating in public, yoked the eroticized representation
of women in the media to an ongoing Euro-American cultural imperialism. Local
music videos were perceived as a vehicle for the imitation and transmission of the
West’s morally suspect values (El-Messiri, March 17, 2005; Ismail, 2005). As such,
they were the latest symptom of the cultural onslaught of globalization, one whose
sexual overtones subverted local customs of gender presentation, dislocating
individuals from their social and moral orders. Music videos, Frances Hasso explains
(2011), “produce exceptional pleasure and anxiety as mediums of sex culture and
sources of provocation” (p.112). Described as a cultural product of imperialist power,
they were accused of “producing a colonial culture that consolidates a colonial
reality” (Al-Barghouti, June 10, 2004). For some, the picture was less bleak, and the
controversial genre offered a “glimpse of a latent Arab world that is both liberal and
‘modernized’” (Freund, June 2003). Music videos, then, became a semiotically rich
site of social investigation. Journalists and commentators accused the makers and
stars of these videos of imitating Western formats, and consequently of promoting
foreign values deemed unsuitable for a local context. The culprits were young women
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who, through music videos, acquired access to the public sphere through the “wrong”
means. Complaints of religious and moral laxity and imitation of foreign sexual
practices were regularly lodged against Arab actresses and female entertainers
(Hasso, 2011, p.112). And as Kraidy (2015) argues in his recent analysis of Arab
celebrity culture, “attraction/revulsion revolves around the politics of female
celebrities’ ostentatious sexuality, and conformity/defiance turns around adherence to
prevailing social and gender norms (p.164). 36 Heated debates about the effects of
music videos in newspaper columns, television talk shows, and academic articles
foregrounded a preoccupation with the representation of masculinity and femininity
that indexed broader questions about the role of religion, family, and the state in the
maintenance of social order.
Just as newspaper columnists played a crucial role in connecting the Arab
reality TV discussions to wider themes of political participation (Kraidy, 2009),
commentators on Arab music videos used the genre to articulate their cultural and
political views of the social transformations underway in Arab societies. These
changes were often interpreted and debated through the structuring binary of tradition
and modernity, where media, and television culture in particular, was held responsible
for the erosion of the former in the name of the latter. As such, music videos
constituted “snapshots of modernity,” to borrow Nilufer Göle’s (2000) visual
metaphor, at a time when new media technologies were redefining intimacy and the
In the 2006 video for her song “Bayya’a al-Ward” (the florist), directed by Yehya Saade,
Lebanese singer Amale Hijazi appeared in a short pixie hair cut, wearing a man’s suit:
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gbrbDzk-2A8). Following negative public reactions in
the entertainment press to her masculine style, Hijazi apologized to her fans in subsequent
media appearances and interviews. It is worth noting here that Yehya Saade started his music
video career as the art director on Nadine Labaki’s videos.
36
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public sphere. They provide a “methodological gateway for reproducing the
significance of the ocular and the corporeal” (Göle, p.115), and tracing the
relationship of both to women’s visibility in public, and how we – as citizens and
consumers – are supposed to talk about it.
The controversies that music videos occasioned revolved around the question
of appropriate gender presentation in public, where the bodies of female celebrities
amplified the tension between global trends and local customs. At its core, the music
video controversy – which was also articulated as a crisis in celebrity culture – was
about gender divisions, separations, and hierarchies in contemporary Arab societies.
Not only did the genre expose the multiplicity of moral attitudes around expressions
of female sexuality and feminine embodiment and style, but it also revealed a
transformation in Arab female celebrity culture, which in the dominant conservative
view, was causing moral and cultural corruption through new technologies and media
genres. “Music video stars” (noujoum al-video clip), as they came to be known, were
young women who offered eroticized television performances in return for
commercial gain and overnight fame. For Arab media scholar Walter Armbrust
(2005), this eroticized femininity on Arab screens was an instance of the media’s
lucrative objectification and commoditization of women’s bodies (p.22). But for
Labaki, who was at the forefront of this new music video culture, this was about
creating new images of strong women in possession of their bodies, in tune with their
sexualities. Through music videos, she “created examples of Lebanese women” who,
as she says, “were very at ease in their bodies, very spontaneous, beautiful of course,
but especially at ease in their bodies” (Walker, February 22, 2008). As she reiterates
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in another interview, she wanted "to play on the image of Arab women; to create
examples of women that are free with their bodies, with their movements, doing
whatever they want to" (The West Australian, September 15, 2008). Labaki’s
successful collaborations with Ajram thus foreshadowed some of the themes and
scenes that the music video director would go on to pursue more thoroughly as a
bonafide filmmaker.
In “Ah w Noss,” Ajram – wearing an Egyptian gallabiya or traditional robe
and a headscarf covering parts of her hair – is an innocently seductive country girl
inviting and resisting the gaze of a determined admirer.37 The video, shot on location
in South Lebanon, is set in what is supposed to look like the Sa’id, the Upper
Egyptian rural landscape popularized in Egyptian films and television series. It
follows Ajram’s movements in the space of the village, from her bedroom to the
street to the rooftop, depicting her restrained seduction of a handsome young man –
played by a Lebanese model – who desperately seeks her attention. In “Ya Salam”
(Oh My), the camera follows Ajram as she steps offstage and into the dressing room,
zooming in on her face while she removes her wig and false eyelashes and wipes
away her make-up, all the while gazing at herself in a brightly illuminated mirror.38 In
“Yay Sehr ‘Ouyounou” (Oh! the magic of his eyes), Labaki casts Ajram as an
eccentrically-dressed hairstylist who falls for the muscular and masculine blue-eyed
construction worker across the street.39 Ajram sings about her desire and infatuation
with her lover’s eyes to her effeminate male assistant at the salon, her best friend on

“Ah W Noss”: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4wG15wKK-yY
“Ya Salam”: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RhnvSAxbk3k
39
“Yay Sehr ‘Ouyounou”: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=luueZ988lzY
37
38
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the bus, and to her mother and little sister in the bedroom and kitchen at home. Hers
is not a love to hide in shame, but one that she boasts about to everyone. “Inta Eh”
opens with a shot of Ajram lying in bed, the camera panning over her exposed legs
and her white satin nightgown. 40 In domestic scenes that alternate between the
bedroom and the bathroom, she cries about her cheating husband’s blatant infidelity.
It was these depictions of women in private spaces and intimate settings that spurred
public interest and outrage in equal measure. Indeed, music videos were critiqued for
their portrayal women where they should not be – in male-dominated public spaces –
and in intimate spaces that should be off-limit to the public gaze – on their beds, in
their bedrooms, in their bathrooms. 41

By doing so, music videos invited the

audience’s gaze into an otherwise private sphere while also staging female desire in
public. As such, they visualized what Morrocan feminist scholar Fatima Mernissi
(1987) identifies as narratives and acts of trespass in gender-segregated Arab
societies.42 For Mernissi (1987), “A woman is always trespassing in a male space
because she is, by definition, a foe [...] she is actually committing an act of aggression
against him merely by being present where she should not be” (p. 85). Music video
40

“Inta Eh”: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tHnoewqUJp0
Egyptian singer Ruby walked down a crowded street wearing a belly-dancing costume in
her debut 2003 video “Inta ‘Aref Leh” (You know why, dir. Sherif Sabry), causing an uproar
in Egypt. In her 2009 video “Ya ‘Ebn el Halal” (Good boy) directed by Yehya Saade,
Lebanese pop star Haifa Wehbe walked down and danced in a crowded alley with her
girlfriends, flirting with the men and women she encountered along the way. In her 2008
video “Birahti” (As I like, dir. Yehya Saadeh), Lebanese singer and actress Nicole Saba
opens the curtain to her bedroom, inviting the viewer into her intimate space. In the opening
sequence of her 2009 video “Khallini Shoufak” (Let me see you, dir. Yehya Saadeh), a white
curtain is lifted, revealing Lebanese diva Najwa Karam sitting on her bed.
42
Here, Saudi Arabia, the region’s Islamic center, provides the extreme case of gender
segregation: women cannot appear in public without wearing black robes and head covers;
they cannot drive cars, bicycles, or motorcycles; and public places such as restaurants and
coffeeshops must have separate seating sections for “family” and “men,” a practice that
legitimates the “family” as the pretext of women’s very presence in public.
41
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stars, as one member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt put it, represented “a tool
for moral destruction” (Jaafar, April 16, 2007) precisely because they turned trespass
into spectacle.
In its staging of this spectacle of feminine desire and intimacy, the LabakiAjram collaboration portrayed, in three-to-five minute long videos, archetypal
feminine roles: The country girl, the femme fatale, the performer, the young woman
in love, the bride, the cheated wife, and the neglected lover. Crucially, these roles –
and the aesthetic sensibilities they embodied – were inspired by Arab and
international cinema. Ajram’s retro look in “Akhasmak Ah” channeled Egyptian
actress Hind Rustom’s femme fatale of 1950s black-and-white Egyptian films.
Rustom’s blond hair and curves, and her recurrent portrayals of the seductive vixen,
had earned her the title of “the Arab Marilyn Monroe.” In “Ah W Noss,” Ajram
revives Egyptian actress – “Lady of the Arab Screen” – Faten Hamama’s role in
“Afwah wa Araneb” (Mouths and Rabbits, 1977), and the trope of the resilient yet
playful village girl who seduces but never yields. Ajram’s appearance on stage in “Ya
Salam” is comparable to Renee Zellweger’s character in Rob Marshall’s 2002 Jazz
musical Chicago. In her embellished blond wig, sequined white flapper dress, and
bright red lips, Ajram steps off-stage and into her dressing room at the end of a
performance of her hit song “Akhasmak Ah,” in the video’s opening sequence.
Labaki’s music videos, with their characters, scenes, settings, and plots, draw upon a
visual archive, local and international, that viewers are familiar with. Here, the
question of imitation should be asked anew, without an a priori condemnation of
imitation as a degraded cultural practice of representation. Imitation, in Labaki’s
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work, requires creative practices of translation, adaptation, and citation. Beyond
music video themes and the commentary they engendered on the unresolved tension
between tradition and modernity, East and West, Labaki’s citational aesthetics – the
recycling and adaptation of old and new, local and global forms – troubled the terms
of the very binaries they drew upon by not forcing us to choose. Indeed, this ability to
cite multiple cultural sources is Labaki’s artistic signature as a Lebanese and Arab
contemporary feminine auteur.

The Seductions of a Global Filmmaker: Labaki as Feminine Auteur
After earning a degree in audio-visual media from the French Jesuit
Université Saint Joseph in Beirut,43 Labaki started her career directing commercials
for Lebanese television. Her breakthrough came with a series of music videos she
directed for Lebanese singer Nancy Ajram in the mid-2000s. Labaki then wrote the
script for Caramel while at the Residence de Cannes in 2005. The film, whose
shooting ended a week before the beginning of the Israeli war on Lebanon in July
2006, premiered in 2007 at the 60th Cannes Film Festival. From its inception,
Labaki’s debut feature-film was molded by the politics and aesthetics of the
international festival circuit. Earning her many awards, accolades, and transnational
fame, Caramel’s wide local and international success launched Labaki’s career as a
Lebanese, Arab, Middle Eastern, and global filmmaker. With a portfolio of awardwinning television commercials, music videos, and films, Labaki has made a major
imprint on postwar Lebanese visual culture. A frequently photographed and
43 Labaki’s graduation film “11 Rue Pasteur” won the Best Short Film Award at the Biennale
Arab Cinema at the Arab World Institute in Paris in 1997.
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interviewed celebrity, she regularly appears on the covers of regionally-distributed
Arab entertainment and women’s magazines such as Laha (For her), Sayyidati (My
Lady), and Elle Orientale. She is versatile in her self-presentation and able to occupy
different cultural spaces and speak in multiple tongues. In her television appearances
in France, Labaki – educated in French missionary schools – speaks with an
impeccable French accent.
The public persona and image of the woman director, particularly in the
context of “world cinema” in which women directors are increasingly coming into
view, is increasingly important in the reception and analyses of her work (White,
2015, p.14). At its most basic, auteurism conceives the film as a “conspicuous”
product of its director and an expression of her individual personality, which can be
traced “in a thematic and/or stylistic consistency over all (or almost all) of [her]
films” (Caughie, 1981, p.9). The idea of the director as film author, or auteur,
emerged in the late 1940s and early 1950s, within debates that took place in French,
British, and U.S film magazines “about the relative artistic value of cinema,
compared with the much longer-established arts” (Grant, 2001, p.114). Feminist film
scholar Catherine Grant (2000) identifies the auteur, following Steve Neale, as a
“brand name," a means of “labeling and selling a film and of orienting expectations”
(p.102). As Patricia White notes (2015), from the range of work presented in festivals
like Tribecca, Toronto, and Sundance – festivals that Labaki regularly attends and
competes in – “emerges a picture of contemporary film art and commerce in which
‘female director’ is figured sometimes as puzzle, sometimes as brand, and
increasingly as promise" (p.30-31).
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I understand my reading of Labaki’s oeuvre as “a study in portraiture”
(Mayne, 1994, p.6): I am interested in the films she has made, as portraits of women,
but also in how they have come to shape Labaki’s image as a woman and a
filmmaker. By treating Labaki as auteur, I want to consider the various texts and
images, which bear the imprint “directed by Nadine Labaki,” in relationship to each
other.44 But I also consider what has been said about her as integral to the meanings
of her films. Methodologically, doing so broadens what constitutes a primary text to
include interviews, “where the auteur, in addressing cults of fans and critical viewers,
can engage and disperse his or her own organising agency as auteur . . . writing and
explaining . . . a film through the promotion of a certain intentional self [with] the
commercial dramatization of self as the motivating agent of textuality” (Corrigan,
1991, p.108-109). This is evidenced, for instance, in Labaki’s claim that the ignition
point for Caramel was that she was not at ease with her body and with who she was
(personal interview, August 15, 2013). As I will show in more detail later, Labaki’s
identities – as a woman, a Christian Lebanese, and an Arab – explicitly and avowedly
inform the creative process and the social narratives that are weaved around the films
themselves. The female portraits that populate Labaki’s work include her own. This
dialogic interplay between the real and the fictional, life and representation, the
director and the actor, which characterizes Labaki’s account of her work, is a
necessary component of the feminist sensibilities underpinning Labaki’s productions.
For Patricia White (2015), the notion of authorship is of critical importance to
feminist film studies in large part because women’s access to the means of cultural
44

I borrow this formulation from Mayne’s (1994) portrait of Dorothy Arzner (p.6-7).

112

production has been historically restricted. For women directors like Labaki from
developing and non-Western countries, this access is further intercepted by and rerouted through local and global ideological and economic forces which inevitably
shape and constrain their films. Circulating as they are on an international scale, these
films, White argues (2015), are “uniquely important vectors of transnational feminist
imagination and publicity” (p.18). But they also, as is the case in Labaki’s work,
reflect the local situation of women through their depictions of female characters and
plots but also through the gender discourse they produce in their national publicity,
circulation, and reception, in a media landscape where such representations are
scarce. According to the 2005 U.N-commissioned Arab Human Development Report,
“Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World,” “women’s social political and
cultural roles were conspicuously absent from films, indicating that Arab cinema
shows no concern for the evolution of women’s positions in Arab societies” (UNDP/
RBAS, 2005, p. 157). 45 The report concludes that the “visual exposure of the
mechanics of women’s submission” is among the most important contributions of
Arab cinema in challenging the social sexual hierarchy (p.15). Arab countries ranked
the lowest in the 2014 Gender Gap Report published by the World Economic Forum,
with Lebanon ranking 135th of the 142 surveyed states and 141 out of 142 in the
political empowerment category (World Economic Forum, 2014).
In light of deeply-engrained and persistent gender inequalities in the region,
films about women by women acquire particular significance in terms of the new
visibilities they create for Arab women at home and abroad. The category of
45

The report included a study of 31 Arab films produced between 1990 and 2000.
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“women’s cinema,” as White explains, has long been contested in feminist film
scholarship: Is it a category of authorship, as in films by women? Or is it more
content-oriented, as in films about women? Labaki’s films, which she co-writes (with
Rodney el-Haddad and Jihad Hojeily), directs, and stars in, in addition to her music
videos for Lebanese female pop stars, undoubtedly place her in both categories. In
this regard, Labaki should be considered alongside other Arab women filmmakers as
well as television writers and directors, including film directors Enass al-Deghidi
(Egypt), Moufida Tlatli (Tunisia), Randa al-Chahal (Lebanon), Jocelyne Saab
(Lebanon), Haifaa al-Mansour (Saudi Arabia), and Annmarie Jacir (Palestine), and
television directors Rim Hanna (Syria), Rasha Charbatji (Syria).46 Indeed, the work of
these directors, whether in cinema or television, should be considered within what
Layale Ftouni (2012) calls an Arab feminist epistemology whose objective is “to
retrieve the agency of Arab women, who are excluded from, or misrepresented within
the narratives of History, culture, politics, and knowledge” (p.163). While Ftouni is
writing about the lack of such an epistemology in critical engagements with
modernity within the fields of Middle East gender studies, her call for an
epistemology that regards “the existential reality of being a woman as a priori to
becoming Arab,” and one that requires strategic moves to “empiricise the lived
experiences of women in Arab societies” (emphasis in original, p.163) also applies to
film and media studies in the region.
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This is far from being an exhaustive list. For a more comprehensive overview, see Rebecca
Hillauer (2005). The encyclopedia of Arab women filmmakers. Cairo, Egypt. American
University of Cairo Press. For more on the history of Arab women in film, see Viola Shafik
(1998). Arab cinema: History and cultural identity. Cairo, Egypt: American University of
Cairo Press.
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Labaki is in fact adamant about the responsibility of cinema in bringing about
social change, and has publicly expressed her vision of and admiration for a sociallycommitted cinema. In a Huffington Post interview, she emphasizes the importance of
cinema for women, “it's like a cry for help, cinema. It's like you're shouting out loud
something that you are feeling deep inside, it's not just about telling a story. It's about
really expressing yourself and trying to make a change because everything needs to
be changed, nothing is going the way it should be” (Rothe, June 9, 2015). In an
interview with France 24, she explains that “when a woman makes a film you feel as
if it’s a scream, as if she’s expressing herself, her view on society, more than merely
telling a story. There are obsessions that the woman wants to talk about […]” (France
24, May 18, 2015). By describing cultural production as self-expression, Labaki
insists on the subjective – and on female subjectivity in particular – as a catalyst for
the creative process. She sketches out a cinema that is in conversation with the social
reality it inhabits and represents as a cultural text, a reality that is always already
gendered. The filmmaker, according to this vision, is a social critic and an activist. In
her metaphorization of women’s cinema as a “scream,” a “cry for help,” a shouting
“out loud,” she outlines the political and personal stakes that undergird the creative
process. While this figuration of expressivity may curtail social critique through a
reabsorption of the social with the psychology of the individual woman director, the
importance of the “scream” lies in its social reverberations, its success or failure to
make women’s lived experiences visible in public, and therefore knowable.
Consequently, my analysis of Labaki’s work treats it as a feminist text for its
contribution to empiricize the lived experiences of women, to give a shape and form
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to publicly muted subjectivities, offering in the process a different perspective of
society, seen through the cracks of the door: in the dressing room, bedroom, and
bathroom, in the waxing room of a beauty parlor, or in the hotel room of an illicit
affair. Labaki’s cinema is a women’s cinema inasmuch as it wants “to effect a new
vision: to construct other subjects and objects of vision and to formulate the
conditions of visibility of another social subject” (DeLauretis, p.136). In this vision,
women, played by non-professional actresses, are not only victims.47 Indeed, Labaki
insists, in interviews, that she did not face any major trouble in the industry because
of her gender.48 Her women break the rules, cheat, lie, and conspire. They challenge
local conceptions of appropriate gender behavior without reproducing tired
stereotypes of Arab and Muslim women in the West.
Born in 1974, on the eve of the Lebanese civil war, Labaki belongs to the war
generation – jeel al-harb - and embodies a certain political sensitivity that undercuts
it. As she explains in a 2007 interview with Sir David Frost, Labaki grew up during
the war yet was sheltered from its direct violence. This feeling of disjunction – of an
endless war without immediate violence – is not exceptional. It is this experience of
the banality of war, its everyday nature, its prolonged tempo that defines Labaki’s
generation. They lived through it, and survived. Labaki’s commitment to survival, as
a necessary artistic and political – and indeed a personal – project captures a
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Labaki states in an interview: “I looked everywhere in life for them, in public places, in
restaurants. I had about five or six people scouting for these people I had in my mind. They
looked everywhere” (Chapman, January 30, 2008).
48 "I'm not saying we are in a perfect situation right now, but women are expressing
themselves more and more freely," she argues. "Lebanon is a free country and it's not too
strict on women. We cannot deny we have a lot of issues and taboos to deal with. But I've
never had any difficulty in my job because I'm a woman" (Aftab, June 20, 2012).
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generational ethos in its preoccupation with the mechanics of survival rather than
revolution. How do women exist in a patriarchal society? How can we prevent the
war? These two questions, respectively, orient Labaki’s two long-feature films
Caramel (2007) and Where Do We Go Now? (2012). In her pathbreaking essay
“Women’s Cinema as Counter Cinema” (1973), Claire Johnston writes that “In order
to counter our objectification in the cinema, our collective fantasies must be released:
women’s cinema must embody the working through of desire: such an objective
demands the use of the entertainment film” (p.33). Johnston’s insistence that pleasure
accompany politics, at odds with the American feminist climate of the 1970s captured
by Laura Mulvey’s “destruction of pleasure as a radical weapon” (p.20), resonates in
Labaki investment in pleasuring her audiences. It is at this juncture, where politics,
entertainment, and pleasure intersect, that Labaki positions herself as a feminine
auteur. For her, the film “has to be accessible to everybody. At the same time artistic
and commercial, because I want everybody to see it.” But, she continues, “We have
this problem, we think that a film that is commercially successful is not intellectuallystimulating. This is something I face; intellectuals think that my films are too
commercial” (personal interview, August 15, 2013).
In his review of Where Do We Go Now? for the Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar,
cultural and film critic Pierre Abi Saab (September 26, 2011) writes, “The young
filmmaker’s charm is irresistible. An actress, director, and citizen of the (Third)
World who knows how to address the West and tickle the feelings of her
contemporaries.” Seduction, Abi Saab argues, is Labaki’s primary mode of
signification, one that knows “how to dramatize the wound without confronting it”
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and whose vision is “utopian yet pragmatic from a commercial perspective.” Labaki’s
powers of seduction lie precisely in her ability to please multiple gazes by scratching
the surface. She is uninterested in offering solutions, and the ones she does offer are
“superficial” in nature, as her critics have pointed out. In Where Do We Go Now?
Labaki’s women attempt to prevent civil strife in their village by distracting the men
with hashish, Russian prostitutes, and fake spiritual revelations. Labaki exclaims,
“Some people took this to the letter! What does that mean?! It’s all a joke! It doesn’t
mean that I found the solution. I don’t claim to have the solution” (personal interview,
August 15, 2013). Instead, Labaki dwells in visually stunning descriptions. Her sets
and costumes are meticulously designed, and her interior spaces, in music videos and
films, capture specific local tastes and aesthetics. In fact, she relies on visual signs to
subtly convey without overstating religious and social diversity in the country.
Labaki’s poetics and aesthetics, then, rely on the power of surface, and as such
constitute what Rey Chow (1995) has identified as a “new kind of ethnography”
(p.143) in postcolonial cinema. The first element of this new ethnography, she
explains, is that “it presents the results of its ‘research’ in the form not of books or
museum exhibits but of cinema” (p.143). In her discussion of visuality and sexuality
in contemporary Chinese cinema, Chow draws a compelling theoretical framework to
understand how visuality operates beyond the colonizer’s gaze in what could be
called the postcolonial politics of visuality. “What is needed, after the ethical polemic
of Said’s Orientalism is understood,” she argues, is the more difficult task of
investigating how visuality operates in the postcolonial politics of non-Western
cultures besides “the subjection to passive spectacle that critics of orientalism argue”
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(p.13). Chow provocatively asks: how do we deal with the fact that non-Westerners
also gaze, are voyeurs and spectators? And how do we discuss what happens when
“the East” uses Western instruments of visuality to fantasize itself and the world
(p.13). When we fail to account for the gaze of the East through an overemphasis on
the “dominant” Western gaze in order to deconstruct it, we superimpose upon “West”
and “East” “the great divide between seer and seen, active eyes and passive spectacle
– a great divide that can as easily perpetuate as disable orientalism” (p.13).
To understand this new ethnography, Chow relinquishes “close reading” in
favor of a focus on the surface, prioritizing the filmic and visual over the thematic.
Identifying an obsession with surfaces in the work of Chinese filmmaker Zhang
Yimou, she shows that it is this obsession with visualizing, recording, and displaying
an imagined reality – through particular tactics of visuality such as camera angles and
color schemes – that characterizes his filmmaking as an ethnographic practice. What
is displayed here is not so much a particular story, character, or theme but rather “the
act of displaying, of making visible” (p.149). With this shifting of attention from the
message to the form of the utterance and to artifice, meaning is displaced onto the
level of surface exchange. Such a displacement, Chow argues, “has the effect of
emptying ‘meaning’ from its conventional space – the core, the depth, or the inside
waiting to be seen and articulated – and reconstructing it in a new locus – the locus of
the surface, which not only shines but glosses; which looks, stares, and speaks”
(p.143). Labaki’s image, as much as her films, is a shiny surface that “looks, stares,
and speaks,” for the West and for Lebanon.
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In a 2011 episode of his popular political talk show Kalam el-Nass (Talk of
the People), 49 Lebanese television personality Marcel Ghanem hosted Labaki in a
special episode dedicated to Where Do We Go Now? As the film’s opening scene
screened in the background, Ghanem introduced Labaki with the following words:
I was in Paris, a month ago, when I made the decision to host Nadine Labaki
and her team, after watching advertisements for her film, and after reading in
many magazines and newspapers and internet sites articles about this
surprising woman who comes from the Land of Cedars. I entered a restaurant
and was asked by the manager, ‘where are you from?’ I told her from
Lebanon. She said, ‘from the country of Nadine Labaki?’ I said yes. She said,
‘I watched Caramel, and I am so eager to watch the new film.’ As soon as I
came back to Lebanon, I asked for an exclusive screening of the new film
before its official public release (September 22, 2011).50
Ghanem’s celebratory introduction of Labaki demonstrates how the filmmaker is the
closest thing the country has to a national sweetheart. She makes the country proud,
and, more importantly, she makes the world proud of Lebanon. For the Lebanese, the
consensus around Labaki’s films is in fact a consensus that she makes them look good
abroad. Both of her films premiered at the prestigious Cannes Film Festival –
Caramel at the Director’s Fortnight in 2007 and Where Do We go Now? in the “Un
Certain Regard” category in 2011. Both were Lebanon’s official entry in the Best
Foreign Film category at the American Academy Awards. They were further

49 This is the longest running political talk show on Lebanese television and remains a
flagship program for the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation.
50

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q4ucPCq2XPw
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recognized with awards from international films festivals in Spain, Sweden, France,
Argentina, Canada, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Syria, something Labaki
proudly notes in her interviews and media appearances. The Independent dubbed her
the “poster girl” of Beirut (Aftab, June 20, 2012) and Variety magazine named her
among the Top Ten Directors to Watch at the Sundance Film Festival in 2007. In
addition, she has starred in television commercials for international brands such as
L’Oreal and Johnnie Walker. In the past two years, Labaki has also appeared in
supporting roles in three French films, Rock the Casbah (2013, French-Morroccan),
Mea Culpa (2014), and La Rancon de la Gloire (2014). In 2008, the French Ministry
of Culture and Communication awarded her the insignia of Chevalier in the Order of
Arts and Letters, which recognizes "significant contribution to the enrichment of the
French cultural inheritance” (Ministry of Culture and Communication, 2015), Labaki
is a true child of the Francophonie.
Indeed, the French state has repeatedly recognized and supported Labaki’s
work, symbolically and financially. As Neidhardt explains (2010), due to the
extremely high production costs of films and a lack of funding in the Middle East,
most of the financing is provided by European public film funds.51 The money is
allocated as loans to European private production companies that either function as
the main producer for an Arab director or cooperate with an Arab production
company and act as co-producer. 52 Thus, beyond their artistic and cultural value,
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Along with Germany, France is the main financer of co-productions with the Middle East.
As far as cinema is concerned, most of the co-produced films are not shown in the Arab
region apart from one-off events, if at all (Reinhardt, p.43).
52
At the Barcelona Conference in 1995, foreign affairs ministers from the EU and 12
Mediterranean states agreed to form the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to nurture closer
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films are also commodities that undergo a highly industrialized process of technical
workflows, division of labor, financing, marketing, and distribution. In addition, due
to the scarcity of cinema screens in the Arab world, films from the region need to rely
on European markets for financial purposes, which places them in a situation of
economic dependence (Neidhardt, 2010, p.32). “Ironically,” Reinhardt comments,
“the European funds demand local stories from the Arab film-makers, but
sophisticated films. Yet what does ‘local’ stand for if the film’s market is Europe and
its audiences cannot decode the Arab Middle Eastern local stories?” (Neidhardt,
p.32). In this market configuration, Neidhardt explains, European funds and
spectators expect filmmakers to represent their national or cultural-religious
collective and make its specific features comprehensible. “The outcome can only be
stereotypical” (Reinhardt, 2010, p.46).
But the appeal of Labaki’s films for foreign audiences, and more specifically
European and American viewers must not be reductively understood as “pandering to
a Western gaze.” Labaki wants to be in conversation with a Lebanese public and to
speak its dialect, but she also wants her film to speak universally: “Why would I want
to just speak to Lebanese? For me, it’s not enough” (personal interview, August 15,
2013). The common assumption that the rise of global culture –global cinema in this
case – through transnational capitalism will inevitably lead to the erosion of cultural
distinctions is troubled by communication scholar Nector Garcia-Canclini (1995) who
argues that distinction will continue to lead individuals (and collectives such as the

economic and cultural ties between the Middle East and North Africa region and Europe. One
result was the launch of the Euromed Audiovisual Programmes, which address media
professionals in both regions.
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nation) to hold on to, unearth, or recuperate traditions to distinguish themselves.
Music is central in this regard. Labaki’s husband, Lebanese pianist and composer
Khaled Mouzannar, created the soundtracks of both her films, mixing classical, jazz,
and oriental music with the colloquial lyrics of indie Lebanese singer Tania Saleh.53
In his discussion of the “cultured middle-class,” Garcia-Canclini (1995) explains that
it is not the association of this class with a repertory of modern objects and messages
that defines it as cultured; rather, it is so because “it possesses the knowledge of how
to incorporate different elements, from tradition and modernity, into matrices of
social privilege and symbolic distinction. There are elites and popular sectors that
reestablish the specificity of their patrimonies or search for new signs in order to
differentiate themselves from others” (p.266). But also, and crucially in the context of
international film markets, differentiate themselves and their societies from preestablished and stereotypical images abroad. As Syrian documentary filmmaker Omar
Amiralay puts it, local filmmakers also seek out transnational collaborations “to
provide an alternative body of representations and meanings of our countries to
Europeans” (Al Abdallah Yakoub, 2006, p. 116).
Through her gendering of national cinema on the world stage, Labaki seeks to
destabilize the common global perception of Lebanon as a country at war. She does
so in Caramel by avoiding the subject, and in Where Do we Go Now? by confronting
it head on. As she explains in a 2007 interview with British television host Sir David
Frost on Al-Jazeera English, following the release of her debut film, the choice not to
make a film about war was deliberate: “I wanted to show a different side of my
53
Caramel’s “Mreyte ya Mreyte” (Mirror Mirror) and Where Do We Go Now?’s “Hashishet Albi”
(Hashish of my Heart) became national hits.
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country, of my people, that you don’t necessarily know over the world. Because the
first thing that comes to your mind when you say Beirut is a completely different
image. It’s a country at war with miserable people” (Frost Over the World, October
26, 2007). She continues, “we are people who are very colorful, who have a very
strong will to live and survive, who have a sense of humor, who are very warm. And
we deal with everyday problems and everyday issues and we are humans. It was
important for me to show that and to say this about my country.”54 Labaki is attentive,
to use de Lauretis’ (1987) words, to “the wider public sphere of cinema as a social
technology” (p. 134) whereby the politics of address, “who is making films for
whom, who is looking and speaking, how, where, and to whom” (p.135) matter. The
author’s positionality and the film’s circulation are therefore important questions that
inform the film’s politics of representation.
In his interview with Labaki, Frost states, “Unlike other movies made by
Lebanese filmmakers, this one is not about war. It’s about love” (Frost Over the
World, October 26, 2007). As hard as it tried to distance itself from Lebanon’s
political reality, Labaki’s romantic comedy could not escape the frame of war through
which it was primarily received and understood. In fact, this insistence on the absence
of war – in local and international media accounts and reviews of the film– landed
Caramel back within Lebanon’s bloody history, not outside it. The need to reaffirm
that the film is not about the war exposed the impossibility of escaping its still
imposing specter. In an interview about a film that is not about the war, Labaki – as it
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“We had a lot of doubts about what the film said, but now I know that it was my mission
after all: This is my country, not the clichéd image that people have in their heads of a
country at war. It has a message of hope” (Chapman, January 30, 2008).
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turns out – could speak of nothing else. Frost then asked her about her experience
growing up during the civil war. After describing her relatively sheltered upbringing,
Labaki explains that it was important for her to forget the war: “It has been so
overanalyzed, and seen in so many different angles. I didn’t feel that I was going to
add anything more.” A year after her film was released though, the country had
reached a political deadlock because of its deep polarization between the pro-U.S
March 14 movement and the Iran-backed March 8 movement, discussed later in more
detail. As she states in an interview, “I thought I could get away from it but the reality
of the war caught up with me” (Doshi, 2009). In her public accounts of Where Do We
Go Now? Labaki repeatedly describes that the idea for the film was inspired by the
eruption of armed sectarian clashes in Beirut and around the country in May 2008.
“At that time I was pregnant with my first child. I guess it does change your
perspective on things. You wonder, what kind of a world is this? How am I going to
raise this child in this world?” (Smith, 2012) Through her insistence on the seamless
continuity between cinema and real life on one hand and motherhood and filmmaking
on the other, Labaki blurs the boundary – in her account of her work – between the
personal and the political, reality and fiction, and caretaking and creative work. If the
war was ignored in the focus on femininity in Caramel, it made its comeback through
motherhood in Where Do We Go Now?

The Reticent Poetics of Caramel
“[Homosexuality] is very secret, which is why I decided to write about that. I
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see a lot of homosexual women and men who just keep it to themselves, and they lead
very unhappy lives where they end up hating their bodies and hating themselves.
Many people live with it in secret, but there are also many victims and others who
have problems dealing with it in public. It’s the contradiction of the country”
(Chapman, January 30, 2008).
In this excerpt from her interview with Vulture about her then newly-released film
Caramel, Labaki makes two related points that capture the ethos of her debut feature
film. First, she reveals the secret that is homosexuality in Lebanon, then she invokes
it – the secret – as the reason for her writing. Secrecy is the centerpiece of Caramel,
its structuring narrative device and plot line. In its depiction of the interconnected
lives of five women around a beauty salon in Beirut, the film traces their fraught
relationship with their bodies, desires, and familial and romantic attachments. Their
everyday navigation of social spaces is conditioned by practices of concealment and
revelation, requiring them to pass as that which they are not, hide who they are, and
confess their inability to do so when they break down or fail. Although the film is not
about homosexuality, it is about the kind of secrecy that structures its circulation in
public, and which can be discerned in the movements and restrictions of women’s
sexuality in public.
Layale, the owner of the salon, is having an affair with a married man. In her
late twenties or early thirties, she still lives with her parents and teenage brother,
hiding under the bed cover and in the bathroom whenever she speaks on the phone
with her lover. Nisreen, the salon’s hairstylist, is engaged to be married to a man who
does not know that she is no longer a virgin. Jamale, a regular customer and friend, is
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a divorced mother of two going through menopause and desperately trying to
maintain a younger image of herself. Rima, the salon’s masculine-looking hair
washer, is attracted to women and develops a crush on a new customer. Finally, Rose
is a middle-aged seamstress who lives across the street from the salon with her senile
older sister Lily whom she cares for. The individual plots constitute the film’s
narrative storyline, which features only one supporting male character, the
neighborhood’s friendly policeman who is infatuated with Layale and played by
famous Lebanese television comedian Adel Karam. 55 Through these connected
individual stories, Labaki invites us to examine the pressures of intimate and familial
relationships on women. What does sisterhood in old age mean? Why do women get
plastic surgery? Where do non-married couples fuck in Beirut? Is pre-marital female
virginity a norm?
While themes of infidelity, jealousy, rivalry, shame, love, and female
abjection are universal in scope, their representation in the film draws on their
socially-specific manifestations in a contemporary Lebanese context. In her script
and cinematography, Labaki captures a sense of locality that has universal appeal.
This slippage between the film’s global circulation and reception and its local
significance is best exemplified in its description by Western media as a “chick flick,”
a light women’s comedy about the status of women in the Arab world, in the Middle
East, in Muslim societies. The chick flick is a commercial women’s genre, specific to
the U.S., described by feminist scholars as a “protofeminist social vehicle for
expressing (and managing) women’s discontent” and a “populist antidote to avant55

Along with Labaki, Karam is the only professional actor on the film’s cast.
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garde feminist aesthetics” (White, 2015, p.38). Taking stock of the global flows of
culture and capital that shape the production and reception of generic formulas like
the “women’s film” outside the West, media and film scholars’ analysis of the genre’s
global manifestations must not be overdetermined by histories and discourses specific
to their original Western contexts. As Patricia White (2015) has recently argued,
“women directors participate in changing national cinema cultures by tapping into
generic formulas of the chick flick, at the same time accessing international circuits in
which these formulas are universalized” (p.37). In addition, generic features
themselves mutate as they move from one social context to another. Caramel may
have had a universal appeal, it may have drawn on familiar Euro-American cinematic
tropes and aesthetics, but it also, crucially, signifies nationally and regionally.
As a melodrama centered on women’s lives, Labaki’s is the first commercial
feature film directed by a woman, about women, in Lebanon.56 As she explains, the
idea of Caramel came from her realization that most women around her were
unhappy and from her inability to find a local female role model. Men too, she adds,
are not at ease and unable to navigate their lives between the “Western example of the
very liberated man” on one hand and “the rules and traditions” on the other, unsure
where they belong or how they should behave (personal interview, August 15, 2013).
Caramel, then, represents social and psychic tensions around gender identity and
behavior and the culture of secrecy that the inability or refusal to conform gives rise
56

Along with Labaki, Randa Chahal, Jocelyne Saab, and Danielle Arbid are prominent,
award-winning Lebanese filmmakers. Although their films featured lead female characters
(Chahal’s The Kite, 2002; Saab’s Dunia, 2005; Arbid’s In the Battlefield, 2004), they were
not specifically framed as about women in the same way that Caramel was by Labaki, the
media, and the critics. In addition, their films were not as commercially-successful as
Labaki’s.
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to among women. To talk about Caramel is to talk about Labaki herself:
The ignition point for Caramel was that I was not at ease with my body, me. I
was not at ease with who I am; I used to dream of becoming more…being
more liberated, being less afraid of who people perceive me as, how they look
at me, or the idea they have of me. Because there’s a big difference between
who I want to be and what I allow myself to be, because of that, because of
how people look at you, how they perceive you, what they expect of you
(personal interview, August 15, 2013).
As a film that is explicitly about women, Caramel is inspired by and mobilizes the
filmmaker’s own experience as a woman. Her own biography informs her account of
the film as well as its reception. Intimacy, the pressures it breeds and feeds upon, she
explains, can be self-alienating, but it also leads, as Labaki herself asserts, to selfcensorship: “Because of all this pressure, I am self-censored. I don’t need people to
censor me because I censor myself, naturally, because of the fact that I grew up here.
I know how to deal with it” (personal interview, August 15, 2013). Thus, Labaki
managed to tackle the sensitive topic of female sexuality without being censored. She
attributes this to her deeply engrained sense of self-censorship. “I know how to cheat,
in a way to please other people, to please society, my parents, my family, the people
who expect so many things from me and at the same time do what I want to do. And
I’ve found this balance […] In both movies I’ve made, that tackled sensitive, delicate
topics, they didn’t censor anything, not even a word” (Personal interview, August 15,
2013). Indeed, as Lebanese film critic Ibrahim el-Ariss (2010) notes, Labaki managed
to secure a wide consensus, locally and in the international film circuit, around her
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film’s success (p.284). Her care about and investment in what people think of her, as
she herself asserts, is evidenced in her commitment to please the censors, the
audience, and the critics. Provoking people, she asserts, does not work in Lebanon.
“You have to propose things in a clever way, in a subtle way in order to be accepted.
And I think that I got away with a lot of things because of humor […] you cannot
provoke, you have to ease your way in” (personal interview).
In her account of her work, Labaki describes a certain reticence that animates
it, an oblique way of getting to things, whether through the reticence of illicit
sexuality in Caramel or the allegory of civil war in Where Do We Go Now? She does
not want to provoke; she wants to propose. In “Reticent Poetics, Queer Politics,” Liu
Jen-peng and Ding Naifei (2005) define reticence as a mode of writing wherein the
real message goes beyond the actual words of the text (p.34). Engaging recent
theorizations that posit non-Western (in their case Taiwanese and more broadly
Chinese) cultures as silently tolerant of same-sex and non-normative desires, the
authors reproach such essentializing accounts for imagining non-Western cultures as
continuous and unchanging, and for failing to account for the homophobic forces that
undergird such silent tolerance and are reproduced by it. As a dominant aestheticethical value, reticence contains deviant subjects in the realm of shadows according to
the following logic: “Although they can’t be made to disappear for good, they can be
made to cooperate in their own invisibility and quiescence” (p.32).

Identifying

reticence in rhetoric, narrative deployment, aesthetic ideal, but also as model of
speech and behavior, Liu and Ding (2005) contend that the ideology of reticence
enables and facilitates a gentle homophobia. Such an ideology keeps persons, whose
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modes and practices of desire are deemed morally reprehensible, in the “shadowy
ghostly spaces of the socio-familial continuum”(p.32). In contexts where personhood
is “inextricably entangled with paternalist familial relations” (Liu & Ding, p.30), the
family is a primary site of gender regulation, surveillance, and control. It is a highly
but often reticently regulated sphere where unspoken rules dictate daily lives,
including sexual behavior and gender expression. Labaki’s focus on family, in her
films as well as her account of filmmaking, reveals the structuring influence of the
family on individual identity and life choices:
In Lebanon, you know, we live…it’s not an individualistic society. We live
within communities, within families, within neighborhoods. We’re very
intimate with the others, so this intimacy creates a lot of pressure. It comes
from love. You’re surrounded by so much love you’re always scared to
deceive. So you end up being the image that everybody wants from you but
maybe it’s not exactly what you want (Labaki, personal interview, August 15,
2013).
The intimacy she describes is a central subject in her films, but also informs her own
practices and decisions as a filmmaker.
As Labaki states in an interview, “girls in Lebanon are raised with the word
‘ayb’ (shame). We are always afraid to commit something we must not do, with the
idea of personal sacrifice to please our parents, children, men, and families. At every
stage of our life we are given a model to follow, even though it doesn’t reflect who
we want to become” (cited in el-Ariss, 2010, p.285). Indeed, Labaki’s “we” invokes a
gender-based commonality, women in plural. She describes a shared experience of
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shame that undergirds each of the character’s storylines: Shame of growing old, of
abandoning family obligations for love, of having sex, of lying, of loving women, and
of looking less feminine. What emerges across these individual plots is the central
role of the family in the regulation of the sexual and affective lives of women. In
these parallel depictions of feminine interiorities, of spaces and affects, Caramel lays
bare the normative structure of kinship in contemporary Lebanon from a woman’s
perspective. The family appears as an enclosing space of intimate sociality, warm and
supportive but also imposing and restrictive. By imposing rules of kinship, the family
reproduces compulsory heterosexuality, monogamy, and female chastity as social
norms, which gives rise to a culture of shame and secrecy around sexual behavior that
deviates from them. Layale struggles to find privacy at home and with her lover.
Nisreen will seek a hymen reconstructive procedure in order to keep the secret of her
pre-marital sexual history from her future husband. And Rima cannot express her
lesbian desire. They each have to navigate social minefields in their negotiation of
intimacies that often become unbearable.
In the remainder of this section, I read Caramel as a reticent feminine text that
stages the silence around female sexualities that exceed the bounds of normative
femininity. In other words, I approach it as a text that strategically mobilizes its filmic
elements – its plot, dialogue, and cinematography – to represent the struggle to
conform to gender norms and the difficulties of talking about it in public. Through
visual analogies and the coupling of individual storylines, the film not only manages
to signify reticently, insinuating what happens in one scene through another, but she
also visualizes, through montage, the intersectionality of the characters’ struggle as
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women. Such an approach decenters the state as a locus of modern power by
examining the micropowers of family and neighborhood as sites of intimate,
informal, everyday regulation. Reading the film through moments of selfconcealment and disguise, we discern how normative rules of kinship shape and
circumscribe women’s bodies in private and public, and how social institutions
regulate women’s sexualities by regulating speech about them. In addition to her
witty use of verbal and visual metaphor, her frequent narrative deployment of humor
softens the edges of otherwise sensitive and often censored subjects. Without saying
anything about virginity, for example, Labaki uses sewing as a metaphor to talk about
it. She notes that while Nisreen never explicitly says anything about sex or hymens,
the meaning is assembled by the spectator who decodes the metaphors leading up to
the scene of the hymen reconstructive procedure: a long close-up of Nisreen’s face
intercut with shots of the seamstress’ hands operating the sewing machine. Labaki
actively enlists her viewers in the construction of the film’s meaning: “I don’t find it
very hard to say the things I want to say subtly. It comes naturally. With Rima and
her lover, there is nothing to say, you can’t cut out anything, but at the same time you
understand everything about what’s happening between them. But the censorship
cannot tell me ‘this is a scene you must remove’” (personal interview, August 15,
2013). While the state can censor a written script, Labaki suggests, it cannot censor
its reading. The filmmaker therefore relies on what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (2003)
has called “periperformatives,” which are not “just about performative utterances in
the referential sense: they cluster around them, they are near them or next to them or
crowding against them; they are in the neighborhood of the performative’ (p.68). As
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Bonnie Honig (2013) explains, periperformatives “dance around a speech act but are
never quite uttered and in this reticence find their power” (Honig, 2013, p.3). This
reticence characterizes the filmic poetics of Caramel.
Looking for a room where she can celebrate her lover’s birthday with him in
private, Layale hops from one hotel to another in a desperate attempt to book a room
without presenting her identity card and a marriage certificate. She attempts to pass as
a married woman but has no evidence to prove it. She worries about being recognized
by someone in the hotel lobby, hides behind her glasses, uses fake names. She dodges
questions from an inquisitive male receptionist about her family background. She
finally settles for a decrepit motel, accepting to “share the stairs with whores” for the
sake of privacy. Her failure to pass as a married woman circumscribes her movements
and limits her choices, ultimately landing her in an uncomfortable place. In the small,
tightly-knit, hyper-networked context of Lebanon, it is practically impossible for the
individual to escape social surveillance which, beyond direct or explicit state control,
keeps the subject in her place. In a comparable scene, Nisreen and her fiancé Bassam
are interrupted, in the middle of their car conversation, by the neighborhood’s police
officer who accuses them of offending public decency. In contrast to the salon, which
appears as a space of female agency, the public spaces that the characters have to
navigate expose them to the normative power and regulatory gaze of heteropatriarchal ideology. In public, the characters’ intimate lives and relationships are
interrupted and scrutinized without their consent and despite their minor resistance.
Caramel is a largely heterosexual romance that exposes the workings of patriarchy in
its portrayal of women’s quests for illicit love.
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After finding a hotel room, cleaning and decorating it in preparation for
birthday dinner for her lover, Layale is heartbroken when he is a no-show on the
much awaited night. Her friends show up at her doorstep, providing her with
emotional support, as she laments the state of her relationship. She crumbles under
the weight of the constant lying she needs to perform in front of her parents, and the
social pressure she succumbs to, for someone who never seems to show up. In fact,
we never see the lover in the film. As she is confessing her shame about having an
affair, Layale is interrupted by Nisreen’s sudden tears. The bride-to-be asks her, “you
think you’re the only one who’s lying here?” Nisreen confesses to her friends that
Bassam, her fiancé, “will not be the first one.” Layale adds, “and he doesn’t know?”
to which Nisreen replies, “he doesn’t know anything.” In a dialogue that is dense with
sexual shame, the two women come out to their friends about their illicit encounters
and relationships. This intimate scene, in a dimly-lit hotel bedroom, is abruptly
interrupted by sounds of sex emanating from the bedroom walls of the cheap, low
class motel.57 In this scene, Labaki stages the secrecy of female sexuality. Nisreen
confesses to her friends that she is not a virgin and then – upon Layale’s inquiry –
that her fiancé doesn’t know about it. This double-confession distinguishes for us, as
analytical categories, sex and speech about it. Layale’s question and the rest of the
scene unravel a shared cultural logic in which sex is not a problem as long as no one
knows about it.
Siham, the oldest among them, breaks the scene’s dramatic intensity with an
off-handed suggestion to stain the sheets with pigeon blood to pass as a virgin on her
Located in an alley off of the central Hamra Street, the motel became a popular tourist
destination following Labaki’s film.
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wedding night. The idea is mockingly dismissed by Rima and Layale, who are then
interrupted by the sounds of a man and a woman having sex next door. Pigeon blood
and loud sex fulfill a comic function that is essential in Labaki’s storytelling, breaking
the seriousness of the subject, softening its rough edges, and, to borrow her words,
“easing her way in.” The imperative to lie about sex that is central to normative
femininity is reproduced in the scene by the women themselves, and later on by
Layale’s decision to opt for hymen reconstructive surgery. Whether it’s the learned
tradition of pigeon blood or the Doctor Stambouli’s clinic which makes her “brand
new,” these are among the many technologies, modern and parochial, available for
women to exercise more control over their bodies and how they want them to signify.
They are also technologies that ensure the reproduction of kinship norms. Fake blood
and fake hymen serve as reparative technologies for an otherwise abject femininity
while simultaneously reproducing female sexuality as an unspoken secret. As such,
they mask female sexual shame rather than eliminate the logics that produce it.
Virginity becomes a form of gender drag, a form of disguise, which we can already
discern early on in the film when, at the request of her fiancé, Nisreen rolls down her
sleeves, buttons up her shirt, ties up her hair, and spits out her chewing gum before
they visit his conservative parents’ house. Passing, writes Randall Kennedy (2001), is
a deception that enables a person to adopt certain identities from which she would be
barred by prevailing social standards (p.1). As Jessa Lingel (2009) has noted, passing
has come to encompass such disparate things as class-jumping, cross-dressing, and
age-faking among other combinations “of adopting or abdicating characteristics of
religion, culture, age, class and ethnicity” (p.391). Through the withholding or
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projection of information about one’s identity, passing allows subjects to navigate
social roles and spaces that are otherwise inaccessible. Together, Layale’s failure to
pass as a married woman without proper evidence and Nisreen’s success in passing as
a virgin expose the social pressure placed on women to embody gender norms and
ideals of female chastity.
Finally, in the hyper-feminine space of the beauty parlor, Rima’s butch
appearance and mannerisms stand out: She sports a short haircut, wears loose-fitting
jeans, and operates the generator during power cuts – a task typically reserved for
men. Rima’s plotline revolves around recurrent scenes of encounter with an attractive
feminine-looking customer whose hair she washes. These eroticized and prolonged
encounters with the woman are juxtaposed to Rima’s antagonistic and clearly rushed
interactions with a hyper-masculine delivery guy whom the ladies mockingly call
“Johny Bravo.” Rima’s gentle and soft-spoken attitude with her now-regular
customer is contrasted with her severe and truncated exchanges with Johny Bravo.
The hair washing scenes between the two women in the salon’s basement are set to
the same tune, composed by Labaki’s husband Khaled Mouzannar and titled
“shampoing revelateur” (revealing shampoo). There, Rima sensuously washes the
customer’s hair as the camera zooms in on both their faces. Lesbian desire is coded in
the slow but deliberate movements of Rima’s hands, through the woman’s wet, long,
black hair, set to the tango melody of Mouzannar’s violins. It is a prolonged ritual, we
learn, as Nisreen loudly scolds Rima for using up all the hot water, upon which the
two women exchange a mischievous, quiet laugh. In the few, brief words they
exchange during the otherwise mute shampoo scenes, the unnamed woman
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compliments Rima’s short hair. Rima returns the compliment by telling her that short
hair would probably suit her as well, to which the woman responds with a mix of awe
and amusement: “Cut my hair? They would go mad at home!” The film ends with a
back shot of the woman sitting in front of the salon’s mirror. The camera then cuts to
the floor where we see her hair falling. In the final scene, the woman leaves the salon,
running her hand through her short hair in disbelief, smiling every time she catches
her reflection in a shop’s window.
In her analysis of the film’s lesbian subplot, Patricia White (2015) describes
Rima’s character as a “stand-in for closeted Lebanese lesbians,” her erotic visibility
exemplifying the film’s more “tolerant, internationalized, and modern” cultural
outlook (p.156). Lesbianism, White argues, functions as “an emblem of Lebanon’s
modernity” (p.155). While this may be true in the film’s foreign, international
reception, the erotically-charged tension between the two women cannot be
characterized, in its local viewing context, as a “well-worn trope of grooming as a
stand-in for lesbian sex” and a “failure of imagination” on the part of the filmmaker
(p.157). Labaki may well be pitching her film for an international, Western audience,
but she is also committed to its local circulation and reception and is therefore careful
not to provoke the General Security which may decide to censor scenes deemed too
daring and inappropriate. Thus, the film’s knowingness about the need for discretion
should be recognized as such: a knowingness shared with the spectator, and relayed
through the knowing glances of Rima’s coworkers when the woman returns to the
salon, of the limits of what can be said and the boundaries of the speakable. This
knowingness, as I previously explained, forces some filmmakers, like Labaki, to
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adapt to the conditions and limits of speech if they want their works to pass
uncensored. As she put it, “You have to cheat in a way where people get the message
without bluntly seeing it. Because if you want to bluntly say the message, it’s not
going to come across. Your film will be cut in pieces, no one will see it, and you will
put in in the drawer” (personal interview, August 15, 2013).
Censorship of literary, artistic works, and media in Lebanon fall under the
jurisdiction of the Directorate General of General Security which controls when and
how much freedom will be permitted in creative works, tightening or loosening
restrictions according to the prevailing political circumstances and dictates of various
political and religious powers.58 Contrary to established laws, the General Security
monopolizes decision-making around censorship and licensing and develops extralegal tactics, such as issuing screening permits after certain deadlines (film festivals
for instance) or even revoking screening permits after their issuance (Saghieh,
Saghieh, & Geagea, 2010).59 When filmmakers know and expect arbitrary restrictions
on their work, they find creative ways to adapt.
The importance of state censorship, then, lies in its promotion of a culture of
pre-emptive self-censorship. Over the years, movies have managed to push the
envelope on a number of issues, particularly in their representation, narration, and
evaluation of the Lebanese civil war. In light of a public silence – termed by some as
collective amnesia –about the civil war (a silence most sharply felt in the total
Censors often recommend the replacement of terms with more “socially acceptable” ones,
for instance, instead of “he’s riding her” use “he’s coupling with her.” With regard to film
screening, General Security is the sole authority with power to censor parts of movies or
restrict viewing to certain age groups (Saghieh, Saghieh, & Geagea, 2010, p.28).
59 For example in the case of Help!, a 2009 Lebanese film banned following pressures by the
Catholic Church.
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absence of the war from school history books and curricula), Lebanese filmmakers
managed, as early as the 1980s, to portray an otherwise unrepresentable war. With the
lack of consensus around the war’s history and the rise of a culture of
unaccountability in its aftermath, Lebanese cinema was at the vanguard of the public
memorialization of national trauma that “had been pushed into the closet”
(Westmoreland, 2008, p.65).60

Where Do We Go Now? Towards a Politics of Lamentation
If Caramel was dismissed as a “chick flick,” Where Do We Go Now? was
often described as a comical take on the tragic national and regional politics of
sectarian division. A New York Times article compared it to a “raucous sitcom about
scrappy little boys whose canny mamas conspire to keep them out of trouble”
(Holden, May 11, 2012). In her second feature film, Labaki represents religious
intolerance and masculine belligerence in the story of an unnamed idyllic village,
isolated from the world, which slowly starts to feel the flames of sectarian violence
infiltrating its borders, pitting Muslim and Christian men against each other in a series
of tragic events. Released in 2011, Labaki’s second feature film was an outcry against
a national political crisis that had gripped the country since the 2005 assassination of
former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in a massive car bomb in downtown Beirut. The
spectacular killing of Saudi Arabia’s number one ally, architect of Lebanon’s postwar
This is best exemplified in local TV series, where the names of characters, for instance,
were always neutral: no Tony or Elie or Therese, visibly Christian names; no Omar or
Haidar, visibly Sunni and Shiite. These may be the most common names in society, but
postwar television had to be sanitized from sects, and names had to stripped of their sectarian
connotations.
60
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reconstruction, economic privatization, and market liberalization, and the nation’s
most popular multi-millionaire secular Sunni leader, inaugurated the emergence of a
new political order.
Syria was directly accused, by the leaders of the newly-emergent multisectarian opposition bloc to which Hariri belonged, of standing behind the
assassination. Following massive popular demonstrations under the slogans
“Freedom, Sovereignty, Independence” and “Syria Out” and mounting American and
European diplomatic pressure, the Baathist regime of Bashar al-Assad pulled out its
troops which had been stationed in the country since Syria’s 1978 military
intervention during the civil war. The resignation of Omar Karami’s government on
February 28, 2005 and the withdrawal of Syrian troops in April 2005 marked the
official end of the unofficial postwar Syrian mandate over Lebanon. If the events that
followed Hariri’s assassination transformed the geopolitical balance of power, they
managed to leave the ruling political class and its logics of governance intact. Indeed,
the same warlords that became de facto political leaders in the wake of the civil war
were the democratic heroes of what came to be variously called the “Independence
Intifada,” the “Beirut Spring,” and the “Cedar Revolution.” Hariri’s assassination set
in motion a process of political and sectarian polarization between the Iran-backed
March 8 and the U.S-backed March 14 coalitions, both named after major popular
demonstrations that took place in 2005. The new national hegemonic order was thus
formulated around the Saudi/U.S-Syrian/Iranian axis of contention, producing a local
politics and discourse of Sunni/Shia division. Political figures and journalists from the
March 14 camp were assassinated in a series of car bombs between 2005 and 2013,
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their tragic and gruesome deaths giving rise to a poetics of mourning and martyrdom
that defined the March 14 and national political rhetoric. Mounting tensions and
armed clashes between Sunnis and Shias, particularly in the North and the Bekaa but
also in Beirut culminated in the 2008 nationwide armed clashes that came to be
known as “Ahdath Ayyar,” or the May Events.
If Labaki tried to avoid national politics in Caramel, she did the exact
opposite in her follow-up film which was literally the brainchild of the May Events.
“At that time I was pregnant with my first child. I guess it does change your
perspective on things. You wonder, what kind of a world is this? How am I going to
raise this child in this world?” (Smith, 2012). As a tragicomedy, the film mirrors the
divisions of the political world, but it also offers, as tragedy as a genre often does, an
“anti-politics” that points beyond them (Honig, 2013). Motherhood constitutes a
central trope in Where Do We Go Now? which is itself dedicated by Labaki “to our
mothers.” The film’s title is a reference to the final scene when, on their way to bury
a young boy who had died from a stray bullet, the men carrying the casket stop to ask
the slain boy’s mother, Takla, where to bury the body: on the Christian or the Muslim
side of the village’s shared cemetery.
The plot of the film, which ends with the collective religious conversion of the
village women from Christianity to Islam and vice versa, revolves around their
creative attempts to pacify and distract the men – their husbands, brothers, and sons –
to prevent them from engaging in intercommunal violence. Relying once again on a
female ensemble cast of non-professional actors, the director’s much-anticipated
second film stars Labaki as Amale, the owner of the village café where most of the
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action unfolds. Along with other women, including the comic Yvonne, wife of the
village mayor, and the tragic Takla, mother of the slain boy Nassim, Amale – a
Christian woman in love with a Muslim man – devises elaborate plots to maintain
civil peace. These include burying weapons where the men can’t find them, hiding
newspapers and destroying the only television set shared by the villagers to prevent
the spread of the news of sectarian warfare, making hash baked goods, inviting
Ukranian strippers to the village, feigning religious miracles, and ultimately resorting
to religious conversion. Premiering at the 2011 Cannes Film Festival in the “Un
Certain Regard” category, the film went on to win the People’s Choice Award at the
Toronto International Film Festival – previously won by The King’s Speech,
Precious, and Slumdog Millionaire – and was a box-office hit in Lebanon where it
became the third-highest-grossing film after Titanic and Avatar (White, 2015).
If the feminine – metonymically indexed by the beauty parlor – constituted the
master aesthetics and poetics of Caramel, the poetics of the maternal anchor Labaki’s
vision of the nation in Where Do We Go Now? As she repeatedly mentioned in
interviews, including the one quoted above, she wrote the film’s script when she was
pregnant with her son. It is therefore as a mother, primarily, that Labaki frames her
authorial intent:
Everything that these women have done in the film, I as a mother can do. I
would shoot [my son] in the foot to prevent him from taking up a weapon and
going down to the street in the name of protecting his family or the building
where he lives or the religion he belongs to or the political party he belongs to.
Yes, I would shoot him in the foot. And I think many women and many
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mothers would do this too. Everything that was written in this film, I as a
mother can do (interview with Marcel Ghanem, September 22, 2011).
Labaki’s mobilization of motherhood in the film and her talk about it cannot be
readily dismissed as a re-enfolding of women’s agency within a familial but never
political sphere.

Such a deployment in fact redefines motherhood as political

performance – a political act – that doesn’t gain its political valence through its
incorporation into a politics. Rather, motherhood as politics reimagines political
space not along private/public lines but through a flattening of the very binary.
Simply, Labaki seems to be saying, kinship is always already political, and women
have a duty and an obligation to act alone and together as mothers in times of war and
crisis.
In her study of women’s literature during the Lebanese civil war, literary
scholar miriam cooke (1987) shows how a group of upper and middle class women
writers who wrote in Arabic, French, and English – the Beirut Decentrists, as she
came to call them – were “compelled by the war to become an increasingly visible
part of the public sphere,” recognizing the role they might play in a society
undergoing massive transformations (p.5). This new consciousness, cooke argues,
inspired literary productions – including novels, short stories and poetry – that
became increasingly feminist in orientation (p.5), and that blamed the men for
participating in the violence or alternatively for leaving the country and the women
behind. The writing of the Beirut Decentrists was therefore crucial in gendering the
war, highlighting the place of women in a conflict that was perpetrated by men.
Clearly, Where Do We Go Now? is a variation on what seems to be a transhistorical
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theme of the role of women in the wars of men. Whereas Caramel is more descriptive
in its approach, in Where Do We Go Now? Labaki adopts a prescriptive tone that is
best captured in Amale’s passionate and angry monologue, delivered to an all-male
audience in her café. After physically intervening to break a fight that had erupted
among customers, Amale stands in the middle of her café – encircled by men - in a
hopeless attempt to expose the senselessness of perpetual violence and to teach the
men a lesson: She screams to their faces, “Are we doomed to keep mourning you?
Are we doomed to stay in black?”61
In her monologue, Amale captures the film’s ethos: mourning and lamentation
as the inevitably tragic fate of women. Set in a mythical time and place, in an
unidentified but clearly Lebanese village, Where Do We Go Now? broaches
Lebanon’s history of religious and sectarian violence in an oblique manner.
Incorporating choreographed musical scenes to dramatize the narrative, including a
funerary march of women dressed in black in the film’s opening sequence, Labaki
formally and thematically draws on tragedy as a genre. The movie, Labaki explains,
“is a fantasy, a fable. That’s why it starts with dancing, and with the narrator’s voice
saying ‘I’m going to tell you a story.’ It’s the story of the short-lived utopia of a
village that managed to find peace at a time of war” (personal interview, August 15,
2013). As an article in the New York Times puts it, the film reveals itself as a “modern
variation of Aristophanes’ ‘Lysistrata,’ in which the village women, sick and tired of

Upon taking the stage at the Murex d’Or –Lebanon’s response to the Oscars – to receive
the best film director award on her behalf, Labaki’s husband musician Khaled Mouzannar
delivered an impassioned and angry acceptance speech, bearing an uncanny resemblance to
Amale’s monologue in the film, scolding the Lebanese for falling prey, yet again, to sectarian
violence.
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losing their menfolk to senseless warfare, band together to keep the peace by any
means necessary” (Holden, May 10, 2012). If the conspiratorial nature of the
women’s collective action recalls one famous Greek comedy, its poetic register and
political discourse evoke another. In its staging of the relationship between death,
kinship, and the state, Sophocle’s Antigone lends itself to being read as one of the
film’s subtexts. The fifth-century Athenian play, one of the most commented-upon
dramas in the history of philosophy, feminism, and political theory, has inspired
many readings, interpretations, and adaptations (Honig, 2013, p. 6). Figuring
prominently in the works of Virginia Woolf (1938), Luce Irigaray (1974), and Judith
Butler (2000), Antigone, as Sam McBean (2012) notes, “has staked her claim on the
Western feminist imaginary” (p.22). Feminists adopted her anti-statist language and
praised her public defiance in the name of family and the private sphere.
Set in the aftermath of a near civil war following the end of Oedipus’s rule
over Thebes, the play, Honig (2013) argues, provided a way for Athenians to grapple
with thorny issues that might have been “too close to home” (p.4). The distant yet
familiar setting of Thebes allowed Sophocles to “broach for public consideration
issues that would otherwise be dangerous to consider” (p.4). After the exile and death
of their father, Polynices and Eteocles – Antigone’s brothers – both lay claim to his
throne, ultimately killing each other in battle. While Thebes’ new ruler, and
Antigone’s uncle, Creon orders the burial of Eteocles in full honor, he issues a decree
forbidding and outlawing the ritual burial of Polynices whose body is left exposed in
the city. Unable to accept her brother’s fate, Antigone feels compelled to offer him a
proper burial, violating through her deed the sovereign’s edict. While Antigone first
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performs the unlawful act quietly at night, when no one is there to witness it, she
returns to burry her brother once again and is caught by one of Creon’s guards. Upon
learning about his niece’s deed the ruler commands that she be immured alive in a
cave. Lamenting her fate but not her action as she is taken outside the city, Antigone
finally hangs herself in the cave/tomb where she had been sentenced to a living
burial.
Antigone’s allegiance to the private sphere, exemplified by her insistence on
performing funerary rites on her brother in defiance of state laws, “dramatizes the
difficult relationship that ‘woman’ has to citizenship” (McBean, 2012, p.22). As such,
Antigone came to embody the possibilities of a feminist political speech for many
feminist theorists (Elshtain, 1981; Dietz, 1985; Zerilli, 1991). In Three Guineas,
Virginia Woolf (1938) returns to Antigone in her attempt to answer the question of
how to prevent war. It is her position as Oedipus’ daughter, and a patriarchal daughter
under Creon more generally, that allows Woolf to see Antigone as a figure “who
binds the daughters’ struggle against patriarchy with the struggle against fascism and
reveals the two causes to be the same” (Swanson, 1996, p.38). In Irigaray’s Speculum
of the Other Woman (1974), Antigone embodies women’s necessity for the
community and the polis and their simultaneous exclusion and occlusion from its
bounds. It is by fulfilling her duties as a woman, mourning and memorializing the
dead in the familial sphere where she exists, that Antigone is expelled from the
community. Against Hegel and Lacan’s readings of an apolitical Antigone, who acts
either from the private sphere or out of pure desire, Irigaray (1974) insists on the
tragic heroine as a civic subject. Her public deed, she contends, is an articulation of a
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political alternative that is not recognized by dominant readings of male-dominated
forms of citizenship (p.218). For Butler (2000), however, Antigone does not act as an
oppositional feminist figure to established authority. Rather, both her character and
the play open up the question of whether kinship and the state can ever exist
separately or whether they are mutually-constitutive. Against readings that place
Antigone on the side of kinship against Creon/The State, Butler argues that Antigone
in fact troubles both the norms of kinship, by the mere fact of simultaneously being
Oedipus’ daughter/sister, and of the state by speaking through the language of
sovereignty, which does not belong to her as a woman. Thus, for Butler (2000),
Antigone’s value lies in “the social deformation of both idealized kinship and
political sovereignty that emerges as a consequence of her act” (p.6). Antigone’s
value for Butler, as McBean (2012) explains, resides in her exposure of the limits of
the very categories of kinship and the state (p.32). Furthermore, her failure to speak in
the realm of the polis exposes citizenship as a category “that excludes, disciplines
subjects, and defines modes of belonging” (McBean, 2012, p.23), preventing women
and other disenfranchised subjects from entering into what is recognizably political.
In the critical feminist writings it occasioned around citizenship, women, and
the state, the play’s theoretical relevance for Labaki’s film is hard to miss, and the
thematic parallels between the two abound. Of particular interest, in this regard, is the
refusal of Takla – one of the village women – to announce the death of her son in
order to prevent civil unrest, which leads her to postpone his burial and to hide his
body in the well behind their family home. Takla, the film’s tragic heroine, is a
widowed mother of two, having lost her husband in an episode of sectarian violence.
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In a dramatic scene following the death of her youngest boy by a stray bullet outside
the village, Takla bursts into the village church late at night to confront the statue of
the Virgin Mary, lamenting her failure to protect her son. Takla, herself dressed in a
light blue robe, epitomizes the figure of the tragic mother, doomed to lose her loved
ones - her husband then her son - to the senseless wars of men. Like Antigone, she is
confronted with a dilemma: to bury her son and fulfill her duties as a mother, or to
keep his death a secret and leave his body exposed, acting as a citizen to maintain
civil peace for the well-being of the community. Takla’s deed, her refusal to make her
son’s death public, is a heavy burden she must carry. Unable to grieve and mourn her
loss, she makes up lie after lie to justify her son’s absence, crumbling under the
pressure of her self-imposed secrecy. Upon discovering the truth, her incensed oldest
son takes up his rifle and decides to avenge his brother’s death despite his mother’s
pleas for peace. In a last attempt to prevent him from starting what at this point
seemed to be an inevitable war, Takla takes up a rifle and shoots her son in the foot.
In its foregrounding of lamentation as a performative speech act, Where Do
We Go Now? attempts to chart out what a feminine politics may look like in public.
Grief and mourning, and their withholding, are reworked and mobilized as viable
modes of public intervention, amounting to what could be called, following Honig
(2013), a “politics of lamentation.” Indeed, it could be said that postwar Lebanese
cinema is itself a cinema of lament. Lina Khatib (2008) has shown how films
produced after the civil war – since its beginning in 1975 and its end in 1990 – have
dealt with themes of impossible and constant mourning, repressed and contested
memory, and the question of the Other as enemy, ally, and stranger. In Where Do We
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Go Now? however, mourning and lamentation acquire a particularly-gendered,
feminized inflection. As a performance genre that has been traditionally and
historically associated with women, the lament is both a passionate expression of
grief and a mourning of a loss. Whether it is the opening and closing scenes of
mournful women in the village cemetery, Layale’s impassioned monologue against
male-perpetrated sectarian violence, or Takla’s confrontation with the statue of the
Virgin Mary in church and with her son at home, lamentation – as a poetics, a
performative speech act, and a form of feminine public speech – constitutes the film’s
rhetorical and visual touchstone. In her reading of Antigone, feminist political theorist
Bonnie Honig distinguishes and juxtaposes a “politics of lamentation” to a
“lamentation of politics,” arguing that the latter enables and is enabled by a “mortalist
humanism” which regards pain and suffering, and ultimately death, as the universal
basis of our shared humanity. Identifying an anti-sovereign sensibility that underpins
this humanism which privileges mortality and vulnerability in its vision of
commonality, Honig proposes an “agonistic humanism” that stresses equality in life,
not death. Instead of rejecting sovereignty, she contends, feminist and democratic
theorists may do well devoting themselves to its cultivation through what she calls a
“politics of counter-sovereignty.”
In its espousal of a universal humanity based on common suffering and grief
against the divisive politics of sectarianism, Labaki’s film seems to fall within that
category of mortalist humanism identified by Honig. Indeed, Labaki herself is vocal
about her belief in a shared humanity around universal human suffering and death. “I
think in a very human way. For me, any mother in the world would act the same way
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when faced with her son’s death. For me it’s a universal, human reaction. So I know
how to talk the universal language, I don’t know why. I know how to speak to a
French woman, an English woman, a Chinese woman, to and Indian woman and to a
Lebanese woman in the same language” (personal interview, August 15, 2013). In her
universal portrait of motherhood and affective maternal labor, Labaki suggests
women as more peaceful, rational, and compassionate social actors than men. Against
sectarian politics, she proposes sex, drugs, and superstition as common pleasures. Her
approach can be construed as a lamentation of politics, exemplifying the antisovereign politics sketched out by Honig. As film critic Pierre Abi Saab (September
26, 2011) put it, Labaki’s deployment of seduction, comedy, and drama as narrative
techniques is not meant “to provoke us and lead us to awareness (which would
require a deeper treatment of the subject), but to build a successful cinematic product
that achieves consensus. She shows us what we love to see, she hides behind clichés
and generalizations to avoid diving into the wound and saying painful things. It is the
aesthetics of seduction that reaches its full meaning here.”
Indeed, Abi Saab is right in pointing out the aesthetics of seduction that are
operative across Labaki’s works. However, the lack of depth he identifies in her
treatment of the national question of sectarian violence is a deliberate one. Labaki is
uninterested in the origins of sectarianism and civil wars. The film, for her, deals with
a universal inability to tolerate the other and to accept difference. That the lines of
contention in her film were religious is only a factor of her immediate context, the
one she is most familiar with and which has informed her personal life and vision. As
she explains, speaking about Muslims and Christians was the most accessible way to
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symbolize intolerance, the refusal of difference. “That’s why it was a sort of a
fantasy, because I didn’t want to speak about the Lebanese war. I consider that most
of the conflicts in Lebanon were done for the wrong reasons and for stupid reasons.
So I don’t have time to waste and analyze why this war happened and whose fault it
was. This is not what I want to do or what I am interested in. I do not want to analyze
the Lebanese war because I will not get anywhere” (personal interview, August 15,
2013). Some people, she adds, took the “solutions” she proposed to the letter whereas
they were clearly comical takes on a tragic situation, a way to show women’s
desperation in the face of male obstinacy and the inevitable warfare it leads to. Labaki
is attached to the idea that the solution will come from mothers. “The solutions to all
the wars in the world should come from mothers. Because it’s all in ours hands; it’s
what we say to our children, it’s how we stop them from going to war” (personal
interview, August 15, 2013). Perhaps this naïve and essentializing belief in the power
of motherhood exemplifies what Abi Saab identified as clichés and generalizations in
Labaki’s work. Here, we are tempted to ask, with Honig (2013), might it be the
maternalism that does the work of universalism? “Is there only power in this
promotion of extra political powerlessness as a kind of admirable female power and
political chasteness?” (p.14 -15).62
In her re-reading of Antigone, Honig (2013) intervenes in the recent turn to
mourning and lamentation in cultural studies. She notes that the play’s dramaturgy
has been largely neglected by feminist, queer, and democratic theorists who focused
Arab critics and journalists saw the film as a satirical protest against sectarian
violence and civil war (Al-Osta’a, May 31, 2012). But once again, they reproached
Labaki for her “superficial” treatment of the subject-matter.
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on its role in the history of philosophy and its arguments on obedience, sovereignty,
authority, religion, gender, and sexuality. What remains relatively unaddressed in
these readings, she argues, are speech acts, rhetoric, gesture, tone, and voice (p.6). A
dramaturgical approach, Honig explains, “treats the text as a performance that may
succeed or fail rather than as an argument that may be true or false, right or wrong”
(p.6). It attends to the way information circulates, which things are said directly,
which are overheard, which are uttered in someone’s absence, and which are said
over someone’s head (p.6). But it also draws attention to the asymmetrical powers of
different speakers, taking double entendre, jokes, puns, irony, sarcasm, and hyperbole
as objects for an analysis of power. In this context, the lament in Where Do We Go
Now? is a performative speech act, among others, that characterizes women’s speech
in public. It is not, as Honig shows, an instance of a “mortalist humanism” (p.24),
which shies away from politics in the name of humanism. Rather, it is an instance of
speech acts that mirror political divisions in the real world while pointing to a place
beyond them. The allegedly superficial nature of the women’s tactics and their
dismissal as apolitical shenanigans must therefore be reconsidered. In juxtaposition to
familiar scenes of “serious” masculine politics, such as the destruction of the statue of
the Virgin Mary, the desecration of the village mosque, the replacement of the
church’s holy water with blood, and bouts of fist-fighting among men, Labaki’s
deployment of hashish, sex, and superstition gestures towards a politics of pleasure,
as if to insist that it is not by death alone that people can recognize their common
humanity. Thus, she proposes pleasure as an alternative basis for a different
humanism, beyond the grip of death and human finitude. If a mortalist humanism
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“focuses on shared mourning rather than shared feasting” (Honig, 2013, p.26), these
tactics of pleasure, borne from an anticipatory fear of death and lamentation, stand as
an example of the importance of political resignification, of “kinship done
otherwise,” that Butler (2000) finds embodied in Antigone’s claim. The ending of
Where Do We Go Now? is perhaps most suggestive in this regard, whereby the
village women appear in cross-sectarian drag, declaring their religious conversion and
thus suggesting a break from the sectarian filiality that structures the postwar sociopolitical order, bringing sectarian difference into the home in order to nullify it. This
conversion should be understood as a performance of disidentification from the status
quo – from the traditional identity politics of sectarianism – through cross-sectarian
solidarity between women. Through her concern with womanhood as the ground for
collective political action, Labaki mobilizes gender as an antidote to sectarian
attachment.
That these women act in public as mothers carries a deep resonance in
contemporary Lebanese history. One of the few remaining, visible, and active public
bodies of the civil war – a public that embodies the war’s persistence in the present,
that insists that it has not yet ended despite official claims otherwise - is the
Committee of the Families of the Kidnapped and Disappeared. The Committee was
officially established in November 1982 by Wadad Halwani, whose husband was
kidnapped from their home in October of that year. Searching for others like her who
were desperately looking for loved ones that had gone missing or were forcibly
kidnapped, Halwani – who was thirty-one at the time – issued a call on the radio,
inviting concerned people to meet in person outside the Abdel Nasser mosque in the
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Beirut neighborhood of Cornishe al-Mazra’a. When she arrived to the meeting,
Halwani (2012) was surprised to see a hundred women gathered outside the mosque,
some with children: “My body went numb, my head got swollen. I said to myself, of
course we must do something, but what, I don’t know! After a while we stopped
crying, we wiped our tears, we organized our ranks, and we started walking. And this
is how [our] first demonstration started, November 17, 1982.” In her speech on the
occasion of the 30th Anniversary of the establishment of the Committee, Halwani
addresses the young men and women of Lebanon, children of the disappeared but also
of the non-disappeared, recounting her story, history: “At first I started running alone,
from a leader to a director to a member of parliament to our prime minister to ask for
their help. All that came out of them were redundant words, ‘How unfortunate, may
God help you you’re still a young little woman. Anyway there are people like you
who came to complain.’ Ok, who are these people? Not one of them was able to give
me a single name!” This is how the Committee was born: mothers and sisters
responded to a stranger’s radio call. “I thought that if I found two like me, but taller
and bigger than me, we would become stronger and we would see what we can do
together, and this is why I made the call,” Halwani explains (November 17, 2012).
The Committee continues until this day to uphold the demand to know the fate
of the disappeared and hold those responsible for their disappearance accountable, a
demand that – unfortunately – has yet to be fulfilled. Halwani’s radio address thus
catapulted a counterpublic into being. To quote Michael Warner (2002), “raise it up
the flagpole, and see who salutes!” (p.42). Importantly, and as Halwani herself
underlines, members of this public did not choose to become so. No one chose to be
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the wife, mother, sister, son, or daughter of a disappeared or kidnapped person. As
Halwani states, “Someone else had chosen that we would spend thirty years on the
street. They chose how we think, how we feel, how we sleep, and how we ache.”
From shared personal and familial trauma emerged a political solidarity – a
movement – that had long-lasting effects on individuals and society. In April 2015,
the Committee co-organized and participated in a national campaign to commemorate
the 40th anniversary of the beginning of the civil under the title of “Min Haqna
Na’aref” (We have the Right to Know). By mobilizing personal and familial ties as
politics, Labaki in fact speaks to a familiar local history where the politicization of
the personal trauma of disappearance, as carried out by the Committee, kept the civil
war’s memory and legacy alive in the national imaginary. Her women in black - in
eternal mourning - carrying the black and white photographs of missing dead men
and marching solemnly into the village graveyard in the film’s opening sequence, can
only recall the women – mostly still in black – who are still holding camp in
downtown Beirut, still insisting on their right to know.
In times of war, lamentation becomes a daily practice. Launched in December
2014 by theater group Aperta Productions, Antigone of Syria is an eight-week drama
workshop that culminated in three on-stage public performances by displaced Syrian
women at Al-Madina Theater in Beirut. The performance combined the personal
stories of Syrian women now living in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, their
views on the tragedy of Antigone and its characters, and a meta-commentary on the
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performance itself.63 Against a massive screen where videos, texts, and images were
projected, the women took turns narrating their tragedies, recounting the death and
disappearance of loved ones, the loss and destruction of their homes, and their
inability to bury the dead. As a review of the play in the Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar
put it, “This is not acting, per se, but more of real-life testimonials presented and
fashioned for a larger audience.” It is a performance style, the writer adds, that is
increasingly popular, “with its heavy infusion of meta-commentary, autobiographical
experiences, and scrutiny of the medium, society, and the self, and in which fact and
fiction bleed together” (Al-Saadi, December 16, 2014).
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actors/participants. 65 In an interview with NPR, the play’s producer Itab Azzam
explained that it is "about women taking control of their lives. Antigone's not a
victim" (Fordham, December 13, 2014). As if contesting a humanist philosophy of
equality in finitude that Honig identified in most readings of Antigone, Mona, one of
the participants, notes, "We are not princesses. No one knows of us and no one would
speak of us if we died. Even in death, there are lucky people" (Fordham, December
13, 2014). Antigone after all, Mona reminds us, was a princess. In civil wars and their
aftermaths, the dead and the disappeared haunt the collective social imaginary. But
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For a short video about the project, see https://vimeo.com/111457644. For more about the workshop
and the play, see Aperta’s website at http://www.apertaproductions.org
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http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/22917
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Explaining his decision to stage Antigone with displaced Syrian women in Beirut, director Omar
Abu Saada states, “The main theme of this text is a very important one for these women. In Arabic,
tamarrod – that is, insurgency, rebellion, disobedience. Antigone defies Creon, she refuses to obey.
She insists on doing what she believes is right, even though there are a lot of consequences. This is one
of the most important questions for Syrians today. Did they do right or wrong in deciding to ask for
freedom?” (Ross, no date).65
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while the dead have been buried, the missing bodies of the disappeared mark the
war’s ongoing presence as their fate remains unknown. Knowing and speaking about
the dead and the disappeared is the only way to preserve their memory as victims of
war. As guardians of that memory, Labaki’s village women are also the guardians of
civil peace.

Conclusion
In her televised and filmic representations of women, Nadine Labaki
foregrounds gender as a cultural and political identity in contemporary Lebanese
society. The circulation of her work, locally and transnationally, opened up discursive
spaces where the role and status of Lebanese and Arab women became an object of
attention. Whether it is the controversies around her music videos in the Arab world
or the success of her feature-length films in international film festivals, Labaki’s work
captivated transnational audiences through its portrayal of femininity as a site of
submission and transgression within a masculinist social order.
In both Caramel and Where Do We Go Now? Labaki displays homosocial
private spaces, such as the beauty parlor and the kitchen, as sites of female support
and solidarity. In Caramel, women help each other navigate the pressures and
constraints of the patriarchal order on their self-image, desires, sexualities, and
aspirations. In Where Do We Go Now?, the village women – doomed to perpetual
mourning – are determined to bond together against men to stop them from starting
another civil war. In both films, secrecy constitutes an organizing narrative thread. In
Caramel, the women are each other’s confidantes; they know and keep each other’s
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secrets about illicit sex, intimacy, and desire. In Where Do We Go Now?, the women
are engaged in a secret conspiracy against men, devising elaborate and comical plots
to prevent violence through the distracting pleasures of sex, food, and hashish.
Secrecy, in both films, is the mode of transgressive behavior. It allows women to
prevent and overcome the shame and stigma of their non-normative bodies,
relationships, and desires in Caramel, and it enables women to intervene in the public
life of their rural community in Where Do We Go Now? Secrecy is therefore a
strategic practice, for the navigation of the constraints of familial, romantic, and
conjugal attachments on the private lives of women in the former and for the
intervention in the masculine realm of politics in the latter. It is also reflected in
Labaki’s creative practice, as a woman filmmaker, through her reliance on reticence
as a mode of signification that allows her to broach the controversial topics of female
sexuality and war, both of which are subject to social and state repression. In this
regard, Labaki’s films are in conversation with the talk shows discussed in chapter 1,
as they also constitute a site to examine the nature and mode of visibility of nonnormative bodies, gender expressions, and sexualities in public culture.
Religiosity is also a central thread and visual trope in both films. It is marked
through rituals and accessories – crosses and headscarves – and is used as an
important marker of harmonious social difference and community. Tradition, on the
other hand, is cast as obsolete and constraining. It is through womanhood, I argue,
that the slippage between the two is enacted in and structures Labaki’s work. As a
collective identity, womanhood carries the promise of anti-masculinist and antisectarian politics through its transgressions of and conspiracies against the traditional
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patriarchal order. It does so without a rejection of and condemnation of religion but
through a critical engagement with tradition as the socially mandated and enforced
reproduction of gender norms like female chastity, heterosexuality, and violent
masculinity. In her filmic representations of cross-sectarian female homosociality and
solidarity, Labaki proposes a sense of commonality that coalesces around the shared
pleasures and pains of femininity. It is this unresolved ambiguity about the social and
political promise of the feminine that is signified in the pleasurable and painful
practices of hair removal, body modification, and lamentation that punctuate Labaki’s
films. These practices are significant in the ways they index the effects of religion and
tradition on feminine embodiment in contemporary society. As such, they speak to
the practices of feminist queer self-writing that constitute the object of the next
chapter, and which expose and critique compulsory heteronormative femininity by
making visible alternative female desires and forms of embodiment.
In conclusion, it is useful to return to the queer subplot in Caramel, which
finds its resolution in the final scene of the film. As she leaves the salon, having just
had her hair cut short by Rima, the film’s hypothetical lesbian, the mysterious
woman, skips down the street, the camera following her movement from across the
sidewalk, then catching her from inside a shop window, as she gazes at her face with
a mix of excitement and disbelief. The camera freezes. Self-identification becomes
possible through the perverse resolution of the dialectic of disguise and surveillance,
a provisional alignment between the surveilling gaze and the perspectival close up.
The film ends with the mysterious woman’s reflection meeting the gaze of the
camera. It is a moment of subversion of the ocular logics that constrain all of the
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women’s lives, and a kind of enactment of Labaki’s own position as the subject and
object of her own directorial gaze. Whether it’s in the hair washing scenes between
the two women or the car scenes which stage illicit and fleeting encounters between
lovers, the camera detaches from the point of view of the film’s characters to become
a surveilling gaze. As spectators, we are invited to peer in on the women through the
bathroom door or the car window. The attempts at privacy are so feeble in both
scenarios. The film thus shows how visibility looks, enacting and representing the
dialectic of disguise and surveillance. Labaki signifies reticently to evade censorship,
and her characters are caught in this dialectic, made visible by intercutting close
perspectival shots with mid range shots that have no character to focalize them. In
this sense, it could be said that Caramel is a film about the police, about policing, and
nowhere is this more evident than in Layale’s/Labaki’s seduction game with the only
visible male character in the film: the neighborhood policeman. He is infatuated with
her, following her every move, forcing her to wear her seatbelt, fining her at every
opportunity. And she, cognizant of her seductive power over him, plays along.
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CHAPTER THREE

“We Must Write:” Language and Visibility in a Feminist Queer Counterpublic
I looked back at the summer of 2007, when I found myself getting closer and closer
to a woman. I couldn’t get her out of my head. When I told her, she completely
freaked out. She wouldn’t answer my calls …What does it mean to tell someone you
can’t stop thinking about them? I didn’t have a name for it.
Anonymous, Bareed Mista3jil, 2009, p.222
To talk about one’s life - that I could do. To write about it, to leave a trace - that was
frightening.
bell hooks, Talking Back, 1989, p.158

Introduction
The epigraph is taken from the last story in Bareed Mista3jil (Express Mail,
2009), a collection of autobiographical short stories published by Meem,66 a Beirutbased feminist queer collective. The anonymous author describes how her inability to
name her desire for another woman, to qualify it, became a defining moment in her
life. The story, titled “That Thing,” is about a woman who went online in search for a
thing she felt but didn’t understand and couldn’t verbalize to herself. The narrator
falls in love with another woman and is unable, for years, to name her feeling which
remains “That Thing,” unidentified but imposing, until an online search leads her to
Meem. While she remains anonymous, her story becomes part of the collective’s
archive, public for others to read. In its insistence on the therapeutic quality of
naming feelings, which the narrator only achieves after joining Meem, the story lays
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Established in 2007, Meem’s name is derived from the letter “m” as pronounced in Arabic
and stands for “Majmou’at Mou’azara lil-Mar’a al-Mithliyya” (Support Group for Lesbian
Women).
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bare queer publicity’s intimate labor: by making alternative desires and embodiments
legible and accessible for others to read, Meem and the community around it changes
the lives and self-understandings of the women who heed its call, who identify
themselves in its public address.
This chapter traces the production and circulation of queer self-expression in
public. It does so through a reading of Bareed Mista3jil (Express Mail, 20009,
hereafter Bareed) and Bekhsoos (2009-2012), an electronic magazine for and by
Lebanese and Arab queer women. These digital and print publications, produced by
Beirut-based feminist queer collective Meem, constitute a public archive of the lived
reality of sexual and gender non-conformity in contemporary Lebanon. Like Ann
Cvetkovich (2003), I explore these cultural texts “as repositories of feelings and
emotions, which are encoded not only in the content of the texts themselves but in the
practices that surround their production and reception” (p.7). I focus less on feelings
and more on the practices of encoding that Cvetkovich gestures to, which I capture
through a textual analysis of Bareed and Bekhsoos and in-depth interviews with five
of their writers/editors. How did queer feminists/feminist queers encode their lives,
desires, politics, and identities? To what effect? My analysis shows that these
practices of encoding create and sustain the communities whose existence they
document?
In contrast to the global visibility of Nadine Labaki, explored in chapter 2, the
queer women that populate this chapter are anonymous to their publics. Responding
to their erasure from national cultural narratives and the pathologization of their
bodies and desires by mainstream media, they produced a counterdiscourse on sex
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and gender norms without making their identities public. Like talk show participants
in the first chapter, they too intervene in public through disidentificatory declarations
of non-heterosexuality. While the content of these declarations has been recently
interpreted by scholars of gender in the Arab Middle East (Dropkin, 2011; Georgis,
2013; Kaedbey, 2014; Hamdan, 2015), their form has not yet been thoroughly
explored. This chapter thus examines how queer self-expression, unfolding as it is in
print and digital platforms, relies on anonymity and translation as strategic
representational practices that enable the formulation and circulation of a feminist
queer discourse in public.
Like talk show appearances discussed in chapter 1, I consider Meem’s public
writings, shaped as they are by the communication technologies through which they
are produced, as acts of mediated self-disclosure (Couldry, 2003). Together, the ezine and the memoir are aggregations of personal experiences that, in their public
circulation, expose the powerful hold of heteropatriarchy while offering a viable
alternative. Through the collective textualization of personal experience, queer
feminists politicized gender and sexuality as sites of community-formation and social
activism. As such, they constitute a form of women’s writing (Cixous, 1976) that
insists on the personal as a locus of power and thus as a necessary site for politics and
resistance. By focusing on queer women’s writing, I want to contribute to the
emerging literature on women’s sexualities in the Arab world (Amer, 2008; Habib,
2007; Georgis, 2013; Kaedbey, 2014) that has engaged questions of representation in
its exploration of queer female desire. I characterize processes of self-writing by
Meem, following Zizi Papacharissi (2002), as a “particular breed of civically
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motivated narcissism” (p.13), self-focused yet socially directed. After providing a
brief overview of LGBTQ media use and community-building in Lebanon that
locates Meem’s publications within a broader history of queer representation, I move
to a more detailed discussion of Bareed and Bekhsoos, unpacking the thorny
questions of language and visibility that have preoccupied scholarship on postcolonial
experiences and representations of same-sex desire.
In what they labeled as the “transnational turn” in gay and lesbian studies and
queer theory, Elizabeth Povinelli and George Chauncey (1999) argue that new
identities, erotics, communities, and intimacies were being examined as they emerged
in “hybrid cultural fields” (p.439). The increasingly transnational mobility of people,
media, commodities, discourses, and capital had an impact on local, regional, and
national modes of sexual desire, embodiment, and subjectivity. They write:
Postcolonial nations were witnessing the emergence of sex-based
social movements whose political rhetoric and tactics seemed to mimic
or reproduce Euro-American forms of sexual identity, subjectivity, and
citizenship and, at the same time, to challenge fundamental Western
notions of the erotic, the individual, and the universal rights attached
to this fictive ‘subject’ (p.439).
Postcolonial scholars have noted the twin-processes of mimicry and
interrogation that animate postcolonial queer cultural expressions. Neville Hoad
(2007) explains that “while one is suspicious of the homogenizing effects of the
culture industry, too quick an assertion of sexual identity as cultural imperialism
misses the ways in which these images/identities are consumed and may be used from
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below to very different end” (xviii). In his work with Filipino gay men, Martin F.
Manalansan (1997) shows that, instead of “‘uncritically transferring or buying the
technology’ of gay and lesbian politics from the outside,” there is a syncretic move, a
notion of a “multiply determined subject and a possibility of coalitions between
different identities and political agendas” (p.495). Cross-cultural communication
therefore involves practices of translation and hybridization that are integral to the
emergence of new sexual subjectivities.
In their introduction to a special issue on “Queer Affect” in Middle East
Studies, Hanadi al-Samman and Tarek el-Ariss (2013) claim that the binary mode of
thinking that posits a clear distinction between a pre-modern East and a modern West
has locked Middle Eastern queer studies in a standstill. This binary, they argue,
ignores “long traditions of cultural exchange and the specific forms of translation and
dialogue that take shape when the identities and models of desire associated with the
West travel or are performed outside it or at its periphery” (p.205). Middle Eastern
sexuality, they insist, cannot be read as exclusively symptomatic of imperialist
projects and must be reckoned with as complex sites of meaning-making and self and
social transformation (p.205). Although the literature on LGBTQ social movement
organizations in the Global South draws attention to the importance of translation in
the circulation of a dominant Western LGBTQ discourses, Moussawi (2014) argues,
it fails to account for the complex ways in which activists from the Global South
situate and define themselves by drawing on both local and global discourses of
sexuality (p.2). By focusing on practices of cultural production by and for queer
women, I want to decenter the West in an analysis of queer identities to enable a more
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locally-attuned understanding of the social, political, and cultural forces that come to
shape and stigmatize non-heterosexual and transgender individuals. Language and
visibility have come to constitute pivotal points in academic and intellectual debates
on the emergence of LGBTQ politics in contemporary Arab and Middle Eastern
societies and beyond. In this regard, the common use of English and the deployment
of a discourse of “coming out” among local queer publics have been construed as
symptoms of the ongoing cultural encroachment of the West on local configurations
of desire.
In what follows, I want to contribute to debates on language and visibility by
unpacking their manifestation in the textual politics of Meem. First, I treat language
as a practice – not as an inherited artifact – in local queer organizing and expression,
teasing out processes of cultural appropriation and translation that have been essential
for queer self-formation. Second, I consider the particular form of anonymous
visibility adopted by Meem to argue that the desire for and fear from visibility is a
feature and dilemma of everyday life, one that cannot be readily dismissed as an
imitation of Western identity politics. Anonymity and translation, I argue, are
characteristic practices that enable and condition the public circulation of personal
accounts on the tyranny of compulsory heterosexuality. Instead of treating these
publications as cultural productions by an existing queer counterpublic, I contemplate
their vital role in the creation of this counterpublic about which they speak and to
whom they are addressed. Through the collective production of countercultural texts,
these publications put into language and make visible an imagined community of
queers, gays, lesbians, bisexuals, trans persons, and individuals who don’t identify
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with any of these categories but who participate in the social lifeworlds that emerge
around them. These texts, in their print and digital forms, act as a community archive,
making queer feminist spaces, histories, and politics legible, and making gendered
and sexual violence a matter of public concern.
Bekhsoos, meaning “concerning” in colloquial Lebanese Arabic, is a
commonly used term among the Lebanese gay community to denote the
insider/outsider status of a person, was launched by Meem in 2008 as a quarterly
electronic zine and re-launched in 2009 as a weekly one. The e-zine, which included
content in Arabic, English, and French, featured commentaries about mainstream
media coverage and representation of sexual deviance, personal testimonies by queeridentified women, intimate relationship stories, sexual health advice, and opinions on
Lebanese and Arab LGBTQ activism and organizing. Published in 2009, Bareed
Mista3jil: True Stories (Express Mail) is a collection of short autobiographical stories
by lesbian, bisexual, queer, and questioning women and transgender persons living in
Lebanon. Written as first-person narratives, the stories are based on interviews with
150 women and trans persons, and arranged around twelve main themes identified by
the editors: discrimination, self-esteem, gender identity, activism, coming out, family,
relationships, sexual diversity, religion, community, self-discovery, and emigration.
“Bareed Mista3jil,” the editors (2009) explain, “has a very close meaning to ‘Express
Mail,’ but a better translation would be ‘Mail in a Hurry.’ It reflects both the urgency
of getting these stories across and also the private nature of the stories – like letters
written, sealed, and sent out to the world” (p.10). While Bareed does not provide a
unified narrative of queerness or feminism, it constitutes, along with Bekhsoos, a
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collectively-produced text: A compilation of individual narratives about bodies and
desires that do not conform to and cannot be contained by dominant heterosexual
norms and narratives.

The Digital Roots of a Counterpublic
The rise of the internet in the Arab world in the mid-2000s transformed the
conditions of possibility for individual self-expression in public. By 2009, blogging
and digital forms of writing were becoming increasingly popular, particularly among
the queer community. One Lebanese blogger described it as a “gay electronic Intifada
(Al-Haddad, August 27, 2009). But the history of queer and LGBT presence online
predates the emergence of blogs. In fact, the histories of the LGBT community and
the internet are intimately connected in Lebanon and can be summarized around three
moments: first, the migration of queers to the internet is search for similar others in
internet chat rooms; second, the move from online encounters to in-person meetings;
and third, a return to online modes of engagement through digital publications. The
domain name www.gaylebanon.com was registered on September 29, 1999 and is
considered one of the first manifestations of LGBT organizing in the country.
According to one queer activist and blogger, gay and lesbian individuals “who were
unable to come out publicly were able to use the website to find information,
resources, links to chat rooms and mailing lists, and a connection to a larger
community” (Moawad, March 30, 2010). Most encounters, in the early 2000s, took
place on an mIRC chatroom “#gaylebanon” (Moawad, 2010). As one anonymous
writer (2009) in Bareed recalls in a story titled “How it all Started,” “During those
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days, websites and chatrooms were another of those rare places where gay people
could meet. A popular website at the time was glas.org (Gay & Lesbian Arab
Society). It was mostly built by Arab gays living in the West. Their online chat room
featured ‘Yawmiyyet il gays bi Libnen’ (The Diaries of Gays in Lebanon)” (p. 124).
Cyberspace, as Zizi Papacharissi (2002) has argued, is a public and private space,
which makes it appealing “to those who want to reinvent their private and public
lives” as it provides new terrain to play out “the age-old friction between personal and
collective identity; the individual and community” (p. 20). Online meetings led to inperson meetings, which flourished in 2001 and 2002, eventually resulting in the
establishment of Club Free, an underground community that organized social
activities and meetings for gays and lesbians.
In 2002, some of the members of Club Free started contemplating the creation
of a public organization that would operate openly in society (Helem, 2008, p.15).
Founded in 2004 and based in Beirut, Helem (which means “dream” and is an
acronym for Lebanese Protection for Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals, and Transgender
Persons) is the first above-the-ground LGBT organization in the Middle East and
North Africa region, “lobbying for the legal and social rights of people with
alternative sexuality” (Helem, 2008, p.5).67 Helem defines itself as a rights-based
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Freedom of association is explicitly guaranteed in the Lebanese constitution. Lebanon
applies the 1909 Ottoman law governing associations and groups. The law itself is largely
based on the French law of association of 1901. It is seen as extremely liberal even compared
to association laws in some Western countries. According to the law in Lebanon, an
organization assumes a legally existing status if it does not receive a negative reply from the
Ministry of Interior within two months of submitting an application. Helem did not receive a
negative reply, nor did it receive an official registration number. Thus it has an ambiguous
legal status as it is not officially recognized by the state (Helem, 2008, pp.14-15; Makarem,
March 2005).
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organization working on the annulment of article 534 of the Lebanese penal code,
which outlaws ‘‘sexual relation contrary to nature’’ (often used to connote anal sex)
(Moussawi, 2014, p.13). Helem does not frame itself as a community of exclusively
LGBT people. As Moussawi (2014) explains, the group’s collective identity “is
derived from its commitment to human rights issues and abuses in the country, which
extends beyond LGBT issues. One could argue that what binds the group together is
its struggle for civil liberties for civil liberties,’’ with an emphasis on LGBT rights
(Moussawi, p.11). In 2005, female members of Helem, feeling that their particular
issues and struggles as women were not being adequately addressed in the
organization, created a women-only listserv 68 then started Helem Girls, a womanfocused group within Helem in 2006 (Abbani, 2012).69 “There were about thirty of us
in our first meeting, then people started learning about this through word of mouth
and were added to the listserv” Maya, one of the founders of Helem Girls, explains.
Soon afterwards some of the members created a zine, Souhak (lesbianism): “we
wrote about our personal stories, and it was a place to vent. That we exist.” Some of
the members of Helem Girls started meeting on a weekly basis in 2007 in a yoga
studio that they rented out on Hamra street, and eventually decided to create Meem,
68

listservs, as Juris (2012) notes, are a particular kind of networking tools with a unique set
of socio-political affordances. They allow users to circulate and exchange information,
interact, collaborate, and coordinate (p.286). These new diffuse network formations, he
explains, “frequently outlived the mobilizations for which they were created, cohering into
more or less sustainable movement infrastructures beyond any specific set of protests or
actions” (p.286).
69
For a critique of gender dynamics within Helem and the establishment of a separate group
for queer women, see this online post by “Shax,” former member of Helem “The Pandora’s
Box of Helem and Gendered Violence”
http://theshaxfiles.tumblr.com/post/44726097983/the-pandoras-box-of-helem-and-genderedviolence\
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which provided a support group and a space that was not male-dominated. It adopted
different organizing strategies and structures from Helem. As Moussawi shows, one
of the main points of diversion between Helem and Meem is their approach to
questions of visibility, the closet, and coming-out. As he points out, while Helem
presents itself as an “above-ground” organization that relies on an “open yet cautious
visibility” to raise awareness in society, Meem is a “partially-visible” support group
for queer women and trans persons which seeks to remain under the social radar
(Moussawi, 2014, p.13). 70 While the address of the safe Womyn House, run by
Meem, was never disclosed to the public, it was nevertheless known by members of
the community. This partial visibility is also reflected in practices of anonymous
writing that will be discussed later in the chapter. Thus, the group aimed to provide
its members with support and services “without the fear of being legally and socially
outed’’ (Lynn, 2010).71 The House, located in the Mar Mikhail district in Beirut, was
essential for community-building, providing a space for queer women to meet,
organize, hold discussions, write, and play cards. “We would there everyday, hang
out, meet new people. There was someone new all the time” (Maya, personal
interview, July 10). The House also provided a space away from the pressures of
family life: “I spent my days at Meem, and my evenings with the Mug Girl and Abdo
el RaQissa, sometimes joined by Shant and others, projecting movies on a white wall,
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For a more thorough analysis of the differences between Helem and Meem, and the ways in
which they craft collective identities around questions of coming out/the closet, queer
visibilities and LGBTQ rights, see Ghassan Moussawi (2014).
71
In a talk delivered by Meem at the International Lesbian and Gay Association in Sao Paolo
in 2009, it presented itself as a grassroots organization with the primary goal of creating
community and providing empowerment and a safe space for LBTQ women in Lebanon
(Lynn, 2010).
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channeling our exhaustions through conversation, a couple of drinks and a smoke,
until some of us went home, and the rest passed out by dawn” (Lynn, May 22,
2012).72 The House consisted of a living room, a coordinators’ office, a library, and a
therapy room. As Maya explains, therapy was one of the strongest and most
sustainable services that Meem and the House offered, “It was very helpful for a lot
of people to have access to therapy, to introduce the idea of therapy to the
community, to healthy process” (July 10, 2015).
In addition to providing, for the first time, a physical safe space for queer and
questioning women, Meem was also committed to writing and publishing. As one of
Meem’s co-founders put it, “The age of ‘wow, gay groups in Lebanon! That alone is
impressive!’ is over. It’s not impressive anymore. Now is the time for us to become
engaged with our own societies, to think analytically, to advance politically, to
understand the truth about oppression, to create, to research, to be proactive, to write,
to write, to write!” (Saldanha, September 16, 2009). The objective for writing was
threefold: First, to monitor and correct the mainstream media’s stereotyped and
prejudiced coverage of gay issues; Second, to provide a virtual space for association
and mobilization where such physical spaces lacked; And third, to provide a forum
for queer self-expressions where similar channels were unavailable. As Meem cofounder Nadz explains in her editorial after Bekhsoos’ 2009 re-launch, the e-zine
started out as a replacement for a “real” print magazine, which would’ve been costly,
but with the way information sharing has evolved, she continues, it became clear that
Bekhsoos belongs online: “That’s where young LGBTs in Lebanon are looking for
72

http://www.bekhsoos.com/2012/05/why-wasnt-i-an-emergency-case/
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information, connections, and support” (September 6, 2009).73 As Internet penetration
increasing and the costs of Internet connection decreased, online publications made
financial sense. But online publishing was also a way to circumvent the gate-keeping
functions of mainstream media, to create content that was simply lacking and absent
in film and television. It provided a direct channel of communication between the
writers and their audiences without the mediation of third-parties, such as writers and
producers of talk shows. Online queer discourse, in its public and politically-driven
nature, was a “strategy for coping with and undermining straight culture” (Smorag,
2008, p.3).
As one browses Bekhsoos and Bareed, an image of the community emerges
trough the writing of its anonymous members. As Georgis (2013) has argued is the
case with Bareed, the stories published in Bekhsoos also give us insight “into a tightly
knit community of queers in Lebanon and form a narrative archive of the
entanglements of their emotional and politically implicated lives” (p.234). Reading,
and print culture generally, Steven Jones (2002) explains, have been criticized for
isolating individuals, “promoting a sense of the imagined, the ‘read about,’ rather
than engagement with the world” (p. 14). But cultures of reading, as Benedict
Anderson (1983) has famously argued, are also at the core of the modern formation of
imagined communities. It is through mediated and shared narratives that collectivities
73

Lebanese bloggers do not face prosecution and intimidation73 typical in neighboring Arab
capitals such as Syria and Egypt, which respectively ranked 3 and 10 in the list of the worst
countries to be a blogger issued by the Committee to Protect Journalists in 2009 (CPJ, April
10, 2009). In contrast, Lebanon displays a lack of any state or ISP censorship or cybercrime
laws when it comes to internet usage; Although the Ministry of Interior proposed a
“Technology Committee” to draft a policy regulating online fraud, cybercrimes, and
pornography in October 2006, there was no proper follow-up on the matter (Moawad, March
30, 2010).
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come to think of themselves as such. “Narratives may imagine communities, and we
may imagine ourselves to be a part of a community based on our reading of a
narrative” (Jones 2002, p.16). Imagination, as Appadurai (1996) reminds us, is a
prerequisite for the formation of communities, and an important practice of media
consumption and production. Here, the imagined, the “read about,” is not at odds with
and does not prevent an engagement with the world. Rather, reading about and with
similar others carries world-making possibilities in its imagination of an otherwise to
heterosexuality in this local queer community, revealed as it is through anonymouslyauthored articles: “We sleep on each other’s couches and share our mothers’
homemade food […] We empty gel hormones into little plastic bottles and sneak
them with a Qor’an and a few oranges into the illegal migrant detention center. We
pick each other up off highways after brutal arguments with family. We care for each
other” (Lynn, May 22, 2012). These articles become archives of people, places, and
memories that would otherwise go unrecorded: Dunkin Donuts Achrafieh – open 24/7
– and perfect after-party joint; drag nights at Walimat Wardy74 in Hamra, Bardo’s
gold ceiling and wall projections;75 catfights, parking lot quickies, and trippy laser
lights at Acid, a popular gay nightclub; awkward encounters with ex-lovers at Coup
d’Etat, the country’s first women-only bar; Paradise Beach in Jbeil, where “Tante
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A restaurant located in the central commercial district of Hamra in Beirut, that specializes
in Lebanese cuisine and is popular among and frequented by journalists, writers, artists, and
Leftist leaning individuals in general.
75
Allegedly, Lebanon’s first gay bar and café, located in the Clemenceau neighborhood of
Beirut, adjacent to Hamra.
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[Aunty] Labibeh” sold her manakish and sodas while some boys got busy in a little
cave by the sea side (Phoenix, January 11, 2010).76
The movement from virtual anonymity to a self-conscious and selfrepresenting community, from gaylebanon.com to Meem, is enabled by the mediated
address to indefinite strangers and the degree of anonymity that digital technologies
allow. This is how, according to Warner (2002), publics and counterpublics are
formed. A public, unlike a concrete audience and a polity, is text-based:
Public discourse says not only, ‘Let a public exist,’ but ‘let it have this
character, speak this way, see the world in this way.’ It then goes out in search
of confirmation that such a public exists, with greater or lesser successsuccess being further attempts to cite, circulate, and realize the world
understanding it articulates (Warner, 2002, p.422).
By eschewing the gatekeeping of traditional media industries, electronic publications
like Bekhsoos are examples of independent media platforms, which thrived with the
emergence of web 2.0 technologies. By launching websites, publishing magazines,
writing blogs, creating public Facebook pages and events, all open for everyone to
see, activists create and circulate a queer discourse that attracts new potential
members and supporters. They are participatory media platforms in which individuals
are creators and consumers of culture, allowing “the public sharing of the minutiae of
life” (Peipmeier, 2009, p.13). As Peipmeier explains, print and electronic zines are
sites where girls and women construct identities, communities, and explanatory
narratives “from the materials that comprise their cultural moment: discourses, media
76

http://www.bekhsoos.com/2010/01/top-10-gay-hang-outs-lebanon/
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representations, ideologies, stereotypes” (p.2). This is what we find, for instance, in
commentaries about media representations in articles where a feminist and queer
perspective is constructed and articulated through a critical engagement with
mainstream culture. Rather than identifying with representations of non-normative
genders and sexualities, Meem’s writers mobilize what bell hooks (1992) has called,
in the context of black female spectators of American mainstream media, “the
oppositional gaze,” whereby marginal subjectivities “both interrogate the gaze of the
Other but also look back, at one another, naming what we see” (p. 116). The critical
gaze, for hooks, is one that looks to document and oppose misrepresentations. By
looking at these representations, queer writers deconstruct the normative assumptions
they are based on and help reproduce, thus asserting their agency by “claiming and
cultivating ‘awareness’” which in turn politicizes “looking relations” and opens up
possibilities for agency (hooks, p. 116).77 Bekhsoos and Bareed therefore embodied
what Janice Radway (2002) has called “insubordinate creativity,” the creative
construction of the self using the cultural materials that are “ready-to-hand” (p.178).
What makes this creativity insubordinate, Radway explains, is the way in which it
calls into question and reinterprets dominant cultural forms and norms. By making
oppositional ways of decoding dominant representations available, Meem politicizes
cultural production and consumption, exposing the power hierarchies embedded in
common discourses of sexual deviance. As Dima Kaedbey (2014) has argued in her
study of emergent queer feminist thought in Lebanon, online queer spaces and activist
77

For hooks (1992), the oppositional gaze is predicated on a refusal to identify with negative
and harmful representations. Critical spectators look from a location that disrupts dominant
narratives, where the pleasure of looking comes from practices of deconstruction and reading
against the grain (p.123).
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print publications constitute the “politicized face of queerness” (p.1).

Narcissism and Women’s Writing: Making Shame Public
With the rise of digital media technologies and the growing popularity of
social media in the Arab world, Arab youths have been labeled the “Facebook
generation,” a derogatory expression referring to their passivity, laziness, lax morals,
and increased influence by the West (Moawad & Qiblawi, 2010, p. 113). The Arab
uprisings instigated a shift in the discourse from slacktivism to a wide recognition of
the catalyzing role of digital technologies and social media in political mobilization
and social transformation, leading some observers to talk of Twitter and Facebook
revolutions. According to a report by the Center for International Media Assistance
(2011),“To peruse the Arab social media sites, blogs, online videos, and other digital
platforms is to witness what is arguably the most dramatic and unprecedented
improvement in freedom of expression, association, and access to information in
contemporary Arab history” (p. 4). The popular uprisings therefore occasioned the
proliferation of online and user-generated content, but also literature on the role of
new media technologies and social media sites in political mobilization, protest, and
collective action in the region (Allagui & Kuebler, 2011; Hirschkind, 2011; Khamis
& Vaughn, 2011; Lynch, 2011; Snider & Faris, 2011).78
In their attention to new opportunities and tactics for popular mobilization and
information sharing by activists and protestors, scholars tended to ignore the ways in

The questions to be asked, as Jeffrey Juris has noted, are “how new media matter; how particular
new media tools affect emerging forms, patterns, and structures of organization; and how virtual and
physical forms of protest and communication are mutually constitutive” (p. 260).
78
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which media technologies also transform modes of intimacy and interpersonal
dynamics, and the repercussions this carries for public life. This requires a
readjustment in the definition of social protest to include long-term forms of sustained
social and political action. The queer feminist writing produced in Bekhsoos and
Bareed is an integral element of the collective and ongoing social protest against
heteropatriarchy and the gender hierarchies and norms it imposes and reproduces.
Importantly, it is an expression of dissent that is borne of the sharing of the putatively
private and isolated experiences of shame that punctuate the lives of queers in
Lebanon. Such expressions are political inasmuch as they produce and circulate a
counterdiscourse on gender, sexuality, and womanhood. By expressing gender as a
site of solidarity, community, and political meaning-making, digital and print
publications make the alternative intimacies that emerge through Meem, and the
community more broadly, public and therefore imaginable as alternative lifeworlds.
At its core, then, queer feminist writing was about making the personal political.
What gives this writing its queer charge is its insistence on publicizing shame as a
mode of overcoming it.
In her reading of Bareed Mista3jil, Dina Georgis (2013) traces the creative
potential of “shame” as a site of signification, noting how “writing shame” is a
modality through which queer identities can be constituted from within their local and
cultural milieu. Georgis distinguishes between the emotional strategies to survive and
negotiate the difficulties of postcoloniality from the strategies of post-Stonewall pride
culture (p.233). Bareed and the expressive impulse that undergirds it, she explains,
must be understood as an exercise in queer community-building through the shared
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expression of experiences of shame and humiliation (p.233).79 But this openness in
talking about shame, which constitutes a central aspect of community-building must
not be misread as a desire to disentangle oneself from the familial and communal
attachments that constitute the very sites of shaming. Rather, as she explains, for
many narrators in Bareed, “the loss of group belonging is not a sacrifice they want to
make for the right to be ‘out’” (p.235). This refusal to choose between familial
attachments and individual freedom, which underpins many of the personal narratives
in Bareed and Bekhsoos, is best captured by the anonymity that characterizes much of
local queer publishing. Anonymous publishing lies at the core of the politics of
feminist queer visibility enacted by Meem, one where the collective rather than the
individuals constituting it is made publicly visible. While I concede with Georgis that
the desire to be “out” does not outweigh the desire to maintain family and community
ties, I want to put more pressure on the latter and consider the alternative
communities that are enabled by a certain mode of “outness.” One of the most
important insights that readers gain from Bareed is that family is not always a safe
space. Indeed, one of the primary concerns of queer and trans women, as expressed in
Bareed and Bekhsoos, is a need and desire for more privacy from family
encroachments and for alternative forms of community. Therefore, while there may
not be a desire to come out in the sense of declaring one’s identity in public, there is a

Georgis infuses her analysis of Bareed with a personal account of her coming to
queerness as a diasporic Arab subject in Canada in the mid-1990s: “At the time, it felt
like my final arrival to queerness was also my adieu to Arab culture—no thanks to
my mother, who insisted that homosexuality did not belong to Arabs” (p.233). For
Georgis, Bareed provided a much-needed opening to the question of what it meant to
be queer and Arab.
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necessary gesture of reaching out in the writing and publication of personal stories.
The openness in talking about shame in queer writing may not require or express a
desire to disentangle from family ties, but it signals a desire for the formation of other
entanglements and attachments sutured by the shared experience of shame. A reading
of a locally-produced discourse on non-conforming genders and sexualities, in
Bareed and Bekhsoos, elucidates the ways in which privacy and publicity are
redefined in queer feminists’ transgressions of the limits of the sayable through their
critical engagement with the disciplinary force of shame. The focus on new identity
formations around sexuality and the ways in which they have been inevitably
structured by the universalization of Western modernity (Massad, 2007) has
foreclosed a sustained engagement with queerness as subculture. By recasting the
public manifestations of non-normative sexualities as a function of the rise of
subcultures rather than the consequence of a hegemonic Western will to knowledge, I
want to foreground a queer desire for and attachment to forms of community and
collectivity that is expressed by and enacted through feminist queer writing.
In “The Laugh of the Medusa,” Hélène Cixous (1976) writes, “woman must
write her self: must write about women and bring women to writing, from which they
have been driven away as violently as from their bodies – for the same reasons, by the
same law, with the same fatal goal. Woman must put herself into the text – as into the
world and into history – by her own movement” (p.875). In her essay Cixoux coined
écriture feminine, “the inscription of the feminine body and female difference in
language and text” (Showalter, 1986, p.249). Writing, Cixous argues, has been
extensively and repressively run “by a libidinal and cultural – hence political,
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typically masculine – economy,” and as such constitutes a locus where women’s
repression has been perpetuated and where woman “has never her turn to speak”
(p.879). This exclusion from writing has serious and unpardonable repercussions,
Cixous explains, because writing “is the very possibility of change, the space that can
serve as a springboard for subversive thought, the precursory movement of a
transformation of social and cultural structures” (emphasis in original, p.879). In what
follows, I want to focus on this precursory force of writing identified by Cixous,
unpacking what it means in the context of feminist queer self-writing.80
“We are trying to define and redefine things as we go,” said Lynn, one of
Bekhsoos’ editors and regular writer, clarifying why certain issues became so divisive
and contentious during editorial meetings.81 Some, for example, objected to a feature
story on pride parades, refusing to ascribe to or reproduce an international and
mainstream LGBT discourse of pride. The discussions had a powerful effect on
members, adding, “the experience of working on this with the same group of people
on a weekly basis was powerful” (Lynn, personal interview, January 13, 2014).
“Tuesday night was sacred for me since that’s when we held our meetings,” recalls
Poupi, author of a regular column in Bekhsoos, who considered quitting training for a
job because it prevented her for making the meetings (personal correspondence,

“It is by writing, from and toward women, and by taking up the challenge of speech
which has been governed by the phallus, that women will confirm women in a place
other than that which is reserved in and by the symbolic, that is, in a place other than
silence. Women should break out of the snare of silence” (p.881).
81 The editorial team consisted of ten people and sometimes there were as many as
fourty. Special issues – on sex tourism for example – took longer to prepare. The
editors would often invite people to write on specific topics, and the zine frequently
featured pieces from Arab contributors and guest writers.
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August 8, 2015). Privately, Bekhsoos was a platform for writers to grapple amongst
themselves with the issues and challenges of identity politics. But it was also a public
platform for feminist queer expression in a local media landscape where both
feminism and queerness were under erasure. It emerged primarily as a counter
discourse to the rhetoric of “sexual deviance” propagated by Lebanese mainstream
media. As Lynn explains, “There’s a specific formula in mainstream media to talk
about non-normative sexualities, and you feel that you cannot identify with this stuff.
There was a problem of representation, of identification” (personal interview, January
13, 2014). The media’s angle was often voyeuristic, she adds, inviting the audience to
gaze upon a victim or sick person who often appeared behind a screen or as a shadow.
In the shadow of a normative mainstream discourse that pathologized queer
genders and sexualities, there was a shared desire to write, and to do it collectively.
Bekhsoos became a textual response to and commentary on different incarnations of
sexism and homophobia in Lebanese and Arab public cultures, cultivating a local
queer feminist discourse. The aim of Bekhsoos, in Lynn’s terms, was to create “an
alternative discourse” because getting angry at television shows was no longer
enough. “We wanted to create a platform to talk about our lives, our experiences, our
relationship to our bodies, to other people’s bodies.” This drive for self-expression, I
argue, is an instance of “civically motivated narcissism” (Papacharissi, 2002, p.13)
which she describes as a the “introspection and self-absorption that takes place in
blogs and similar spaces.” This new narcissism, she explains, “is defined as a
preoccupation with the self that is self-directed, but not selfishly motivated,” one that
is motivated by the desire to connect the self to society (p.13). The social nature of
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this form of narcissism through self-writing is evidenced in the writers’ description of
their motivation to write: “It was essential to me to write about my experiences and
my feelings and the questions i was asking myself and sharing them in the world
since i knew a lot of people were going thru similar things to what I was feeling and
the challenges and barriers i was facing as a queer person living in Beirut” (Poupi,
personal correspondence, August 8, 2015). “For me it was anyone who is in my
shoes; people stuck at home, who came out of the closet thinking they are the only
ones on the planet; so I was writing for them” (Maya, July 10, 2015). As Leen
explained, they often imagined younger generations as their audience, “We were
obsessed with lesbian teenagers. She was very present. At every meeting we would
raise this point; whenever we would disagree on something, we would say, ‘imagine
you’re 15 years-old and reading this article, what would you think or feel?’” (personal
interview, July 6, 2015).
Here is where the precursory politics of Meem become most evident. In its
reaching out to an other, the writing in Bareed and Bekhsoos prefigures the kind of
community it hopes to achieve and believes it achieves. As Phoenix writes in one
article, “We must use Bekhsoos as a documentation tool. She archives our struggles
and our pain […] The Bekhsoos motto is ‘we must write.’ And write, we shall. Our
writings will be our letters to the world. They will be the words of support from the
ones who can speak to the ones who cannot, until they are capable of doing so”
(September 6, 2010). 82 She imagines Bekhsoos as the writing of a common pain,
“our,” as a form of support for imagined others who cannot speak, but who will one
82

http://www.bekhsoos.com/2010/09/bekhio-therapie/

184

day. “Writing was a fuel for us,” Maya explains. “We were very into the idea of a
movement, of an underground movement, feeling that we were going to be
groundbreaking” (personal interview, July 10, 2015). There was a desire for a
“movement,” one that has perhaps yet to materialize, but which is invoked in and
through the writing, fuel for a collective imagination, and for the imagination of a
collective. “We weren’t too far in age, from the teenage girls,” Leen explains, “we
were in our early twenties and remembered very well how difficult and complicated
teenage years were; we needed every bit of support, and almost all of us didn’t find it,
until we found each other. When we used to live each one alone, in our societies as
teenage girls, we never found this. For us it was very important for a fifteen year-old
girl, who is just starting to feel these things, to go to Bekhsoos and see that we are
OK, that we survived, that we grew up, that we’re writing, that there are people who
feel like her” (Leen, July 6, 2015).
The feeling of social alienation, beyond the specificities and multiplicities of
bodies and desire, is what binds the community. Scenes of shame and stigma are
revisited and inscribed in writing, which turns experience into public knowledge,
repurposing shame – through confession – as a source of community. As such, the
writing in Bekhsoos and Bareed points to feminist theory’s original emphasis on the
analysis of the personal (Miller, 1991, x). The expression of the personal for the
purpose of its analysis and critique necessitated acts of translation and anonymiztion.
In the following sections, I will unpack translation and anonymity through a focus on
Bareed and Bekhsoos, respectively, to demonstrate how language and visibility are
structuring issues in the postcolonial politicization of sexual and gender identities.
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Translation at the Limits of the Sayable
Bareed appeared in English because the authors were more comfortable
writing in English. When they tried to write in Arabic, the editors note, they were
faced with “a powerful blockade against talking about sexuality. The words didn’t
exist to express exactly what we wanted them to, and we were constantly struggling
between the Lebanese Arabic dialect that we speak in our everyday lives and classical
Arabic which is traditionally used in writing” (p.6). Classical Arabic, they explain,
was remarkably distant from real-life experiences. Bareed Mista3jil, a collection of
forty-one short autobiographical stories of “women who are not heterosexual” in
Lebanon (p.2), was conceived by members of Meem as a publication that
communicated the lived experiences of queer women and trans persons in Lebanon,
experiences they believed were ignored, mystified, or pathologized in mainstream
media discourse. The result was a collection of short essays, some submitted in
written form and others narrated by individuals but recorded and composed by the
editors.83
In Bareed’s introduction, the editors explain how they struggled with
euphemisms and scientific words to describe sexuality terms and slang that differ in
different regions of Lebanon. “We’ve tried to analyze the reasons for this other than
the obvious cause that we don’t talk about sexuality much in the Arab world. Arabic
Bareed was published in 2009 through a grant from the Heinrich Böll Stiftung, a
German political foundation affiliated with the German Green Party tablished in
1987, the foundation was named after German writer Heinrich Böll. Headquarted in
Berlin, the foundation has thirty offices around the world. Its main areas of interest
are ecology and sustainability, democracy and human rights, and self-determination
and justice. In addition, it places particular emphasis on “Gender Democracy,”
defined as social emancipation and equal rights for men and women.
83
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as a language has not adapted itself to create new words or a more comfortable use of
existing words to describe things related to sexual expression” (p.6). The editors
explain their use of “queer” to represent all non-heterosexual identities, as an
umbrella term for non-conforming sexualities. “It is very similar to the current Arabic
derogatory term, ‘shazz,’ which literally means ‘deviant’ and is the most common
Arabic term for ‘homosexual’” (p.2). Through a series of translations that open the
book, the reader is immediately introduced to the language predicament that
constitutes Bareed’s master theme; indeed, that characterizes Arab queer cultural
production. “It’s becoming harder for what the world calls ‘developing countries’ to
study and look at sexuality outside of the Western construct of ‘LGBT,’ which is the
most widely used term to denote non-heterosexual individuals and communities”
(p.2). The editors bemoan the fact that the most globally visible queer identities are
generated in Europe and North America, which they believe further reproduces
stereotypical ideas about what it means to be a homosexual, bisexual, or transsexual
on a universal scale (p.3). The cultural hegemony of LGBT identity politics, coupled
with the quasi absence of alternative representations of non-heterosexual sexualities
and identities, shapes the forms and idioms through which Arab queers – and
Lebanese queer feminists in particular – come to identify and represent themselves. In
this section, I want to show how queer writing emerges in and through a postcolonial
condition of interlinguality (Chow, 2014), where Arabic and English are brought
together in creative attempts to fill the public silence that shrouds non-conforming
genders and sexualities.
In her critical reading of the 2005 UN-sponsored Arab Human Development
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Report: Towards the Rise of Arab Women, anthropologist Lila Abu Lughod (2009)
interrogates the international circulation of political discourses on women’s rights and
empowerment in the early 21st century (p.83). While she admires the report’s
ambitions, intentions, and commitment to the amelioration of women’s lives and
status in Arab societies, Abu Lughod is disappointed “by the political limitations of
the intellectual framework and language it used and in the prejudices that shape its
analyses of women’s everyday lives” (p.83-84). She identifies three main problems
with the report: first, the possibility of its negative appropriation in what she calls a
“particular international context of global inequality and hostility” (p.84-85); second,
the report’s limited focus on a “cosmopolitan or urban middle-class” perspective on
women’s lives; and third, the report’s reliance on the “particular international
language of women’s rights” and the dominant political paradigms it indexes –
modernization, human development, and neoliberalism. Abu Lughod (2009) explains
that the social networks and international bodies through which the dominant liberal
definition of women’s rights is promoted gave rise to a “‘dialect’ of rights the status
of what [Talal] Asad calls a ‘strong language,’ one into which others must be
translated” (p.84). Translation is construed here in a negative light.
In Desiring Arabs (2007), Massad imagines a pre-colonial, fluid, and nonidentitarian same-sex desire, unbridled by the structuring forces of Western sexual
discourses and the taxonomies underpinning them. He establishes a firm link between
cultural imperialism and the emergence of new gender and sexual identity politics. In
a chapter titled “Re-Orienting Desire: The Gay International and the Arab World,“
Massad (2007) interrogates the new visibility of “gay” and “lesbian” identities and
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the validity of their use as categories of Arab personhood. He distinguishes between a
Western homosexuality that is an “identity seeking social community and political
rights” and non-Western “forms of sexual intimacy that seek corporeal pleasure”
through same-sex contact (Pagano, December 1, 2009). He writes, “The categories
gay and lesbian are not universal at all and can only be universalized by the
epistemic, ethical, and political violence unleashed on the rest of the world by the
very international human rights advocates whose aim is to defend the very people
their intervention is creating” (p. 41). He accuses a constellation of Western-based
international gay rights organizations of creating homosexuals where they do not
exist, acting as agents of an indiscriminate and culturally-insensitive universalization
of a gay rights discourse. The “Gay International,” as he calls this organizational
network, stands behind the heterosexualization of a world “forced to be fixed by
Massad explains that “homo/heterosexuality were invented recently as direct
translations of the Latin original: ‘Mithliyyah’ or sameness in reference to
homosexuality and ‘ghayriyyah’ or differentness in reference to heterosexuality” (p.
172). The invention of Arabic words, through the translation of foreign concepts, is
characterized in his account as an “epistemic violence.” In its introduction of new
terminologies into the Arabic lexicon, and by extension of new modes and objects of
knowledge in Arab societies, translation is treated as an index of the cultural and
epistemological onslaught of neo-imperial power. As such, the lack of words and
expressions in Arabic around gender or sexual identity is mobilized as evidence of the
inexistence or elitism of said identities.
Like Massad, who describes self-identifying Arab gays as “native informants”
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and agents of the West fulfilling an “imperialist epistemological task” (p.189), Abu
Lughod is skeptical about the currency of a women’s rights dialect among local Arab
elites whose appropriation of a foreign, strong language stands as proof of their
implication in the perpetuation of cultural imperialism. While she draws her
conclusion about the international circulation of a gender discourse from the
dominant position of bodies and institutions of global governance, such as the U.N,
the critical questions of political appropriation, perspective, and language that she
outlines could be posed from a minor perspective. The production of knowledge
about gender and sexuality in the Arab world is not restricted to international
organizations. In this context of global inequality and hostility charted out by Abu
Lughod, minor publics like Meem strategically appropriate globally-circulating
discourses of gender and sexual rights in their social struggles and political projects.
Bareed Mista3jil and Bekhsoos provide a different and often disregarded perspective
through which the forces of colonialism and globalization could be apprehended. A
view from the bottom, I suggest, engenders new perspectives on the old question of
cultural imperialism by attending to the resistances it inevitably generates.
First, while it is true, as Abu Lughod (2009) demonstrates, that modernization,
human development, and neoliberalism are dominant political paradigms that
underpin the global discourse of gender and sexual rights, these paradigms are
interrogated in the appropriation of this discourse by Lebanese and Arab queer
feminists who inflect them with local meaning. Second, in their rendering of class,
sectarian, gender, racial, and sexual differences that constitute Lebanese society,
Bareed and Bekhsoos expose the multiple and intersecting vectors of power that make
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postcolonial female and queer subjectivities. Although they present largely
cosmopolitan and urban middle-class perspectives, these publications are highly
reflexive about the omissions and exclusions that they help reproduce and cognizant
of the importance of intersectional analysis and praxis. In an article on Arab queer
organizing published in Bekhsoos, for instance, Lynn Darwich and Haneen Maikey
(2011) call for a thorough understanding of local queer activism within the
geopolitical framework within which and against which it must define itself. They
recognize the universalization of a dominant narrative whereby “the Homophobia,
Coming Out, Visibility, and Pride axis has continuously been shaping contemporary
LGBT communities, their values and demands, around the world” (para. 9). They
explain that, within this framework, their struggles become issues of representation
and privilege, ones that “contribute to hierarchies that leave the transgenders, the nonidentified, the bisexuals, the intersexed, the disabled, the migrants, the colored, the
illiterate, and many more, at the bottom, and unworthy of rights” (para.10).84 The
skewed, unavoidable middle class perspective, then, is interrupted by reflections on
self-implication in the marginalization and exploitation of disenfranchised others.
Finally, in their appropriation of queer and feminist discourses, also in global
circulation, queer feminists engage in a process of translation, investing and inflecting
concepts originating elsewhere with local value and meaning, Arabizing English
terms, and often creating new Arabic terminologies of sex and gender. Through an
explicit and self-avowed struggle with language, the producers of and contributors to
local feminist queer publications lay bare the cultural politics that animate
http://www.bekhsoos.com/2011/10/from-the-belly-of-arab-queer-activism-challenges-andopportunities/
84
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postcolonial self-expression. 85 I characterize these processes of appropriation and
translation as instances of what Rey Chow has called “languaging.”
In Not Like a Native Speaker: On Languaging as a Postcolonial Experience,
Rey Chow (2014) unpacks the linguistic processes that necessarily shape and are
shaped by the experience of colonialism which had profound consequences on
colonized subjects as “linguistic or language subjects” (p.37). The disciplining of
subjects through language, as she notes, is at the core of the colonial enterprise. In
this regard, a colonial education entails “a protracted confrontation between the
enforcement of the colonizer’s language as the official channel of communication and
the demotion of the colonized’s languages as obsolete or simply irrelevant” (p.37). In
her autobiographical essay “Growing Up to be a Woman Writer in Lebanon,”
Lebanese novelist, artist, and poet Etel Adnan (1986) recounts her education at the
hands of the nuns of the French Catholic Church in Beirut. Upon establishing their
official mandate over Syria and Lebanon, the French expanded the already-existing
French schools in the country and established new ones. They imposed a system of
education in total conformity with its counterpart in France, an education, Adnan
(1986) notes, which “had nothing to do with the history and the geography of the
children involved” (p.7).

Reflecting on her language education during these

formative years, Adnan remembers how she started speaking French upon starting
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These discourses, in other words, are accented. It is through the accent that we can
discern the oblique trajectories of European and American cultural imperialism – past
and present – in whose shadow individuals continue to live, and against whom Arabs
have been defining and re-defining themselves. It is the accent that opens up a
possibility for difference in sameness, and hence for the endless deferment of
complete hegemony.
192

school at age five and then only French, as Arabic was forbidden in French schools.
“So,” Adnan writes, “I grew up thinking that the world was French. And that
everything that mattered, that was ‘in books,’ or had authority (the nuns), did not
concern our environment. This is what is called alienation” (p.7). Adnan’s loss of
Arabic, as well as the disappearance of Greek and Turkish – usually spoken with her
Greek mother – at home, exemplify the process, identified by Chow, “in which to
learn is simultaneously to alienate or estrange from oneself what is closest to one,”
and which should be recognized “as the condition a priori to the postcolonial scene of
languaging” (p.45).
Alienation, for both Adnan and Chow, is produced and felt at the level of
language. Colonial education, extolled as it was by the French Mission Civilisatrice
(Civilizing Mission) that sought to uplift indigenous populations, was predicated on
the spread and promotion of the French language.86 This came at the expense of local
languages deemed inferior, creating a sense of cultural loss and dispossession, but
also of alienation in intimate family life. As Adnan writes, “studying in a language
basically foreign to my parents created a distance between us: I was engaging myself
in territories alien to them and I was being estranged. I felt more and more different,
with frames of reference they could not share. I was becoming a foreigner in my own
house” (p.14). Indeed, as she started expressing her desire to move to France to
continue her education, Paris came to embody, for Adnan’s mother, “hell itself, the
86

Created in 1970 to embody the solidarity between its 80 member states, the International
Organization of la Francophonie, a postcolonial extension of France’s linguistic colonial legacy,
represents one of the biggest linguistic zones in the world. It boasts that its members not only share a
common language but also share “the humanist values promoted by the French language.” Lebanon
has been a member of La Francophonie since its establishment.
http://www.francophonie.org/Welcome-to-the-International.html
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capital of white female slavery, the chaos in which children who have left home
disappear forever” (p.19). And when Adnan finally tells her mother that her professor
at the Ecole des Lettres wanted to send her on a scholarship to Paris, the mother
accused the teacher of being an immoral man, “stirring us up and separating us from
our homes,” and threatened to blow up the school (p.19). “We obviously lived in
irreconcilable worlds,” Adnan concludes. Adnan’s alienation through the mastery of a
foreign language, manifested as it was on an intellectual and intimate level, was also,
importantly, her gateway to individual freedom, creativity, and professional success.
Thus, even as she retraces her “traumatic interpellation” by colonial education, to
borrow Chow’s words, Adnan recognizes this trauma’s structuring role in her
formation as a “woman writer.” While her subjectivity was necessarily constituted in
a condition “of being caught between languages not simply as skills but as indexes of
cultural superiority and inferiority” (Chow, 2014, p.39), Adnan’s intellectual,
academic, and professional advancements were predicated on her mastery of French.
She described writing in French, which she took great pleasure in, as her “little
domain,” a world where she had no fear, no tension, no problem (p.11).
Mastering the colonizer’s language secured an education, followed by a first
job as a teacher of French Literature in Al-Ahlia school for girls. There, Adnan got
close to the headmistress, a Lebanese Protestant woman whose success and
achievements she admired: “She was an admirable person, had gone to the American
University of Beirut and had a Ph.D in Education from a university in the United
States. It was my first contact with teaching and with Anglo-Saxon oriented milieu of
Lebanon” (p.20). Here, Adnan’s account reveals the coexistence of French and
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American cultural domination through missionary education, exposing the
multilingual colonial milieu that was Lebanon. Language proficiency gave her access
to an unfamiliar universe and eventually secured her a scholarship, in 1949, to finish
her Licence des Lettres in France, thus moving out of the family home and away from
the homeland. The alienation, at the scene of colonial education, is thus done and
undone by the knowledge of a foreign language. While that knowledge distanced her
from her culture and her family, it simultaneously provided otherwise restricted
opportunities for her emancipation as a woman. Predicated as it is on her alienation as
a national subject, Adnan’s languaging illustrates the melancholic scene in which “the
colonized suffers the loss of her harmonious relation to her own language” (Chow,
p.47) but also represents the reparative potential of recasting coloniality, through its
language politics, as a prosthetic rather than an origin for the subversion of gender
norms and hierarchies. Here I engage Chow’s central questions: “How to strive for
self-recognition even as one must efface oneself in the process of speaking and
writing? How not to essentialize loss even when loss is embodied and intimately felt,
but rather to treat loss itself as…a kind of prosthetics?”
This detour through Adnan’s biography, by way of Chow’s theorization of
postcolonial language practices, is meant to establish the postcolonial scene of
languaging, defined as it is by loss, dislocation, and alienation, long before the
relatively recent global emergence and circulation of a language of women’s and
LGBT rights and feminist and queer identity politics. By setting the “givenness of the
fraught linguistic scene” (Chow, p.38) that is the postcolonial contemporary writing
of queer desire, I want to disrupt the epistemic break that is commonly drawn around
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the internationalization of sexual rights politics. The subject has already been
disciplined by the colonization of language when the gay rights discourse enters her
cultural and linguistic repertoire.
Maya, a founding member of Meem and regular contributor to Bekhsoos,
explains, “When you get to college, and during your entire time there you take maybe
one class in Arabic. All your surroundings tell you that English is wow and Arabic is
shit. This is social pressure” (personal interview, July 10, 2015). The expression of a
remoteness from the native language and culture, as Chow (2014) demonstrates,
results from the instillation of a hierarchy of cultural values in which English is
deemed “an indispensability for social advancement” (p.44). Leen, one of the editors,
notes that Arabic is not the language of instruction in Lebanese schools. “We study
sciences, maths, everything in English or French, we don’t study them in Arabic. The
curriculum, from a pedagogical point of view, is really problematic” (personal
interview, July 6, 2015). And Lynn, another editor, concedes,

“Unfortunately,

because of our education, we don’t learn to conceptualize in Arabic. We don’t learn
how to express ourselves in Arabic. If you learn philosophy in French you won’t be
able to conceptualize in Arabic” (personal interview, January 10, 2013).
The discomfort with Arabic, and the complaint about its absence, lack, and
inadequacy is reiterated by other Arab queer activists and collectives. Rauda Morcos,
co-founder of Aswat (Voices), a Palestinian lesbian organization, states in an
interview, “I have forgotten my language, I don’t know how to say ‘to make love’ in
Arabic without it sounding chauvinistic, aggressive, and alien to the experience”
(Whitaker, October 2, 2006). For Morcos, queer activism was primarily “about
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developing a ‘mother tongue’ with positive, un-derogatory and affirmative
expressions of women and lesbian sexuality and gender,” adding, “we are creating a
language that no one spoke before” (Whitaker, October 2, 2006). Queer publications
are one site for the production and circulation of affirmative expression. The 2005
inaugural issue of Barra (Out), the first Arab LGBT magazine produced by Helem,
featured a “glossary of Arabic expressions” which consisted of Arabic translations of
English terms such as “bisexual”, “gay,” and

“transsexual.” Barra is a direct

translation of “Out” and thus invokes the coming out narrative that is central to
American LGBT politics. The magazine was launched in March 2005, in the midst of
“the Independence Intifada” that followed the assassination of former Prime Minister
Rafik Hariri in February of that year. It featured articles about homosexuality, health,
arts and culture, but also reported on mainstream media coverage of LGBT issues in
Lebanon and the Arab world. 87 Ahmad Saleh, the magazine’s coordinator, explains
that writing in Arabic was a challenge. He recalls discussions in the magazine about
the Arabic translation of “transgender.” There were many possible permutations
between “tahawwol” (transformation) and “taghayyor” (change) on one hand and
“naw’a jandari” (gender), “dawr jandari” (gender role), and “jins” (sex) on the other.
Possible translations included “taghayyor al-naw’a al-jandari” (gender change),
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The second issue in 2006, for instance, included a four-page feature on Lebanese press coverage of
issues such as the presence of queer characters in Arab music videos, gay marriage in the West, and the
troubles of being homosexual in Lebanon. The magazine also included interviews with prominent
Lebanese personalities, such as television producers and writers, about their opinions on the legal and
social status of homosexuality. It was distributed electronically over Helem’s mailing list and website
(www.helem.net) and was found in print select venues. In the editorial of the first issue, Helem cofounder Ghassan Makarem writes, “Homosexuals have a history that hasn’t been written, but it exists
in the folds of literature, art, poetry, and the human sciences […] homosexuals also have a present that
they have to historicize to illuminate the causes and effects of the repression they are subject to”
(Makarem, March 2005).
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“taghayyor al-dawr al-jandari” (gender role change), “tahawwol al-naw’a aljandari” (gender transformation). The magazine’s goal, first and foremost, was to
discuss practical issues around non-normative sexualities and gender identities in
Arabic, in public, where they were lacking (personal interview, May 1, 2015).88 For
example, Saleh recalls, the magazine published an article on breast binding for trans
men in the health section. “This wasn’t about risk or fear or danger around sex, it
was something people think about and try to find online, and we were offering this in
Arabic, and this was the point, to actually make it available in Arabic” (personal
interview, May 1, 2015). In Bareed’s introduction, the editors highlight the inability
to express sex in Arabic as a major obstacle in writing. This could be, as both activists
and scholars have pointed out, because of the sheer inexistence of certain terms in
Arabic. Alternatively, it could be a problem not of language, but of the difficulty of
speech, of speaking about sex in public. As Leen explains, “We find it uncomfortable
to express sexuality in Arabic because we are not used to it. Not the other way
around. We are used to ‘kiss’ (pussy) as an insult in Arabic. The connotation is
negative. Sexuality and sex are not an issue that is spoken about in our societies, in
Arabic, in the mainstream media for example” (personal interview, July 6, 2015). She
adds, “we get acquainted with these issues mostly through the internet, especially if
you’re LGBT or queer or whatever, and you are learning about your identity in a
language that is not your language. Therefore, the inner thoughts and constructs that
are related to your queer identity [al-hawiyya al-queeriyya] come from an English

Members of Helem have also discussed language deficiency in awareness materials for HIV/AIDS
that were unavailable in Arabic (Helem, 2008, p. 40).
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original. The word itself, queeriyya [queer], does. And hence, you have this distance,
this alienation from Arabic” (personal interview, July 6, 2015).
As Chow points out, the inevitable confrontation between languages in a
colonial education, rather than leading to the replacement of one language by another,
positions the colonized subject in an interesting and conflicted ontological situation
“in which there can be no pure linguistic practice because the use of one language is
habitually interfered with by the vying availability of others” (p.37). The medium of
language, in her account, is a vehicle that speakers and writers adapt, transform, and
repurpose (p.38). This is how queer becomes queeriyya, and how new identities find
expression. Media scholar Noor al-Qassimi (2011) uses the example of “Boyah” in
the Arab Gulf to describe the emergence of new butch identities through languaging.
“Boyah” is a lexicalization of the English “boy” followed by the Arabic feminine
suffix -ah. As al-Qasimi notes, the word refers to the self-stylizations and aesthetics
of lesbian butch identities in what has become an increasingly visible subculture
within Arab Gulf States. Boyah’s semiotic power lies as much in its queering of
normative femininity, through its visible performance of female masculinity, as it
does in its transgression of monolingualism. The Arabic female suffix -ah queers an
otherwise English word and the result is neither English nor Arabic. This term, an
amalgamation of multiple languages and genders, registers a new and local form of
queer embodiment and self-expression. In fact, the question of interlinguality that
Chow poses has been broached by scholars of postcolonial and non-Western
sexualities.
Writing about the transnational circulation of a gay rights discourse, Iranian
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historian Afsaneh Najmabadi (2008) considers the subversive potentials of
appropriation and translation and the possibility of reiteration with a difference:
“Perhaps one of the problems with the current heated debates between proponents of
‘global gay’ and opponents of ‘gay international’ resides in the presumption, common
to both groups, that ‘I am gay,’ or ‘I am transsexual’ means the same thing anywhere
it is pronounced (p. 37). She explains that loan words and expressions such as
straight, gay, lesbian, transsexual, homosexual, top, bottom, and versatile—largely
picked up from the media—are pronounced in Persian just as they are in English and
are freely used in discussion. But, she adds, these enunciations mean differently and
do a different cultural work in different contexts (p. 37). To the extent that the
adoption of the terms gay and lesbian into Persian nomenclature can be viewed as
some sort of mimicry, Najmabadi argues, it is a strategic move to shed the cultural
stigma” of local words (p. 40). Moreover, whether these language moves work or fail
is not determined by “the cultural power domination by a presumed ‘gay
international’ that is exporting its identity categories in imperial fashion” (p. 40). In
his study of queer subjectivities in Indonesia, Tom Boellstorff (2003) proposes the
notion of “dubbing culture” to conceptualize the relationship between persons and the
cultural logics through which they come to occupy subject positions under
contemporary globalizing processes. He argues that gay and lesbi subjectivities do not
originate in the “West” (and are not perceived as diasporic), nor are they a hybrid of
“West” and “East,” but are distinctively Indonesian phenomena formed through a
sense of linkage to distant but familiar Others (p. 226). 89 Looking at queer cultural
89

Boellstorff italicizes gay and lesbi to keep them distinct from the English terms.
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production in Taiwan, Fran Martin (2003) interprets the complex mix of Chinese and
English terms in lesbian magazine Ai Bao as an instance of “cultural translation”
(p.4). 90 This compels us to ask, following Chow (2014), “is not such a state of
bilinguality or interlinguality – often in the form of puns, jokes, ellipses, silences,
awkward turns of phrases, erroneous or estranged uses that mark the entanglement of
different voices and compositions – something with which we have yet to come to
terms?” (p.38).
To do so, Chow uses Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus to explain
transformations that occur at the level of language. Rather than account for the fixity
and reproduction of practices, habitus as a structure of durable dispositions becomes
perceptible, according to Bourdieu, during experiences of adjustment when people
adapt or abandon deeply-entrenched social practices to function under new historical
conditions. It is, in Chow’s formulation, a “way of conceptualizing a kind of
experience – what may be described more precisely as a practical transitioning – that
people accustomed to an older socioeconomic order […] have to go through in order
to participate in a new one” (emphasis in original, p.25).91 Once we consider language
as habitus, at once resilient and adaptable, we may read appropriation, translation, and
adaptation as process of creative reinvention rather than passive accommodation. By
She highlights that there is not one but many Chinese words used to translate
“queer.” The term tonghzi appeared in Taiwan Mandarin via Hong Kong as a
translation of the English term queer but then shifted to signify lesbian/gay identity.
“At issue here, then, is not simply a translation between English and Chinese, but also
the translations between ‘lesbian/gay’ and ‘queer’ and the translation of that
translation into Taiwan’s cultural context” (Martin, 2003, p. 4).
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Bourdieu developed his theory of the habitus in his examination of the workers of Kabyle society in
Algeria in the late 1950s and early 1960s, where he observed the transformation of precapitalist
economic activities such as gift exchange and debt caused by the onset of a new colonial economic
order, one that is based on the spirit of calculation under capitalism and modernization.
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considering the role of languaging in the emergence of LGBTQ identities outside the
West, I want to de-essentialize language as an inherited and fixed system of
representation in order to interrupt the seamless continuity between sexual desire and
practice that is often assumed in theorizations of Arab same-sex desire.
In this regard, it is instructive to note the tension that queer writers – and nonqueer writers too – express between the use of written classical Arabic (fusha) and the
spoken Lebanese dialect of everyday life. Writers often talk about the difficulties of
translation between the two, for example in the book launching event for Bareed. In
December 2009, Meem held a public reading at al-Madina Theater, 92 with two
narrators reading selected stories in English and Arabic. 93 As Joelle, the Arabic
narrator, explains, the translation process was difficult. “It was going to be alienating
to go on stage and read in fusha which would create a distance from the text. We
don’t normally tell our stories in fusha so it made sense to translate them and read
them in colloquial Lebanese. Colloquial is much closer than fusha” (personal
interview, July 1, 2015). Many writers in fact choose to write in colloquial Lebanese,
often using Latin letters instead of Arabic. In a post titled “Ma3mal l 3elab” (The
Factory of Boxes), the “3” in “ma3mal,” for example, stands for the letter “’ayn” in
Arabic (people use it because it looks like an inverted “’ayn”). The entire post is
written in what could be described as a Latinized Arabic, commonly referred to as
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The theater is located in the commercial and residential district of Hamra in the heart of Beirut.
Sunbula: Arab Feminists for Change and the Global Fund for Women staged two readings of Bareed
in San Francisco and Berkeley in December 2009. In a letter addressed to Meem and posted on
Bekhsoos, Saida, one of the event’s organizers, writes: “Our readers have expressed their gratitude at
participating in this project – many have told me they are finding it healing to read others’ words so
closely reflecting their own experiences and reading as a way to send healing energy to the original
‘owners’ of the harshest words and celebrating the joy inherent in other loving sequences.”
http://www.bekhsoos.com/2009/12/staged-readings-of-bareed-mista3jil-in-california/
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Arabish, which is an informal transliteration system mostly used in online chatting to
write Arabic in Latin letters, creatively transliterating Arabic sounds that cannot be
expressed with Latin letters by using numbers instead. The boxes the writer refers to
are the labels that are forced upon her, as a girl then a woman: “infidel, whore,
deviant, crazy, slutty, emasculating, mannish, loose!” 94 (Crimson, December 21,
2009).

In another post titled “Mouto: A Feminist Rants about Non-Feminist

Women,” the same author paints a portrait of the norms governing the lives of
Lebanese women. By urging them to die at the beginning of every verse of her poem
– literally, Mouto means “die” – she expresses her refusal to uphold or abide by the
norms of female behavior dictated by society as feminine virtues: “Mouto faking
orgasms kel 7ayetkoun; Mouto 3azara; Mouto diet; Mouto tharthara 3ala el jiran;
Mouto zaha2 min hayetkoun; Mouto jorsa” (Die faking orgasms all your life; Die
virgins; Die from diet; Die from gossiping about the neighbors; Die from boredom in
your life; Die from scandal) (Crimson Curls, December 6, 2009).95 Reflecting on the
use of the Lebanese colloquial in Barra, Ahmad Saleh notes that some contributors
thought that it was more hip and accessible, while others believed fusha was clearer
and had more legitimacy. He explains that while colloquial is more practical and
accessible when spoken, once put in writing it is hard to read and understand. “You
have to say it to understand it. There were articles where we suggested a mix of the
two, to make it more conversational while maintaining the coherence and structure of
fusha” (personal interview, May 1, 2015).
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http://www.bekhsoos.com/2009/12/masna3-l-3elab/
http://www.bekhsoos.com/2009/12/mouto-a-feminist-rants-about-non-feminist-women/
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This distance between the written classical Arabic and the oral Lebanese
dialect must therefore be examined apart from the question of Arabic-English
translation. During a 2010 campaign on the occasion of the International Day Against
Homophobia, Lebanese queer activists attempted to reclaim the word shadh through a
campaign slogan that read “Eh ana shadh” (yes I am a deviant), which lead to lengthy
discussions and disagreement in the community (Lynn, personal interview, January
13, 2014). The word mithli had been largely adopted by Arab queer activists and
some media outlets as the politically correct alternative to the commonly used shadh
(deviant). Unlike its English counterpart, shadh still carries the stigma of deviance in
a Lebanese and broader Arab cultural context, and the debates around the use of
mithli versus shadh thus revealed broader tensions and schisms around queer versus
LGBT politics. Internal translations between lesbian/gay and queer, as Fran Martin
(2003) explains in the context of Taiwan, intimate the inadequacy of a binary
transnational framework in which ‘English’ always confronts a local indigenous
language, such as Chinese or Arabic, as its mirroring other (p. 4).
Furthermore, writers often tackle English terms and expressions they deem
problematic. In a Bekhsoos post in French titled “Shemale, Shemale, Shemale!”
Randa problematizes the use of the term to refer to trans women, explaining how it
reduces the transsexual woman to “an exotic sex object, a mythic creature of modern
times.”96 By using this common terminology, she writes, “we refuse the ‘shemale’ her
identity as a woman” (September 8, 2011). Similarly, in a story titled “Butch” in
Bareed, the narrator explains her unease with the categories “butch” and “femme,”
96

http://www.bekhsoos.com/2011/09/transsexuelle-ou-shemale/
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frequently used in the community and which she finds reductive. For her, “butch” and
“femme” designations reproduce gender stereotypes in the lesbian community and
fail to capture nuances in gender performance and presentation (p.153). In this regard,
it is worth revisiting Massad’s use of “same-sex practitioner” as a more accurate
descriptor than “homosexual” or “gay.” By avoiding reference to “homosexuality” as
fixed identity category to eschew essentialist sexual binaries, the term “same-sex”
brushes over the complexities of gender. What kind of erotic attachments and
configurations are excluded from the category “same-sex?” To quote Najmabadi
(2006), adopting the concept of same-sex “may have trapped our thinking of human
relations bound by the contours of the ‘same-sex-ness’ of those relationships,”
making “sex” the truth of these relations and “regenerating the binary of male and
female bio-genital difference as the defining mark of that truth” (p. 17). Thus, the
concern with the neo-imperialist underpinnings of a globalized language of sexual
rights and identities, and attempts to redress linguistic representations, may misfire in
their reification of a gender binary, and the essentialization of gender in biological
sex, that are enacted by a category like “same-sex.” Naming Arab sexualities is a
contentious and fraught endeavor, Georgis (2013) argues, because “there is no easy
way to make sense of the historical entanglements of precolonial traditions,
colonization and sexual shaming, and gay epistemologies in the lives of present-day
Arabs” (p.237). Refusing labels and evading taxonomies, rather than liberating sex
and gender, may have the adverse effect of perpetuating the invisibility of gender and
sexual diversity and the fixity of existing categories that remain unchallenged.
As Frederic Lagrange (2000) notes, research on same-sex eroticism in Arabic
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literature “has been very cautious with its vocabulary, preferring in place of
‘homosexuality’ terms such as ‘homoeroticism’ or ‘same-sex sexuality’” (p. 171). In
fact, the very need to use sexual labels and categories is called into question. For Pratt
Ewing (2011), “Muslims are less troubled by sex and desire in all their possible forms
than they are by the peculiar modern practice of naming our sexualities as the basis
for secular public identities” (p. 89). Here, naming one’s sexuality amounts to
“essentializations” that are themselves part of “the coming out stories foreign to
Muslims (Pratt-Ewing, 2011, pp. 93–94).97 In her insistence that the public naming of
desires as identities is out of sync with non-Western local contexts, Pratt Ewing not
only delegitimizes such identities where they do exist, but she also ties in such acts of
naming with secular politics, and ultimately depicts secularism itself as undesirable to
and incompatible with an unspecified public of “Muslims.” Publicity, in such
accounts, is never conceptualized as a desire. It remains an opaque category, invoked
in debates around “gay rights” but never contemplated as a question of everyday life.
As the narrator of “My bisexuality,” explains, “I don’t mind labels. On the contrary, I
spent almost half of my life trying to label myself. I have gone from calling myself
straight to lesbian to bisexual to lesbian to bisexual more times than I can remember
in the past 10 years. Although I never liked people labeling me, it was still very
important for me to give a name, a category, an identity of sorts to myself” (p.48).98
Because of a lack and inadequacy at the level of language, the editors explain, “queer
97
It is worth noting that the author uses the category “Muslims” without further qualification or
specificity throughout her piece.

Naming Arab sexualities is a contentious and fraught endeavor, Georgis (2013)
argues, because “there is no easy way to make sense of the historical entanglements
of precolonial traditions, colonization and sexual shaming, and gay epistemologies in
the lives of present-day Arabs” (p.237).
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people in Lebanon are more likely to frame their identity in English or French
because that’s where these words exist more freely and where we find internet pages
and papers written about sexuality” (p.7).
In the book’s opening story, titled “Sou7aqiyyeh” (latin transliteration of the
Arabic word for lesbian), the narrator explains her unease with Arabic words that are
commonly used to identify her like “souhaqiyya” (lesbian), “shazzeh“ (deviant), and
“mistarjli” (mannish woman): “Lesbian is such an ugly word to me. It makes me
cringe – especially the French version that is more often used in Lebanon ‘lesbienne’
(with an elongated ‘ieeeen’)” (p.34). Part of the job of a lesbian community, she adds,
is to rethink these terms in Arabic and Lebanese, and to deconstruct the images
associated with them. “We do need to present the public with alternative words and
images. And it’s not just terms related to homosexuality. Think of the Arabic word
for vagina, for clitoris, for masturbation […] Arabic is our language too, and
languages are alive. People give meanings to words, and people can change the
meaning of words, or invent new words altogether, or simply refuse using offensive
words” (p.36).

The Politics of Visibility: The Uses of Anonymity
As I have stated earlier, the process of collective coming out as a
community through writing does not rest on the self-revelation of individuals.
Anonymous authorship is thus a critical feature of this feminist queer
counterpublic. Websites, blogs, social networking sites, and online magazines
allow public expression while maintaining a degree of individual anonymity
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and privacy. This ambiguous structure allows for degrees of publicness rather
than a public/private binary. Bekhsoos’s decision to publish the authors’
pseudonyms or first names only, Lynn explains, was motivated by a desire to
avoid internal hierarchies where people who would write using their full
names would be seen as more progressive or bold. One can choose to use
nicknames or full names as necessary; one can choose to be out on her
Facebook profile while maintaining higher levels of privacy in a more public
forum. Michael Warner (2002) writes, “the individual struggle with
publicness is transposed, as it were, to the conflict between modes of
publicness” (p.424). By allowing for “modes of publicness,” the internet was
an ideal space for expression for queer activists who want to circulate a new
discourse and address a bigger public but wish to avoid social stigma and its
ramifications.
This is not to suggest that the Internet is free from social control, a space
where culture is necessarily subverted. Representational visibility does not
automatically translate into power, and the Internet as a virtual space of sociality
replicates many of the structural inequalities of the non-digital world (Nguyen, 2001).
Indeed, while early representations of cyberspace denied sexual difference by
positing the Internet as a gender-neutral zone, a space where one is freed from the
constraints of identity, feminist scholars have demonstrated the limits of this utopian
vision of the possibility of physical disembodiment online. The work of Lisa
Nakamura (2000) and danah boyd (2012) among others has shown the resilience of
race, class, and gender as markers of identity online. More recently, the Gamergate
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controversy around the role and representation of and violence against women in
online gaming cultures exposed how gender difference operates within new media
technologies and digital platforms. But cyberspace, Dietrich (1997) writes, offers “the
potential for virtual communities, or ‘consensual loci,’ where women can join
voices/texts to articulate (and activate) issues pertinent to them (Stone, 1991). “In an
effort to reconstitute a feminist ‘subject’ in the context of postmodern
decenteredness,” she continues, this task becomes an effort both to inscribe textual
space and follow through with active (political) choice. In this instance, cyberspace
becomes a narrative space, a potential authoring site in an economy where textual
circulation can recover political agency” (p.180). Following Bukatman (1993),
Dietrich describes text, in this instance, as a tactic – a technology – that challenges
masculinist formations in cyberspace. Indeed, the limits of representational visibility,
and the shapes it take online, have been acknowledged by the creators of Bekhsoos.
In an article titled “Framing Visibility,” first delivered as Meem’s speech during the
International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) conference in Sao Paolo in 2010,
Lynn, the zine’s English editor, asks:
Had our visibility at Meem been constructed differently, had we tagged
our foreheads with the words ‘lesbian’, ‘queer’ or ‘transgender’ and went
on national TV shows and discussed our own sexualities and genders,
our own struggles, and we publically linked our first and last names to
our sexual identities, had we exposed our faces as ‘leaders of the LGBT
movement,’ would we have been able to be as effective in our
community and movement building as we have been so far? (2010)
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What Lynn proposes is a strategic flattening of the in/out binary that’s been
the subject of much queer theoretical writing. What Lynn suggests is a form of
visibility that is better-suited for local realities and in sync with a national context in
which “exposing faces” and publicly revealing first and last names either are not, or
cannot, be a priority or a desirable political objective. Lynn goes on to explain that
“There’s obviously an ambiguous space that comes with this kind of visibility,”
adding “we take that ambiguity, that space, to our advantage.” As Nina Wakeford
(2000) explains, cyberqueer spaces are “necessarily embedded within both
institutional and cultural practices, means by which the lesbian/gay/transgender/queer
self can be read into the politics of representation and activism confronting
homophobia” (Wakeford, p.408).
Indeed, anonymous publicity is one of the major affordances of digital
writing. Anonymity online, as Papacharissi (2002) has noted, assists one “to
overcome identity boundaries and communicate more freely and openly” (p.16). In
the case of stigmatized identities, this anonymity is often the only way that
stigmatized individuals can express themselves without facing social retribution. As
such, anonymity lowers the costs of participation in this public discourse. But,
Papacharissi cautions, “The same anonymity and absence of face-to- face interaction
that expands our freedom of expression online keeps us from assessing the impact
and social value of our words” (p.16). The anonymous expression of dissent does not
automatically translate into social change, and while new technologies offer new tools
for expression, these do not transform social norms or displace dominant cultural
logics.
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Identification, the choice or state of being recognized by individuals, society,
or the state as a particular kind of subject, is not a requirement of visibility.
Anonymity is a way to render the subject opaque to the regulatory gaze. The use of
pseudonyms in publications, the refusal to appear on television as the “leaders” of the
“LGBT movement,” are strategic choices, Lynn argues, that have allowed for
effective community and movement building. It is the desire for a sustainable
collectivity that guides and motivates a group like Meem. Visibility cannot come at
the expense of collectivity. Visibility, however, is essential for movement-building:
people need to recognize each other to come together. Visibility, according to
Meem’s logic, can be managed. It is not a question of being in or out. It is not a
binary, but a spectrum, and is about ways of being in public: how to make a
movement or a community present, recognizable, and therefore reachable while
taking into consideration the constraints of the political and social reality in which
this movement exists. In its reframing of visibility, Bekhsoos’s strategy is to be
visible while managing those constraints, and without necessarily being known. As I
discussed in chapter one, this visibility comes through what Jose Esteban Munoz calls
disidentificatory acts that occur in the public sphere. While talk show performances
constitute one example of such acts of disidentification from dominant norms through
a public avowal of sexual or gender deviance, writing in Bekhsoos constitutes another
example. In an Arabic post titled “Seen: Sou’al, Jeem: Sourakh” (Q: Question, A:
Screaming,” the writer attempts to answer frequently asked questions by his straight
acquaintances: “why do you have to keep talking about your sex life all the time?
Why do you have to tell everyone that you are a homosexual?” “I need the whole
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world to see me, because if I don’t speak, everyone will consider that I don’t exist or
that I desire the opposite sex (God forbid!)” (Gholam Abi Nawas, February 28,
2010).99 The writer must constantly speak of his queer sexuality, he insists, because it
is nowhere to be seen, whereas heterosexuality is everywhere: at his aunt’s house, on
the bus, in school, in movies and advertisements, at the dinner table, and on the street.
His speaking out takes the form of insistent disidentification from the heterosexual
norm that suspends the erasure of gender and sexual diversity from public view.
Doing so makes alternative desires, identities, and communities known and therefore
accessible to the uninitiated. As one writer explains, “it’s usually the most
marginalized that find their way to the group […] it’s been the young, the working
class, the isolated, the trans persons, the abused, the questioning that have been
sending that nervous and hopeful email to coordinator[at]meemgroup.org asking to
join Meem” (Lynn, May 22, 2012). The act of reaching out is fraught with anxiety yet
driven by the hope of finding someone to talk to.

Conclusion
In the editorial of the first issue of Barra (Out), Helem co-founder Ghassan
Makarem writes, “Homosexuals have a history that hasn’t been written, but it exists
in the folds of literature, art, poetry, and the human sciences […] homosexuals also
have a present that they have to historicize to illuminate the causes and effects of the
repression they are subject to” (Makarem, March 2005). Makarem uses the word
“ta’rikh” – meaning to historicize – to describe the function of the practices of
99
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inscription put forth by a magazine like Barra to record and document the existence
of minoritarian subjects whose lives have historically been erased from public
consciousness. Practices of inscription have been integral for the formation of a queer
counterpublic in Lebanon. From the early days of Internet chatrooms to the openly
queer print and digital publications of Meem, media has proven to be a vital for
community building and self-expression for those whose gender identities and sexual
desires are a source of shame and stigma. By writing about shame, the writers and
editors of Meem’s publications exposed the repression that gender and sexually-nonconforming individuals – and women in particular – are subjected to, opening up a
space to critique the patriarchal and heteronormative logics that repress their
flourishing in public. Whether it is restrictions around gender expression or the
unspeakability of same-sex desire, writing about the difficulties of navigating the
public/private divide that structures queer lives in contemporary Lebanon is a
defining feature of the anti-normative drive of a collective like Meem. The antinormative charge of Meem’s politics lies in the refusal to perpetuate the silence and
secrecy that shrouds bodies, desires, and intimacies that do not fit within prescribed
social norms. The movement from silence into speech, the act of speech and “talking
back,” as bell hooks (1989) reminds us, is a gesture of defiance for the oppressed
(p.9). This movement, hooks points out, makes “new life” and “new growth”
possible. As this chapter has demonstrated, writing, recording, and documenting
queer experience enabled experimentation with language and the creation and
circulation of new terminologies of sex and gender.
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Once we recognize the individual and collective labor of self-making that
members of Meem – and of the queer community more broadly – undertake to craft
viable subjectivities, Massad’s claim that the emergence of LGBT and queer
discourses in the region is the result of the Gay International’s unchallenged
imposition of foreign sexual categories and labels becomes tenuous. As Ritchie
(2010) has pointed out, “Globalization is a hierarchically structured process in which
certain ideas and discourses move, with greater force, in certain directions.”
However, he continues, “in dismissing self-identified Arab queers as essentially
inauthentic replicas of their Western counterparts, Massad overlooks their capacity to
act as conscious agents and risks ‘circumscrib[ing] the sorts of defensive and
offensive actions that might be taken,’ and in fact are taken, against the missionary
project of the Gay International” (p. 567). Ritchie’s work with Palestinian queer
activists demonstrates that, like their Lebanese counterparts, they do not un-selfconsciously heed Israeli “healing calls” (p. 569). Rather, the anti-homophobic and
anti-normative discourse they produce is mediated by their staunch anti-occupation
politics. Arab queers in Lebanon and Palestine are cognizant of the social terrain they
must navigate between a Western discourse that claims them as victims of their
cultures and a local discourse that rejects them as the brainwashed victims of
Western imperialism. They are aware of the cost of their visibility as it gets
highjacked by imperialist and reactionary politics. As Haneen Maikey, chair of AlQaws, explains, visibility does not figure into the organization’s goals (Ritchie, 2010,
p.569). This ambivalent relationship to visibility is echoed by Rauda Morcos, former
chair of Aswat, who explains that there are different kinds of visibilities, and that
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“Western and Israeli queer activists do not generally understand that their kind of
visibility ‘does not work for everyone’” (Ritchie, 2010, p.569).
Like Aswat and Al-Qaws, Meem’s ambivalent relationship to the politics of
visibility reveals the critical engagement of Arab queer collectives – which took
shape over the past decade – with Western LGBTQ politics. It is this critical
engagement that is made visible in the public writings of Meem. Visibility, then, is
less about the public declaration of a sexual identity. Rather, it is about using
language to articulate new subject-positions, making them available for recognition
and identification. This coming to writing, I argue, has defined the visibility of Meem
as a feminist queer counterpublic. As Cixous (1976) reminds us, women’s “writing is
precisely the very possibility of change, the space that can serve as the springboard
for subversive thought, the precursory movement of a transformation of social and
cultural structures” (p.879, italicized in original). Meem’s writing, and the practices
of translation and reading it enacts, together constitute a precursory movement of the
transformation of the social and cultural structures that govern sex and gender in
contemporary Lebanon. Meem transforms the social meaning of non-normativity by
converting the shame associated with queer bodies and desires into shame associated
with homophobic and sexist gazes and discourses. This displacement of shame,
through writing, is precursory inasmuch as it rejects the normative constraints of the
social order and conjures an alternative mode of being.
Media technologies are instrumental in this regard, as they open up previously
non-existent channels of communication, self-expression, and self-representation. As
Zakia Salime (2014) notes in her discussion of the politically-motivated self215

publication of nude portraits online by young Arab women during the Arab uprisings,
we can trace a new form of feminism that “prospers in the fluidity, connectivity, and
interwoven maps of cyberspace.100 Its cultural imaginaries are projected through the
production of images, sounds, and signs through cyberspace” (p.18-19). Meem’s
writings online can similarly be characterized as new forms of “microrebellions”
which, according to Salime, are less in tune with older forms of feminist mobilization
in the region which tended to prioritize the reform of state laws while marginalizing
the body and sexuality (p.16). Cyberspace thus allows for “moments of
counterpublicity” (Munõz, 1999) where women seize the representation of their own
bodies in textual and visual forms. And while a print anthology like Bareed can also
interpellate readers as queers, feminists, or both, the scope and speed of its circulation
is not comparable to that of a digital text or image. However, as Warner (2002) notes,
“no single text can create a public. Nor can a single voice, a single genre, even a
single medium. All are insufficient to create the kind of reflexivity that we call a
public, since a public is understood to be an ongoing space of encounter for
discourse” (p.420). Therefore, to understand the counterpublic that Meem’s texts call
into being, we must necessarily consider the different media through which Meem’s
feminist queer discourse circulates. “Texts themselves do not create publics, but the
concatenation of texts through time” (Warner, 2002, p.420). Meem’s digital and print
publications must be considered in tandem, for the power of their public address –
their ability to interpellate their readers as members of a counterpublic – lies in their
intertextual, citational, and cross-referential nature. In addition, if a public is the
100

Salime discusses nude protest actions by nineteen-year old Tunisian woman Amina Sboui and
twenty-one year old Egyptian woman Aliaa Magda Elmahdy in the context of the Arab uprisings.
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social space created by the reflexive circulation of discourse (Warner, 2002), then the
practices of reading and interpretation that these texts enable are also central to the
formation of this counterpublic. Meem’s writers and their readers both constitute
these publications as a precursory movement towards social change, because
“between the discourse that comes before and the discourse that comes after one must
postulate some kind of link. And the link has a social character; it is not mere
consecutiveness in time, but a context of interaction” (Warner, 2002, p.420). This
interactive social relation of a public is premised on an author/reader relation.
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CONCLUSION
The Afterlives of Counterpublics
“Good morning Adnan. Beirut is becoming beautiful again. Do you want to return?”
Wadad Halwani, August 29, 2015
In this dissertation, I examined the visibility of non-normative bodies and
desires in the media to probe the shifting boundaries of the public realm. I explored
visibility’s relationship to publicness, and how this relationship is shaped and
reshaped by media genres, platforms, and technologies that trouble the distinction
between “private” and “public,” that make the personal available for public
recognition and contestation. Through the analysis of voyeuristic television talk
shows, feminist films, and autobiographical digital and print publications, as well as
interviews with their producers, I argued that media representations are instrumental
for the collective imagination and contestation of what is normal gender behavior.
But they also constitute, through their circulation in discourse and their reception and
interpretation by differently-positioned audiences, a necessary node in the
constitution and expression of new publics that take gender and sexuality as orienting
vectors in their collective politics.
The media and cultural productions I have examined in this dissertation
publicize the personal and intimate symbolic and material violence endured by
women and sexual minorities. They circulate real and fictional accounts of the effects
of patriarchal, masculinist, and heteronormative social orders on vulnerable and
stigmatized bodies. They are therefore vital for the articulation of gender as a site of
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power and resistance, and of sexuality as a vector of regulation, surveillance, and
control. Whether they represent the multiplicity and variability of sexual desires and
gender roles, challenge the social normalization of gender-based violence and
discrimination, or reproduce the normative logics of appropriate gender behavior,
cultural representations make these questions available for public recognition and
contestation, thus creating the conditions of possibility for their social transformation.
The enactment of new and more just social relations is not possible without first
disturbing society’s “privilege of unknowing” (Sedgwick, 1988) the scope, nature,
and extent of the violence it harbors against non-normative subjects. The main
contention of this dissertation is that gender domination cannot be activated as a
question of social justice if the hierarchies of power that produce gender are to remain
enclosed within a secluded and private sphere of human action or explained away as
inherent cultural features of society. Visibility, in this regard, is a political necessity
for social change.
“Looking at someone who looks back at you is, in a sense, the beginning of all
society” (Brighenti, 2010, p.1). In his theorization of visibility as a concept for social
theory, Andrea Brighenti (2010) explains how media technologies transform
conditions of vision and practices and modulations of looking. The act of looking, as
he describes it, “prolongs in all sorts of different directions towards different
activities involving thought, awareness, understanding, appreciation, recognition,
talk, manipulation and control” (p.3). By transforming relations of looking, the media
become integral to account for changes in the social perception and recognition of
gender and sexual diversity. They constitute difference as a social problem, erode the
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neat distinction between the private and public realms, and interpellate publics and
counterpublics into being. The visible, thus, entails more than the sensorially
perceptible; it is “a field of inscription and projection of social action” (Brighenti,
2010, p.4). The mediated visibility of the abnormal thus reconfigures the boundaries
of public life, turning implicit, hidden, “private” practices into observable and audible
ones. And it is here that we must rethink visibility.
Visibility, as I have shown in this dissertation, is not the emergence of nonnormative subjects from an originary maw of darkness – a waving of rainbow flags in
the broad daylight of public life – but the articulation of new modes of social
intelligibility that enable these subjects to see and recognize themselves, to
themselves and others, as something other than figures of abjection to be fixed, saved,
or discarded. Reframed as such, visibility is the inscription of sexual and gender
diversity in culture, an assertion that other erotic desires, bodily comportments, and
forms of attachment are livable, desirable, and real. It is a refusal to succumb to
heteronormativity and the social structures and institutions through which it is
articulated in everyday life – in the oppression of women, the gender binary, the
nuclear family, reproductive sexuality, and conjugal domesticity. Visibility is the
necessary condition for the re-articulation of sex and gender beyond what Hall (1986)
has called the “magnetic lines of tendency” (p.54) of heterosexual definition. The
infrapolitical mode I identified across different media genres is a condition of
possibility for such a re-articulation to take place. Rather than assume a teleological
trajectory that reproduces the “coming out” narrative, whereby sexualities move from
darkness to light, from shame to pride, conceptualizing the infrapolitical allows us to
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account for the indeterminate social space between privacy and publicity that queer
people have cultivated and occupied, and sometimes even resisted. This
indeterminacy is reproduced and mirrored in the mode of representation of the nonnormative captured across the previous chapters.
Taking the television talk show as a site of social inquiry, chapter 1 examined
how this form of mediated talk, with its focus on televised self-disclosure, refracts
otherwise muted differences of class, sect, and gender in the national public sphere.
By analyzing the performance and discussion of sexual deviance as a matter of public
concern, I show how sexuality is deployed in the articulation of sectarian and
religious, but also secular and progressive social discourses. In the process, I
demonstrate how television represents a national public to itself through a spectacle
of democratic deliberation, but also how it shapes the visibility of stigmatized
subjects, simultaneously redrawing and challenging the boundaries of normalcy and
of the public sphere. In chapter 2, I examined the depiction of femininity and
womanhood in the work of filmmaker Nadine Labaki, including its local and
transnational reception, to tease out the norms that structure female subjectivity and
sexuality and their expression in private and public. In the process, I also traced the
place of gender – and of femininity in particular – in the construction of postwar
national identity. Finally, in chapter 3, I analyzed print and feminist queer
publications to demonstrate how language and technology allowed the public
expression

of

symbolically-marginal

and

socially-stigmatized

subjectivities,

providing a space for individual self-fashioning and affirmation, community-building,
and socio-political engagement. Together, these different cultural productions and the
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media platforms enabling their circulation constitute a locus for the study of the
visibility of non-normative gender roles and sexual desires and practices, and the role
of media in the transformation of the status of women and sexual minorities in public
life.
If the public sphere is a sphere of communication through visibility and
accessibility (Brighenti, 2010), being visible is a necessary condition to enter the
public domain, to exist socially. It is about who and what can appear in public and
under what conditions. In this regard, the dissertation showed how secrecy, reticence,
and anonymity are modes of visibility that make non-normative and stigmatized
bodies and experiences public. Whether it is the use of anonymizing techniques on
television talk shows, pseudonyms in the writings of the queer feminist collective
Meem, and rhetorical and visual reticence in the narrative films of Nadine Labaki,
cultural producers devise creative strategies to circulate controversial messages in
public. They evade censorship and social condemnation through techniques of
disguise, dissimulation, and masquerade that can be described, following James Scott
(1990),

as

infrapolitical.

Masks, pseudonyms,

and

metaphors

demand

a

reconceptualization of visibility as a spectrum rather than a binary, displaying as they
do the forbidden through fugitive gestures that allow the circulation of non-normative
subjectivities and experiences in public. Narratives of leading double lives on talk
shows and in Labaki’s Caramel (2007), of secret female conspiracy in Where Do We
Go Now? (2012), and the difficulties of proclaiming and inhabiting alternative gender
roles and sexual desires described in the publications of Meem, reveal how women
and queers bear the weight of social scrutiny, which forces them to navigate the
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boundary between their private and public lives very vigilantly. Shame is a
structuring force in this regard, mandating a code of secrecy around sociallyunacceptable behavior and routinizing practices of self-surveillance and censorship.
Whether it is Hannah Arendt’s (1958) definition of the public as the “space of
appearance” or Erving Goffman’s (1971) conceptualization of the public realm as an
arena for the intervisibility of actors, visibility’s relationship to publicity has long
been theorized by philosophers and sociologists. The public sphere, as Turkish
sociologist Nilufer Göle (2015) has argued, “does not initially appear as a democratic
space providing equal access of all citizens to a rational-critical debate on public
issues, but it emerges as a stage on which modernist patterns of conduct and living are
performed” (p.109). Commenting on the visibility of modern Islamic subjectivities in
conventionally secular public spheres, Göle explains that disputes over gendered
lifestyles and the regulation of social encounters between male and female citizens,
“far from being a trivial issue of individual choices or changing trends, define the
shrinkage or expansion of the boundaries of the public sphere, which in turn defines
the stakes of democracy” (p.116). Her observation on the moralization of the public
sphere through the prescription of appropriate gender behavior can be expanded to
include non-conforming expressions of masculinity and femininity. When regarded
as an appearance in public, visibility is both a burden and a necessity. A central claim
of this dissertation is that the appearance of alternative, non-normative life forms in
public is essential for social transformation. If masculine domination and the
injustices it engenders are to be challenged, the articulation and dissemination of new
discourses of gender and sexuality is necessary. Visibility, as the total sum of
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processes of mediation that shape how certain bodies and social experiences, deemed
abnormal, deviant, and shameful, come to be regarded, apprehended, and resisted as
such by members of a society. Investigating the visibility of the non-normative
therefore matters insofar as we recognize normativity as a social force that is integral
for the reproduction of the socio-political order. Thus, attributing transformations in
gender and sexual discourses, such as the rise of LGBT publics in postcolonial and
Global South societies, to the universalization of Western discourses of women and
gay rights (Abu Lughod, 2002; Massad, 2007) ignores the role of local cultural
politics in redefining gender norms and roles. This redefinition is predicated on
making marginal, dominated, and non-normative experiences visible, and therefore
knowable. My aim was to locate the different mediated spaces in which this process
of redefinition, or re-articulation, takes shape, and to show inconsistencies as well as
recurrent patterns therein. When searching for such moments of articulation, one
needs to look in unlikely places.
In the summer of 2015, tens of thousands of people took to the streets in
Beirut demanding the fall of the sectarian regime and an end to its structural
corruption. On July 17, 2015, the Lebanese government’s contract with Sukleen, the
company which has been granted exclusive rights for garbage collection in the
country since 1994, expired.101 At the same time, the country’s main landfill in the

The Sukleen contract with the Lebanese government has its origins in the postwar
reconstruction era of the 1990s, in what many consider a non-competitive bidding process.
Nevertheless, this contract had since been renewed several times, each time at a higher cost.
In July the government did not renew the contract on the grounds of excessive pricing and
failed to
101
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coastal town of Na’ameh, south of Beirut, was shut down under popular pressure
when locals blocked access to the dumping site to protest ecological damage and
health hazards. As a consequence trash collection services ceased, and garbage started
piling up on the streets of the capital and around the country. In the face of
government inaction on the matter, civil society initiatives sprung around what
became a full-blown “garbage crisis.” A group of activists created a campaign,
#YouStink, calling for protests in downtown Beirut against the government,
parliament, and the political ruling elite. On August 19, footage showing scenes of
police brutality against protestors during a demonstration facing the government
building in Beirut’s central commercial district went viral, inciting people to take to
the street in much larger numbers on August 22. Within a week, what started as a
protest campaign against the state’s failure to deal with the garbage crisis
metamorphosed into a protest movement, haraak, against the corrupt sectarian
postwar regime.102
Twenty-five years after the end of the civil war, people took to the streets to
hold political elites and the state institutions they control accountable for their

reach a consensus on a new one. For more about Sukleen and its relationship to the Lebanese
state, see Mohammad Zbeeb (August 27, 2012). “$5million a year: The tip of the Sukleen
waste pile.” Al-Akhbar. http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/11479
102 On August 23, teenagers from the most deprived urban areas of Dawra, Burj Hammoud,
Khandaq al-Ghami’, Sabra, Tariq Jdideh, and Shiyyah joined the demonstration. As the
protest movement’s demands expanded beyond the resolution of the garbage crisis, and as it
brought together different social classes around shared socio-economic grievances, the
government escalated its repressive tactics and erected a concrete wall, “the Wall of Shame”
as it was dubbed on social media, between protesters and the building of the Prime Ministry.
On the night of August 25, riot police chased protesters out of the downtown area, pulling
those fleeing the scene out of taxis, beating the injured, and arresting dozens in police stations
around the city. By August 28, at least seven recognized groups/collectives had emerged from
the protests.
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endemic failure to provide basic services such as water, electricity, waste
management, public transportation, and healthcare. In his account of the political
events that culminated in a movement against social injustice, Beirut-based journalist
Moe Ali Nayel (August 28, 2015) pointed out that it is important to look at the street
and the forces that reclaimed it to understand what is being referred to as an uprising.
“Many Lebanese at this particular moment,” he explains, “are breaking away from the
confines of their social-sectarian boxes.” At the core of this protest movement, he
notes, “is a mix of anger and vengeance by jobless, impoverished, socially-alienated
youth from different sects; LGBT individuals and activists who have been subject to
violence and harassment by a patriarchal state; a variety of grassroots leftist
movements; feminist activists and networks that have become increasingly active and
visible in recent years; young mothers and fathers who struggle to provide an
adequate life for their children.” Feminist and queer activists and collectives,
including members of Meem interviewed in chapter 3, have been involved in the
#YouStink mobilization since the beginning of street demonstrations in mid-July.
What transpired through these events – and the discourse produced about
them by new political collectives, the media, political parties, the government, civil
society activists, intellectuals, journalists, and observers – is a prolonged episode of
public contention around citizenship, as an identity, a right, and a practice, and its
relationship to social identity. Protests against the corruption of the ruling class, the
accumulating failures of the state, and the inefficiency of the sectarian system opened
up a physical and figurative space for the resignification of the political. The groups
and collectives that emerged through and crystallized around public protests are
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working to unsettle the deeply-entrenched sectarian and partisan lines of contention
that have defined Lebanese politics since the end of the civil war in 1990. By
reclaiming the street as a site of direct confrontation with the authorities and using
social media to create and circulate their counter-discourses, protestors have
demonstrated a commitment to call a politically disenchanted public into being.
Mobilizing around demands for social justice, beginning with the right to live in a
garbage-free society, they punctured the hegemony of religious sect as a politically
defining social cleavage and the master signifier of national difference. Through their
signs, chants, and online posts, they addressed “the poor,” “the sick,” “the
disenfranchised,”

“the

repressed,”

“the

unemployed,”

“the

women,”

“the

immigrants,” not the usual “Christian,” “Druze,” or “Muslim” publics interpellated by
the ruling political parties. Indeed, through their manifestation in public, protestors
turned the garbage crisis into a political event, the starting point of something else.
Ongoing street protests and police arrests have sustained the movement which is
accumulating enemies and doesn’t seem to be losing its momentum yet. The garbage
crisis, the invasion of public space by the waste materials of everyday life, called a
counterpublic into being. #YouStink is a public declaration of the failure of the state,
hashtagged to maximize networking, association, and visibility. In Arabic, tol’et
rihetkom captures the accumulative nature of stench, its eruption into the sensory
field. A key symbolic and metaphorical contribution of #YouStink, as Marwan
Kraidy (2016) has argued, “was to make this political rot hyper-visible by not only
investing into the symbolic capital of garbage, with its tropes of putrification, odor,
dirt, nausea, disease, corruption, but by insisting on a notion of citizenship grounded
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in a body politic imagined to be non-sectarian and subject to the rule of law” (p.22).
While it may have fell short from securing tangible victories at the policy level, the
movement articulated social justice as a cause for popular struggle, displacing
sectarian attachments as the basis of collective political identification in the public
sphere.103
Gender inequalities and injustices were visibly present in the protests, through
the banners and signs demanding rights for women, such as the abolition of the
exploitative sponsorship system that regulates the work of foreign domestic workers –
the majority of whom are women from Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, and the Philippines – and
a citizenship law granting Lebanese women the right to pass their nationality to their
non-Lebanese spouses and children. This was also evidenced in the movement’s
rhetoric and poetics, especially in the insistence on the use of the feminine – along
with the de facto masculine form – in the Arabic social media posts of the different
groups that have organized around the #YouStink campaign. Like most languages,
Arabic is a highly gendered one where the masculine form stands in for the universal
subject. The use of feminine pronouns and suffixes was therefore a deliberate move to
interrupt and question the masculinist hegemony over language and political
discourse. In addition, images of female protestors and journalists, on the frontlines of
confrontations with anti-riot police, were widely circulated in the media, igniting
commentaries on the status of women in public life. In a column in the pan-Arab
daily Asharq al-Awsat, Lebanese journalist Diana Mukalled (August 31, 2015) noted

Posts and discussions about Lebanese racism against Syrian and Palestinian refugees as
well as critiques of classist attitudes among progressive civil society activists were prominent
on social media.
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that “the transformation of the images of ordinary female protestors into a subject of
debate returns us to square one, to the normative view of woman and the historical
stereotyping of Lebanese women.” Mukalled, along with other journalists and
commentators, compared the relative freedom and safety of Lebanese female
protestors to the harassment, abuse, and rape that women endured in protests and
public spaces in Egypt and other Arab countries since the beginning of the uprisings.
In a post on the feminist website Sawt al-Niswa (The Voice of Women), Lamia
Mughnieh and Stephanie Gaspais (September 7, 2015) asks: “Is the Lebanese
woman’s ability to protest in the street without harassment or rape the most we can
ask for? Do we measure the ability to express and make demands through the number
of female bodies in the square?”
Feminist activists, journalists, and writers were quick to assume the task of
commentary and documentation. Sawt al-Niswa is a network and community of
feminist writers, activists and artists, “working towards changing their realities by
building a space that critically reflects on the social, political and intellectual
experiences of women living in the Arab region” (About, 2015). Members of Sawt
have been recording testimonies from female protestors about their participation in
the movement, posting audio broadcasts on their website and social media accounts
and encouraging women to share their frustrations and demands in shared digital
documents. 104 Sawt’s website also featured feminist critiques of protest goals and
tactics, such as the reliance on masculinist forms of political expression predicated on
the performance of violence (Al-Ammar, August 28, 2015). Should resistance to
104

https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1OpCtLb1WLFlUDzmb4tXc2RZh3Ql5Gb7ZHfZMfQlg
wnc/viewform
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masculinist authority only take the form of an insurgent counter-masculinity? Are
women supposed to remain silent in the face of slogans such as “we want to fuck this
whore state” in order protect the movement’s momentum? By recording and
documenting women’s experiences and perspectives about and within a political
realm that systematically excludes them, Sawt’s media initiatives constitute one more
instance of the publically-mediated disclosures compiled in this dissertation. Like the
media artifacts and performances discussed in previous chapters, such testimonies
interrupt the ordinariness of masculine domination by exposing its violence, silences,
and exclusions. In a public post on the Facebook page of the Leftist collective “#AlCha’ab Yourid” (The People Want), one of the main groups mobilizing protests,
feminist writer and activist Farah Olfat Kobeissy (September 1, 2015) shared her
testimony about a transphobic incident that occurred during a demonstration at the
Ministry of Environment, where protestors insulted two transgender women and
forced them to leave.

“I'm writing this to say that our struggle is not on one front.

It's not only against the ‘system’ but all the prevailing ideas that this system has
created. One of them is masculinity […]

we will continue to slander every sexist

chant and behavior because we want to build a real alternative to the system and new
social relations” (September 1, 2015). Kobeissy’s comment exposes the exclusionary
normativity that endures in progressive political discourse, but it also conjures an
oppositional “we” that should also struggle against the repressive force of
normativity. Among the consequences of conjoint action, John Dewey (1927) notes,
is the way in which it “forces men to reflect upon the connection itself; it makes it an
object of attention and interest. Each acts, in so far as the connection is known, in
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view of the connection” (p.24). Kobeissy’s intervention, in this digitally-mediated
space of protest, constitutes such a reflexive moment where the premises of
connection and its exclusionary logics are interrogated, but where this connection is
re-affirmed in her collective “we.” The expulsion of trans bodies from the public
space of politics does not go unnoticed. It is witnessed first-hand and re-interpreted as
a discriminatory move, and in the process of its circulation as event, articulates a
sense of collectivity not premised on the erasure of difference and a display of
sameness, but borne from a joint recognition of the bodies that matter and those that
don’t, and an insistence on social marginality as a subject-position that takes on many
forms. Digital media technologies and social networking sites allow the cultivation of
self-reflexive counterpublics where the marginal status of women and sexual
minorities, as subjects and citizens, is articulated as a political issue among digitallynetworked protestors and the audiences they address. 105 In their introduction to a
special issue on the relationship between social media practices and popular
contestation, Thomas Poell and Jose Van Dijck (2015) argue that public space is not
readily available for today’s citizens and activists, but is “conquered and constructed
through processes of emotional connectivity” (p.226). An important challenge for
researchers of contemporary activism, they explain, “is to trace the dynamic exchange
between social media communication and street protests, an exchange that very much
revolves around the channeling of emotions” (p.228). Thus, the authors speak of
“flashes of collectivity” which “do not provide the basis for the construction of stable
105

A group of protestors organized an open forum in Riad al-Solh Square in downtown
Beirut, the main location of protests, on August 28, 2015, about the relationship between
women’s rights and anti-government protests as well as the relationship of homosexuality and
gender to the sectarian system.
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social movements, but they do keep people emotionally invested in the protest event”
(p.228). “It is through the mass sharing of emotions that (temporary) public spaces
are constructed” (p. 228). Poell and Van Dijck describe these spaces as
“fundamentally transient” (p.228).
Protests activated existing yet amorphous networks of civil society activists,
journalists, union leaders, intellectuals, lawyers, and students who took to the internet
in their address to an imagined public. Members of that public recognized themselves
in digital iterations of a collective “we.” In a Facebook post published on her personal
page on the morning of August 29, 2015, Wadad Halwani, founder of the Committee
of the Families of the Kidnapped and the Disappeared, addressed her missing
husband, abducted from their home in Beirut in 1982. “Good morning Adnan. Beirut
is becoming beautiful again. Do you want to return?” As a counterpublic that
emerged and grew in response to the state’s failure to address the enduring injuries of
the civil war, the Committee – under the leadership of Halwani – had sustained the
memory of the war, now a distant event, into the present by relentlessly exposing the
state’s ongoing failure to address the crimes that resulted in the disappearance of
17,000 persons and the political demands of those who survive them. Halwani’s
intimate public address to her disappeared husband summons a dormant
counterpublic by insisting on its connection to a nascent one. Having participated in
the largest #YouStink demonstration on August 28 as a representative of the
Committee, Halwani shared her feeling of political optimism with her followers,
asking them and herself whether the struggle needed to be revived. Halwani’s post,
and the intimacy of the singular “you” in its address, is yet another instance of the
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politicization of personal trauma that has guided the Committee’s work since its
establishment. In its singularity, the “you” – the missing person – functions as a point
of access to a shared collectivity that feels and acts together, that recognizes the
structural nature of personal injustice and therefore the need to de-privatize it.
Halwani, too, was imagining a “we” upon which she can project her personal loss,
always with the purpose of politicizing it. Since its establishment in November 1982,
when hundreds of women responded to Halwani’s radio call for a street meeting that
turned into a demonstration, the Committee continuously disrupted public and official
silence about the war’s history and legacy through popular campaigns, press
conferences, newspaper op-eds, media appearances, and an open sit-in in downtown
Beirut. For Halwani, the present political moment seemed ripe to galvanize the long
struggle for the right to know the fate of the disappeared by integrating it with an
emergent movement for social justice and political accountability.
"The decisive element in every situation,” writes Gramsci (1971), “is the
permanently organized and long-prepared force which can be put into the field when
it is judged that a situation is favorable (and it can be favorable only in so far as such
a force exists, and is full of fighting spirit)" (p.185). For Gramsci, a situation is
favorable only insofar as there is an existing force that can interpret and capitalize on
conditions of favorability. This force, in its presence, transforms social reality. The
vocabulary it creates, in its process of self-articulation, transforms the way in which
this reality is apprehended. Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, where counter-hegemonic
projects can emerge as a threat to the dominant order, is about the possibility of
political agency. The force of which he speaks exists only insofar as it is organized,
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and organization is a long-term, collective project. Political opportunities do not
emerge from thin air. They often reveal themselves, gradually, through a slow and
extended process of accumulation, and are articulated as such by social actors who
transform the event into an opportunity for the resignification of the status quo. The
visibility of women as women in this emergent protest movement is the result of
social sedimentations that are irreducible to one cause. Cultural productions and the
collective processes of meaning-making they put in motion are integral for the
formation of a counter-hegemonic discourse. The anti-sectarian, anti-masculinist, and
anti-patriarchal rhetoric in the discourse of anti-government protests in the summer of
2015, and the clear articulation of gender as a vector of oppression and domination
therein, can only be understood in light of the social initiatives, campaigns,
collectives, and cultural productions that have politicized gender by making the
relations of domination governing it knowable as such.
Social campaigns for civil marriage, citizenship rights for women, the
criminalization of domestic violence against women, and the abolition of article 534
of the Lebanese criminal code which punishes sex against nature have all come under
attack from the state, the political elite, and religious institutions and met with official
disdain, hostility, and indifference. Social mobilization around gender and sexual
rights and personal status laws is seen as threatening to the sectarian socio-political
fabric of the country. Claims for personal and civil rights are undercut by a sectarian
religious discourse that has shaped the contours and cleavages of the country’s public
sphere since the end of the civil war in 1990. While the war was a protracted conflict
involving regional and international powers – including Syria, the Palestinian
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Liberation Organization, Israel, the USSR, and the United States to name a few – it
was primarily framed as a civil war between Muslims and Christians. This framing
necessitated and fuelled the production of an official postwar ideology of national
reconciliation and common living where religious sect constituted a primordial and
socially-fracturing identitarian difference. In this context, religion bears heavily on
the articulation of social difference around class and gender. The visibility of gender
and sexual differences and the constraints on their expression in public is therefore
structured by the moral imperatives put in place by the hegemony of religious sect as
a master signifier in the political, social, and cultural life of the postwar era.
While the increased social visibility of issues like domestic violence and gay
rights can be attributed to civil society campaigns and initiatives, it must be
understood in the context of a changing media landscape where all sorts of
boundaries – between the national and the transnational, the local and the global, the
private and the public – have been reconfigured. The leakage of the “private” into the
public realm, and the moral crises it engenders, expose the relations of domination
that constitute gender. The confessional talk show, feminist film, and queer
autobiographical writing examined in each chapter are genres that formally and
thematically challenge the public/private binary by making the effects of the violence
it conceals visible. Whether they do so for sensationalist or progressive purposes,
these representations reveal the structuring force of normativity in everyday life,
depicting its operation in intimate, familial, and public spaces. Televisual, filmic, and
digital media reflect dominant gender ideologies and the hierarchies subtending them,
but they also make the experiences of the dominated and marginalized visible in the
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public domain. The discourses they generate are socially and politically meaningful
insofar as they create counterpublic moments where subjects imagine and rehearse
alternative life forms and identities, ones whose effects outlive the ephemerality of
mediation.
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